Policies for decentralization and development of health education

How the policy of action and professional standards have influenced the development and decentralization of health education is discussed. It is concluded that a review of policies both of developing as well as of developed countries could help to put some observations into a perspective that is closer to the Brazilian reality.

Health financing changes in the context of health care decentralization: the case of three Latin American countries

OBJECTIVE: The results of an evaluative longitudinal study, which identified the effects of health care decentralization on health financing in Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru are presented in this article. METHODS: The methodology had two main phases. In the first, secondary sources of data and documents were analyzed with the following variables: type of decentralization implemented, source of financing, funds for financing, providers, final use of resources, mechanisms for resource allocation. In the second phase, primary data were collected by a survey of key personnel in the health sector. RESULTS: Results of the comparative analysis are presented, showing the changes implemented in the three countries, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each country in matters of financing and decentralization. CONCLUSIONS: The main financing changes implemented and quantitative trends with respect to the five financing indicators are presented as a methodological tool to implement corrections and adjustments in health financing.

Effects of health decentralization, financing and governance in Mexico

OBJECTIVE: To identify the effects of decentralization on health financing and governance policies in Mexico from the perspective of users and providers. METHODS: A cross-sectional study was carried out in four states that were selected according to geopolitical and administrative criteria. Four indicators were assessed: changes and effects on governance, financing sources and funds, the final destination of resources, and fund allocation mechanisms. Data collection was performed using in-depth interviews with health system key personnel and community leaders, consensus techniques and document analyses. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed by thematic segmentation. RESULTS: The results show different effectiveness levels for the four states regarding changes in financing policies and community participation. Effects on health financing after decentralization were identified in each state, including: greater participation of municipal and state governments in health expenditure, increased financial participation of households, greater community participation in low-income states, duality and confusion in the new mechanisms for coordination among the three government levels, absence of an accountability system, lack of human resources and technical skills to implement, monitor and evaluate changes in financing. CONCLUSIONS: In general, positive and negative effects of decentralization on health financing and governance were identified. The effects mentioned by health service providers and users were related to a diversification of financing sources, a greater margin for decisions around the use and final destination of financial resources and normative development for the use of resources. At the community level, direct financial contributions were mentioned, as well as in-kind contributions, particularly in the form of community work.

Cultural organizations and communication in portuguese decentralization policy

This paper intends to show the Portuguese municipalities’ commitment, since the first decade of this century, in cultural facilities of municipal management and how it provided 12 of the 18 district capitals of mainland Portugal with cultural equipment, but after all we want to know if this effort resulted in a regular, diverse, and innovative schedule. Investing in urban regeneration, local governments have tried to convert cities’ demographic changes (strengthening of the most educated and professionally qualified groups) in effective cultural demands that consolidate the three axes of development competitiveness-innovation-creativity. What the empirical study to the programming and communication proposals of those equipment shows is that it is not enough to provide cities with facilities; to escape to a utilitarian conception of culture, there is a whole work to be done so that such equipment be experienced and felt as new public sphere. Equipment in which proposals go through a fluid bind, constructed through space and discourse with local community, devoted a diversified and innovative bet full filling development axis. This paper presents in a systematic way what contributes to this binding on the analyzed equipment.

Cultural organizations and communication in portuguese decentralization policy

This presentation intends to show to what extent the Portuguese municipalities’ commitment, from the first decade of this century, in cultural facilities of municipal management and which has provided 12 of the 18 district capitals of mainland Portugal with equipment, resulted in a regular, diverse and innovative schedule. Investing in urban regeneration, local government has tried to convert cities’ demographic changes (strengthening of the most educated and professionally qualified groups) in effective cultural demands that consolidate the three axes of development competitiveness-innovation-creativity. What the empirical study to the programming and communication proposals of those equipment shows is that it is not enough to provide cities with facilities; to escape to a utilitarian conception of culture, there is a whole work to be done so that such equipment be experienced and felt as new public sphere. Equipment in which proposals go through a fluid bind, constructed through space and discourse with local community, devotes a diversified and innovative bet full filling development axis. This paper presents in a systematic way what contributes to this binding on the analyzed equipment.

A comparative study between centralization and decentralization of diagnostic reasoning in EPS

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa de Lisboa para obtenção do grau de mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Decentralization and privatization in Portuguese health reforms

ABSTRACT - The Portuguese National Health Service (SNS), a universal, centralized and public owned health care system, exhibits an extraordinary record of equalization in the access to health care and health gains in the late thirty years. However, the most recent history of the Portuguese health reform is pervaded by the influence of decentralization and privatization. Decentralization has been present in the system design since the 1976 Constitution, at least in theory. Private ownership of health care suppliers and out-ofpocket expenditures, on the financing side, both have a long tradition of relevance in the NHS mix of services. The initial aim of this study was to demonstrate expected parallelism between health reforms and public administration reforms, where a common pattern of joint decentralization and privatization was observed in many countries. Observers would be tempted to consider these two movements as common signs of new public management (NPM) developments. They have common objectives, are established around the core concepts of gains in effectiveness, efficiency, equity and quality of public services, through improved accountability. However, in practice, in Portugal, each movement was developed in a totally separated way. Besides those rooted in the NPM theory, there are few visible signs of association between decentralization and privatization. Decentralization, in the Portuguese SNS, was never intended to be followed by a privatization movement; it was seen merely as a public administration tool. Private management of health services, as stated in the most recent SNS legislation, was never intended to have decentralization as a condition or as a consequence. Paradoxically, in the Portuguese context, it has led invariably to centralized control. While presented as separate instruments for a common purpose, the association between decentralization and privatization still lacks a convincing demonstration. Many common health care management stereotypes remain to be checked out if we want to look for eventual associations between these two organizational tools.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Lessons of peace in Aceh: administrative decentralization and political freedom as a strategy of pacification in Aceh

This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.

Decentralization, happiness and the perception of institutions

This paper analyses whether the different powers and resources at the disposal of local and regional governments across Europe deliver greater satisfaction with political institutions and lead to greater personal happiness. The analysis uses microdata from the four available waves of the European social survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008), including more than 160,000 observations of individuals living in 29 European countries. Our results reveal that political and fiscal decentralization have a positive and significant effect on individuals’ overall happiness. Fiscal decentralization also exerts a significant effect on the level of satisfaction with political and economic institutions and with the education and health systems, whereas the effect of political decentralization on these variables is more limited. The results show that citizens seem to be happier with the actual capacity of their local governments to deliver than with the general principle that they can have a say on their daily politics and policies. Keywords: Happiness, well-being, satisfaction, fiscal and political decentralization, Europe. JEL codes: H11, H77

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

Corruption and decentralization : what economists have to say about it

This paper deals with both theoretical and empirical aspects of the link between corruption and decentralization in both developing and emerging countries. Only mixed results can be drawn from the literature. Decentralization can help discipline "predative" governments, but only under certain conditions. Indeed, it depends on fiscal arrangements and political features that are likely to be different between countries. The way incentives to local governments are designed by the central governments also plays an essential role.