Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Collateral or utility penalties ?

In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.

The appropriateness of default investment options in defined contribution plans : Australian evidence

For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the participant’s wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth.

Don’t judge a superannuation default investment option by its name

With the massive decline in savings arising from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it is timely to review superannuation fund investment and disclosure strategies in the lead-up to the crisis. Accordingly, this study examines differences among superannuation funds’ default investment options in terms of naming and framing over three years from 2005 to 2007, as presented in product disclosure statements (PDSs). The findings indicate that default options are becoming more alike regardless of their name, and consequently, members may face increasing difficulties in distinguishing between balanced and growth-named default options when comparing them across superannuation funds. Comparability is also likely to be constrained by variations in the framing of default options presented in investment option menus in PDSs. These findings highlight the need for standardisation of default option definitions and disclosures to ensure descriptive accuracy, transparency and comparability.

Default judgment set aside without costs

A recent District Court case is believed to be the first in Queensland in which UCPR r 5 has been used to support the setting aside of a regularly entered default judgment without a costs order.

Default, deadlock and remedies

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of common default provisions and the range of common law and equitable remedies available to a joint venture partner in the event of default by a co-venturer. Because of the various joint venture vehicles such as trusts, corporations, partnerships and others, it is proposed to deal only generally with these questions.

Setting aside default judgment - whether judgment regularly or irregularly entered - service under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s109X(1) - requirements for affadavit of service

In Hill v Robertson Suspension Systems Pty Ltd [2009] QDC 165 McGill DCJ considered the procedural requirements for the service of originating process on a company, and for proving that service for the purpose of obtaining default judgment.The judge’s views adopt a strict and technical construction of the requirements for an affidavit of service under r 120(1)(b). Though clearly obiter, they may well affect the approach taken on applications to enter or set aside default judgments in the lower courts. Pending further judicial consideration of the issue, it is suggested the prudent course is to ensure that the deponent of an affidavit for service effected under s 109X(1)(a) of the Act deposes not only to the location of the registered office of the company but also, at a minimum, provides the source of that information.

Form prevailing over substance?

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Kellas-Sharpe v PSAL Ltd [2012] QCA 371 considered a not unusual provision in a loan agreement, being a provision whereby a lender agrees to accept a lower or concessional rate of interest in circumstances of prompt payment by the borrower. The loan agreement in question provided for the borrower to pay a standard rate of interest of 7.5% per month. However, if the borrower was not in default, the lender agreed to accept interest at a concessional rate of interest of 4% per month. The issue for determination by the Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Gotterson JA and Fryberg J) was whether the clause was subject to the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties, and, if so, if the interest rate provision should be treated as a penalty making the interest rate provision void. In mounting this argument, the borrower was seeking to overturn a long line of authority which has repeatedly upheld the semantic distinction between an increase in the rate of interest (which attracts the doctrine concerning penalties) and an incentive to the borrower by way of a reduction in the interest rate for prompt payment (which does not attract the doctrine)...

Asset allocation policy, returns and expenses of superannuation funds : recent evidence based on default options

We examine the asset allocation, returns, and expenses of superannuation funds whose assets are mainly invested in default investment options between 2004 and 2012. A majority of these funds fail to earn returns commensurate with their strategic asset allocation policy. It appears that much of the variation of returns between the funds might be a result of their engaging in significant active management of assets. Our results indicate that returns from active management are negatively related to expenses. We also find strong evidence of economies of scale existing in these superannuation funds across different size categories.