The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionalities: economics or politics?

Conditionalites, measures that a borrowing country should adopt to obtain loans from the IMF, are pervasive in IMF programs. This paper estimates the effects of political and economic factors on the number of conditionalities and on the fiscal adjustment requested by the IMF. As found in the literature, political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders has an important effect on the number of conditions in an agreement. However, the fiscal adjusment requested by the IMF is strongly affected by the size of a country’s fiscal deficit but not by political proximity. We also find a very small correlation between the number of conditions and the fiscal adjustment requested by the IMF

A procura de gasolina em Portugal no período 1960-2008 : cálculo das elasticidades de curto e longo prazo

Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciências Empresariais.

Minsky on "Big Government"

This paper objective is to assess, in light of the main works of Minsky, his view and analysis of what he called the "Big Government" as that huge institution which, in parallels with the "Big Bank" was capable of ensuring stability in the capitalist system and regulate its inherently unstable financial system in mid-20th century. In this work, we analyze how Minsky proposes an active role for the government in a complex economic system flawed by financial instability.

Políticas económicas anti cíclicas en América Latina

Uno de los principales fenómenos a los que está sometida una economía es la existencia de ciclos económicos. Las fluctuaciones económicas, medidas principalmente a través del producto interno bruto, han sido una de las preocupaciones centrales de la macroeconomía moderna. Si bien los ciclos no son iguales en todos los países y momentos, sí tienen en común importantes características generales que los convierten en materia de estudio sistemático. A lo largo de este trabajo se exponen las distintas medidas de políticas económicas aplicadas en las tres décadas analizadas, así como las circunstancias bajo las cuales se tomaron las mismas y los ciclos económicos que han tenido lugar. Las políticas económicas que los países han aplicado para disminuir las fluctuaciones bruscas de los ciclos económicos han sido muy variadas a lo largo de los años, y entre los países,no siempre han tenido el carácter anti cíclico necesario.

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 : report of the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives to accompany H.R. 4241, a bill to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 201(a) of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2006 together with minority, additional and dissenting views.

"November 7, 2005."

O crime de fraude fiscal: o impacto na receita pública do Estado

Orientador: Doutor, José Domingos Silva Fernandes

Fiscal multipliers in Portugal using a threshold approach

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Would Fiscal Authorities in the EMU prefer to coordinate?

This article studies whether fiscal authorities would prefer to operate like in the current EMU or to coordinate according to the theoretical literature. The EMU approach will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits, but the SGP deficit target will be breached less often. Keywords: fiscal policy coordination, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.