Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal?

We model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity premium, sustainability, and service smoothing. We use a dynamic-equilibrium model with tax distortions and government outlays uncertainty, and model maturity as the fraction of debt that needs to be rolled over every period. In the model, the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. We then calibrate our artificial economy and solve for the optimal debt maturity for Brazil as an example of a developing country and the US as an example of a mature economy. We obtain that the calibrated costs from defaulting on long-term debt more than offset costs associated with short-term debt. Therefore, short-term debt implies higher welfare levels.

Debt maturity determinants in Brazil: evidence from private and public corporate borrowings

This study provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil. We built a unique database that includes privately placed debt and public debt for 308 publicly traded, non-financial Brazilian companies, from 2009 to 2013. We perform GMM panel analyses using as dependent variables the amount of long-term debt payable in more than one, three, and five years for total debt, BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) debt and corporate bonds. The results show that the BNDES finances less risky firms, i.e., those that are larger, older, more tangible and more transparent. We also find support for information asymmetry theories, as companies with higher transparency levels have similar leverage levels relative to others but higher proportions of long-term debt in their capital structures. Regarding debt levels, we find that more levered companies are larger, less profitable, more tangible and have fewer growth opportunities. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil that uses various specifications of long-term debt and that examines different types of debt.

Debt management in Brazil: evaluation of the Real Plan and challenges ahead

The Brazilian domestic debt has posed two challenges to policy-makers: it has grown very fast and its maturity is extremely short. This has prompted fears that a default or a compulsory lengthening scheme would be imposed. Here, we analyse the domestic public debt management experience in Brazil, searching for policy prescriptions for the next few years. After briefiy reviewing the recent domestic public debt history, we decompose the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-2000, searching for its macroeconomic causes. The main culprits are the extremely high interest payments-which, unti11998, were caused by the weak fiscal stance and the quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime; and since 1999, by the impact ofthe currency depreciation On the dollar-indexed and the externai debt-, and the accumulation of assets of doubtful value, much of which may have to be written off in the future. Simulation exercises of the net debt path for the near future underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to prevent the debt-GDP ratio from growing further. Given the need to quickly lengthen the debt maturity, our main policy advice is to foster, and rely more on, infiation-linked bonds.

Joint Leverage and Maturity Choices in Real Estate Firms: The Role of the REIT Status

We explore the interdependence of leverage and debt maturity choices in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and unregulated listed real estate investment companies in the U.S. for the period 1973-2011. We find that the leverage and maturity choices of all listed real estate firms are interdependent, but in contrast to industrial firms, they are not made simultaneously. Across the different types of real estate firms considered, we find substantial differences in the nature of the relationship between leverage and maturity. Leverage determines maturity in non-REITs, whereas maturity is a determinant of leverage in REITs. We suggest that the observed differences reflect the effects of the REIT regulation, rather than solely being a function of real estate as the underlying asset class. We also present novel evidence that the relationship between leverage and maturity in both firm types can be used to moderate the effects of other exogenous financing policies.

Fatores determinantes da maturidade e composição da dívida das empresas portuguesas cotadas

Mestrado em Contabilidade e análise financeira

The financial leverage of large Portuguese Firms in the European context

The Financial Leverage of Large Portuguese Firms in the European Context This paper studies the leverage, cost of debt servicing ability and structure of debt maturity of large Portuguese firms, over the pre-crisis (2006-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2013) periods through a comparative analysis with other European peers. We document that large Portuguese firms have been reducing their leverage since the end of 2009. We find that this decrease in leverage is not a consequence higher Equity levels but rather a result of asset’s downsizing. We also document that Portuguese firms are still more leveraged than their European peers, even though this difference has decreased over time. High corporate debt levels are transversal across industries.

Impacto do IOF sobre composição de dívida e investimento das empresas brasileiras

Este trabalho investiga como os controles de capitais praticados no Brasil através da imposição do Imposto sobre Operações Financeiras (IOF) sobre empréstimos externos em 2011 e 2012 afetaram decisões em âmbito financeiro empresarial. As principais questões abordadas são: As empresas brasileiras com financiamento de curto prazo em moeda estrangeira investiram menos após a imposição do IOF sobre empréstimo externo? Elas alongaram suas dívidas em moeda estrangeira, ou seja, mudaram a composição, mas não o total de dívida? Elas reduziram a dívida externa total, aumentando a dívida doméstica? Para responder a essas perguntas, foi adotado o método de diferenças-em-diferenças. Os resultados encontrados sustentam que as empresas brasileiras que tinham passivos externos de curto prazo antes da adoção do IOF não diminuíram seus investimentos significativamente mais do que as empresas que não foram diretamente afetadas por tal medida de controle, nem alteraram mais a proporção de endividamento externo sobre dívida total. Não obstante, os resultados apontam para um maior alongamento das dívidas em moeda estrangeira.

Capital markets and the market structure of foreign investments

Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct ownership. Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital component of the multinational’s competitive market structure. Moreover, multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets. They can also mitigate higher levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial risk to creditors in the host economy. Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their equity to foreign market risk. Multinationals can modify the profit maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 countries.We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by modifying their capital structure and debt maturity. Further, we show how the operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or profit maximization. We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good asset utilization.

On the Capital Structure of Real Estate Firms

The leverage and debt maturity choices of real estate companies are interdependent, and are not made separately as is often assumed in the literature. We use three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression analysis to explore this interdependence for a sample of listed U.S. real estate companies and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) traded between 1973 and 2006.We find substantial differences in the nature of the relationship between leverage and maturity for the two firm types. Leverage is a determinant of maturity for non-REITs, whereas maturity is a determinant of leverage for REITs. We also find that the drivers of capital structure choices in real estate companies and REITs clearly reflect the effects of the REIT regulation.

REIT Capital Structure Choices: Preparation Matters

Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015) find that capital structure risks, namely high leverage and a high share of short-term debt, reduced the cumulative total return of US REITs in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We find that mitigating capital structure risks ahead of the crisis by reducing leverage and extending debt maturity in 2006, was associated with a significantly higher cumulative total return 2007-2009, after controlling for the levels of those variables at the start of the financial crisis. We further identify two systematic cross-sectional differences between those REITs that reduced capital structure risks prior to the financial crisis and those that did not: the exposure to capital structure risks and the strength of corporate governance. On balance, our findings are consistent with the interpretation of risk-reducing adjustments to capital structure ahead of the crisis as a component of managerial skill and discipline with significant implications for firm value during the crisis.

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

"Published online: 19 Oct 2015"

Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender’s claim in the hierarchy of debt of a firm, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through different channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.

In Search of a theory of debt management

A growing literature integrates theories of debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising theory argues that the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in the market value of debt offset changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management is valid even when the government only issues non-contingent bonds. A number of authors conclude from this approach that governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. We argue that the conclusions of this approach are too fragile to serve as a basis for policy recommendations. This is because bonds at different maturities have highly correlated returns, causing the determination of the optimal portfolio to be ill-conditioned. To make this point concrete we examine the implications of this approach to debt management in various models, both analytically and using numerical methods calibrated to the US economy. We find the complete market approach recommends asset positions which are huge multiples of GDP. Introducing persistent shocks or capital accumulation only worsens this problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates through habits partly reduces the size of these simulations we find no presumption that governments should issue long term debt ? policy recommendations can be easily reversed through small perturbations in the specification of shocks or small variations in the maturity of bonds issued. We further extend the literature by removing the assumption that governments every period costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt. This exacerbates the size of the required positions, worsens their volatility and in some cases produces instability in debt holdings. We conclude that it is very difficult to insulate fiscal policy from shocks by using the complete markets approach to debt management. Given the limited variability of the yield curve using maturities is a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. The result is the positions recommended by this approach conflict with a number of features that we believe are important in making bond markets incomplete e.g allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, etc.. Until these features are all fully incorporated we remain in search of a theory of debt management capable of providing robust policy insights.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism