45 resultados para Dennett


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A abordagem de Tomasello da evolução da cognição humana busca integrar processos biológicos, comportamentais e culturais em um mesmo sistema explicativo. No entanto, uma das principais críticas a essa abordagem é a necessidade de uma melhor elaboração do conceito de intencionalidade. O objetivo do presente trabalho foi: (1) analisar o tratamento de Tomasello do conceito de intencionalidade; e (2) estabelecer interlocuções desse tratamento com teorias da intencionalidade na filosofia da mente e com abordagens funcionalistas da cognição humana na psicologia comportamental. Sugerimos que o tratamento do conceito de intencionalidade na abordagem de Tomasello é compatível com essas teorias e abordagens. Além disso, a abordagem de Tomasello pode ampliar a investigação de processos simbólicos mais complexos do que aqueles tradicionalmente investigados pela psicologia comportamental.

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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

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Propomos, neste trabalho, que o conceito de intencionalidade é uma ferramenta relevante para a interpretação de repertórios simbólicos humanos. Analisamos como os conceitos de intencionalidade e de linguagem verbal são articulados na Teoria da Aquisição da Linguagem Baseada no Uso de Tomasello, na Teoria dos Atos Ilocucionários de Searle e na Teoria dos Sistemas Intencionais de Dennett, buscando identificar seu papel na determinação da cognição humana. Essas teorias propõem uma interdependência entre esses conceitos, os quais difeririam entre si quanto ao modo como se dá essa articulação. Elas também destacam a importância dos repertórios simbólicos, especialmente a linguagem verbal, para a cognição humana. Como a intencionalidade é um aspecto da cognição humana, uma conexão entre linguagem verbal e intencionalidade para o funcionamento cognitivo humano é uma questão a ser investigada na psicologia científica.

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Dennett (1981/1987b) caracteriza sua abordagem do funcionamento dos termos intencionais (aqueles para as assim chamadas atitudes proposicionais) como um "behaviorismo lógico holista", ou versão holista de delineamentos conceituais traçados por Ryle (1949). Este artigo avalia algumas de suas possíveis contribuições e desvantagens para tais delineamentos, e algumas consequências para sua proposta de utilização destes termos em psicologia. Argumenta-se que a abordagem não se mostra mais plausível do que a de seu predecessor, caso a dimensão mentalista que lhe acrescenta seja equivocada, e que de fato este é o caso. Disso resulta que suas contribuições e proposta correlata devem ser entendidas com independência daquilo que tal dimensão implica. Uma alternativa não-mentalista, baseada no modelo selecionista de Skinner, para uma eventual adoção dos termos intencionais em psicologia, é brevemente discutida.

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Design as seen from the designer's perspective is a series of amazing imaginative jumps or creative leaps. But design as seen by the design historian is a smooth progression or evolution of ideas that they seem self-evident and inevitable after the event. But the next step is anything but obvious for the artist/creator/inventor/designer stuck at that point just before the creative leap. They know where they have come from and have a general sense of where they are going, but often do not have a precise target or goal. This is why it is misleading to talk of design as a problem-solving activity - it is better defined as a problem-finding activity. This has been very frustrating for those trying to assist the design process with computer-based, problem-solving techniques. By the time the problem has been defined, it has been solved. Indeed the solution is often the very definition of the problem. Design must be creative-or it is mere imitation. But since this crucial creative leap seem inevitable after the event, the question must arise, can we find some way of searching the space ahead? Of course there are serious problems of knowing what we are looking for and the vastness of the search space. It may be better to discard altogether the term "searching" in the context of the design process: Conceptual analogies such as search, search spaces and fitness landscapes aim to elucidate the design process. However, the vastness of the multidimensional spaces involved make these analogies misguided and they thereby actually result in further confounding the issue. The term search becomes a misnomer since it has connotations that imply that it is possible to find what you are looking for. In such vast spaces the term search must be discarded. Thus, any attempt at searching for the highest peak in the fitness landscape as an optimal solution is also meaningless. Futhermore, even the very existence of a fitness landscape is fallacious. Although alternatives in the same region of the vast space can be compared to one another, distant alternatives will stem from radically different roots and will therefore not be comparable in any straightforward manner (Janssen 2000). Nevertheless we still have this tantalizing possibility that if a creative idea seems inevitable after the event, then somehow might the process be rserved? This may be as improbable as attempting to reverse time. A more helpful analogy is from nature, where it is generally assumed that the process of evolution is not long-term goal directed or teleological. Dennett points out a common minsunderstanding of Darwinism: the idea that evolution by natural selection is a procedure for producing human beings. Evolution can have produced humankind by an algorithmic process, without its being true that evolution is an algorithm for producing us. If we were to wind the tape of life back and run this algorithm again, the likelihood of "us" being created again is infinitesimally small (Gould 1989; Dennett 1995). But nevertheless Mother Nature has proved a remarkably successful, resourceful, and imaginative inventor generating a constant flow of incredible new design ideas to fire our imagination. Hence the current interest in the potential of the evolutionary paradigm in design. These evolutionary methods are frequently based on techniques such as the application of evolutionary algorithms that are usually thought of as search algorithms. It is necessary to abandon such connections with searching and see the evolutionary algorithm as a direct analogy with the evolutionary processes of nature. The process of natural selection can generate a wealth of alternative experiements, and the better ones survive. There is no one solution, there is no optimal solution, but there is continuous experiment. Nature is profligate with her prototyping and ruthless in her elimination of less successful experiments. Most importantly, nature has all the time in the world. As designers we cannot afford prototyping and ruthless experiment, nor can we operate on the time scale of the natural design process. Instead we can use the computer to compress space and time and to perform virtual prototyping and evaluation before committing ourselves to actual prototypes. This is the hypothesis underlying the evolutionary paradigm in design (1992, 1995).

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This paper explores how game authoring tools can teach processes that transform everyday places into engaging learning spaces. It discusses the motivation inherent in playing games and creating games for others, and how this stimulates an iterative process of creation and reflection and evokes a natural desire to engage in learning. The use of MiLK at the Adelaide Botanic Gardens is offered as a case in point. MiLK is an authoring tool that allows students and teachers to create and share SMS games for mobile phones. A group of South Australian high school students used MiLK to play a game, create their own games and play each other’s games during a day at the gardens. This paper details the learning processes involved in these activities and how the students, without prompting, reflected on their learning, conducted peer assessment, and engaged in a two-way discussion with their teacher about new technologies and their implications for learning. The paper concludes with a discussion of the needs and requirements of 21st century learners and how MiLK can support constructivist and connectivist teaching methods that engage learners and will produce an appropriately skilled future workforce.

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For decades psychoanalysis was the discipline studying the unconscious, and other branches of study lacked competence to take a stand on the issues concerning the unconscious. From 1980s onwards intense study of the unconscious has been taken place in the scope of cognitive orientation. Thus, nowadays it is talked about both pyschoanalytic and cognitive unconscious. The aim of this thesis is to integrate psychoanalytic and cognitive views. When the "Freudian" conception of the unconscious is considered, there are four entangled issues: 1) what is the unconscious like, 2) how does the unconsciuos give rise to psychic disorders 3) why and how certain contents are missing from consciousness (repression of contents), 4) the emergence of those contents (becoming conscious of the repressed). The conventional psychoanalytic answer to the first question - and "the cornerstone of psychoanalysis" - is "the unconscious is mental". The issues 2)-4) depend radically on the answer given to the 1): "psychoanalytic" conceptualizations on them rest on the "cornerstone". That ground was challended in study I: it was argued that it has never been clear what does it mean that the unconscious is mental. Thus, it was stated that in the current state of art psychoanalysis should drop out the ephitet "mental" before the term unconscious. That claim creates a pressure to reappraise the convential "psychoanalytic" answers to the other questions, and that reappraisal was the aim of studies II and III. In study II the question 2) is approached in terms of implicit knowledge. Study III focuses on mechanisms, which determine which contents appear in the scope of consciousness, and also cause missing of contents from there (the questions 3) and 4)). In the core of study III there are distinctions concerning the processess occuring in the levels of the brain, consciousness, self-consciousness, and narrative self-consciousness. Studies I-III set "psychoanalytic" topics in the frames of cognitive view. The picture emerging from those studies is not especially useful for a clinican (psychotherapist). Studies IV and V focused that issue. Study IV is a rather serious critique toward neuropsychoanalysis. In it it was claimed that repressive functions of conscious states are in the core of clinical psychoanalysis, and functions in general cannot be reduced to neurophysiological terminology. Thus, the limits of neuropsychoanalysis are more strict than it has been realized: crucial clinical issues remain outside its scope. In study V it was focused on the confusing state of things that although unconscious fantasies do not exist, the idea on them has been an important conceptual tool for clinicans. When put in a larger context, the aim of study V is similar to that of study IV: to determine the relation between psychotherapists' and neuroscientists' terminologies. Studies III, IV and V apply the philosopher Daniel Dennett's model on different levels of explanation.

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The juvenile sea squirt wanders through the sea searching for a suitable rock or hunk of coral to cling to and make its home for life. For this task it has a rudimentary nervous system. When it finds its spot and takes root, it doesn't need its brain any more so it eats it. It's rather like getting tenure. Daniel C. Dennett (from Consciousness Explained, 1991) The little sea squirt needs its brain for a task that is very simple and short. When the task is completed, the sea squirt starts a new life in a vegetative state, after having a nourishing meal. The little brain is more tightly structured than our massive primate brains. The number of neurons is exact, no leeway in neural proliferation is tolerated. Each neuroblast migrates exactly to the correct position, and only a certain number of connections with the right companions is allowed. In comparison, growth of a mammalian brain is a merry mess. The reason is obvious: Squirt brain needs to perform only a few, predictable functions, before becoming waste. The more mobile and complex mammals engage their brains in tasks requiring quick adaptation and plasticity in a constantly changing environment. Although the regulation of nervous system development varies between species, many regulatory elements remain the same. For example, all multicellular animals possess a collection of proteoglycans (PG); proteins with attached, complex sugar chains called glycosaminoglycans (GAG). In development, PGs participate in the organization of the animal body, like in the construction of parts of the nervous system. The PGs capture water with their GAG chains, forming a biochemically active gel at the surface of the cell, and in the extracellular matrix (ECM). In the nervous system, this gel traps inside it different molecules: growth factors and ECM-associated proteins. They regulate the proliferation of neural stem cells (NSC), guide the migration of neurons, and coordinate the formation of neuronal connections. In this work I have followed the role of two molecules contributing to the complexity of mammalian brain development. N-syndecan is a transmembrane heparan sulfate proteoglycan (HSPG) with cell signaling functions. Heparin-binding growth-associated molecule (HB-GAM) is an ECM-associated protein with high expression in the perinatal nervous system, and high affinity to HS and heparin. N-syndecan is a receptor for several growth factors and for HB-GAM. HB-GAM induces specific signaling via N-syndecan, activating c-Src, calcium/calmodulin-dependent serine protein kinase (CASK) and cortactin. By studying the gene knockouts of HB-GAM and N-syndecan in mice, I have found that HB-GAM and N-syndecan are involved as a receptor-ligand-pair in neural migration and differentiation. HB-GAM competes with the growth factors fibriblast growth factor (FGF)-2 and heparin-binding epidermal growth factor (HB-EGF) in HS-binding, causing NSCs to stop proliferation and to differentiate, and affects HB-EGF-induced EGF receptor (EGFR) signaling in neural cells during migration. N-syndecan signaling affects the motility of young neurons, by boosting EGFR-mediated cell migration. In addition, these two receptors form a complex at the surface of the neurons, probably creating a motility-regulating structure.

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Faz reflexões sobre as várias formas de relação entre sujeitos e objetos-técnicos, com ênfase para a utilização dos computadores digitais e, particularmente, os softwares chamados agentes inteligentes. Analisa o espaço e suas mudanças qualitativas na atualidade, a partir do conceito do espaço como produção humana, analisando como as transformações em curso no ambiente afetam nossas subjetividades e, reciprocamente, como afetamos nossos ambientes. Discutidas as possibilidades de sobrevivência do homem nu nesses novos espaços, sem que esteja devidamente atualizado com as últimas novidades tecnológicas - próteses sensoriais e motoras. Perpassa a discussão sobre o pensamento que se utiliza do espaço como elemento constituinte do próprio pensamento e reflete sobre o espaço abstrato por excelência, os mundos virtuais. Discute o padrão de apropriação de artefatos pelo homem e seus efeitos na subjetividade, a manutenção do padrão de apropriação dos objetos-técnicos materiais em relação às formas de apropriação dos objetos-técnicos intangíveis (softwares). Traz reflexões sobre a possibilidade de autonomização completa dos agentes inteligentes e a sua instituição, ipso facto, como agentes - a chamada Inteligência Artificial.

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Investigou-se pelo presente estudo se a concepção presente na Teoria de Replicadores, expressa através do conceito de meme (DAWKINS, 1979), poderia ser um modelo compatível para explicar a propagação de memes no substrato das mídias sociais. No âmbito dos estudos locais, Recuero (2006) sugeriu uma transdução desse modelo, baseando-se nas concepções de Dawkins (1979). Refletindo sobre o posicionamento epistemológico de Recuero (2006), o presente trabalho, baseando-se em Dennett (1995), Blackmore (2002) e Tyler (2011b; 2013b), procedeu às instâncias de Análise Conceitual e Composicional dessa transdução. A partir do conceito de memeplexo (BLACKMORE, 2002), esta pesquisa de base linguística (HALLIDAY, 1987) entende os memes, no substrato das mídias digitais/sociais, como práticas de produção e distribuição linguístico-midiáticas, propaladas a partir de diversas unidades de propagação e das relações criadas pelos internautas nesse processo de transmissão. Investigando tais relações, a partir da instância de Análise Relacional, propõe-se examinar duas unidades de propagação. Expressões meméticas (Que deselegante e #Tenso) e imagens meméticas (oriundas do fenômeno memético Nana em desastres). Integram este estudo dois corpora de expressões meméticas (5275 postagens oriundas ou redirecionadas para o Twitter.com total de 83.655 palavras/tokens) e um corpus bilíngue (Português/Inglês) de imagens meméticas (um total de 134 imagens oriundas do Tumblr.com e Facebook.com). Para analisar os corpora de expressões meméticas utilizou-se a metodologia de Linguística de Corpus (BERBER-SARDINHA, 2004; SHEPHERD, 2009; SOUZA JÚNIOR, 2012, 2013b, 2013c). Para a análise do corpus multimodal de imagens meméticas, utilizou-se a metodologia que chamamos de Análise Propagatória. Objetivamos verificar se essas unidades de propagação e as práticas linguístico-midiáticas que estas transmitem, evoluiriam somente devido a aspectos memético-midiáticos, conforme Recuero (2006) apontara, e com padrão de propagação internalista (DAWKINS, 1979; 1982). Após análise dos dados, revelou-se que, ao nível do propósito, os fenômenos locais investigados não evoluíram por padrão internalista (ou homogêneo) de propagação. Tais padrões revelam ser de natureza externalista (ou heterogênea). Ademais, constatou-se que princípios constitutivos meméticos de evolução como os de fecundidade, longevidade (DAWKINS 1979; 1982) e o de design (DENNETT, 1995), junto com o princípio midiático de evolução de alcance (RECUERO, 2006) mantiveram-se presentes com alto grau de influencia nas propagações de natureza externalista. Por outro lado, o princípio memético da fidelidade (DAWKINS, 1979; 1982) foi o que menos influenciou esses padrões de propagação. Neutralizando a fidelidade, e impulsionados pelo princípio de design, destacaram-se nesse processo evolutivo os princípios linguísticos sistematizadores revelados por este estudo. Isto é: o princípio da funcionalidade (memes evoluem porque podem indicar propósitos diferentes) e o princípio do alcance linguístico (memes podem ser direcionados a itens animados/ inanimados; para internautas em idioma nativo/ estrangeiro)

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Revisión del problema de la filosofía de la Inteligencia Artificial a la vista del Equilibrio refractivo. La revisión del problema se lleva a cabo para mostrar como "¿pueden pensar las máquinas?" sólo se ha evaluado en los terminos humanos. El equilibrio refractivo se plantea como una herramienta para definir conceptos de tal modo que la experiencia y los preceptos se encuentren en equilibrio, para con él construir una definición de pensar que no esté limitada exclusivamente a "pensar tal y como lo hacen los humanos".

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La conciencia, sus diversos estados y las propiedades específicas de estado han sido materia de indagación en prácticamente todas las culturas. Como producto de ello, se han generado multiplicidad de perspectivas sobre el valor de estos estados de conciencia y sobre los modos adecuados de producirlos y utilizarlos. A éstos últimos se les conoce como prácticas de transformación o tecnologías de la conciencia. En el presente trabajo, luego de presentar las posturas contemporáneas básicas utilizadas para el estudio de la conciencia, se revisan las concepciones que sobre ella surgen desde la psicología transpersonal y en el budismo mahayana. Le sigue la presentación del concepto de estados y estados alterados de conciencia en la psicoterapia. Tras discutir la noción de prácticas de transformación de la conciencia se concluye con una presentación más detallada de la meditación y la oración como ejemplos de tecnologías de conciencia utilizadas como medio de sanación y de crecimiento personal.