Interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents. A formalization in temporal modal defeasible logic and its implementation

Sustainable computer systems require some flexibility to adapt to environmental unpredictable changes. A solution lies in autonomous software agents which can adapt autonomously to their environments. Though autonomy allows agents to decide which behavior to adopt, a disadvantage is a lack of control, and as a side effect even untrustworthiness: we want to keep some control over such autonomous agents. How to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy? A solution is to regulate agents’ behavior by norms. The normative paradigm makes it possible to control autonomous agents while respecting their autonomy, limiting untrustworthiness and augmenting system compliance. It can also facilitate the design of the system, for example, by regulating the coordination among agents. However, an autonomous agent will follow norms or violate them in some conditions. What are the conditions in which a norm is binding upon an agent? While autonomy is regarded as the driving force behind the normative paradigm, cognitive agents provide a basis for modeling the bindingness of norms. In order to cope with the complexity of the modeling of cognitive agents and normative bindingness, we adopt an intentional stance. Since agents are embedded into a dynamic environment, things may not pass at the same instant. Accordingly, our cognitive model is extended to account for some temporal aspects. Special attention is given to the temporal peculiarities of the legal domain such as, among others, the time in force and the time in efficacy of provisions. Some types of normative modifications are also discussed in the framework. It is noteworthy that our temporal account of legal reasoning is integrated to our commonsense temporal account of cognition. As our intention is to build sustainable reasoning systems running unpredictable environment, we adopt a declarative representation of knowledge. A declarative representation of norms will make it easier to update their system representation, thus facilitating system maintenance; and to improve system transparency, thus easing system governance. Since agents are bounded and are embedded into unpredictable environments, and since conflicts may appear amongst mental states and norms, agent reasoning has to be defeasible, i.e. new pieces of information can invalidate formerly derivable conclusions. In this dissertation, our model is formalized into a non-monotonic logic, namely into a temporal modal defeasible logic, in order to account for the interactions between normative systems and software cognitive agents.

Implementation of a non ground meta interpreter for defeasible logic

Human reasoning is a fascinating and complex cognitive process that can be applied in different research areas such as philosophy, psychology, laws and financial. Unfortunately, developing supporting software (to those different areas) able to cope such as complex reasoning it’s difficult and requires a suitable logic abstract formalism. In this thesis we aim to develop a program, that has the job to evaluate a theory (a set of rules) w.r.t. a Goal, and provide some results such as “The Goal is derivable from the KB5 (of the theory)”. In order to achieve this goal we need to analyse different logics and choose the one that best meets our needs. In logic, usually, we try to determine if a given conclusion is logically implied by a set of assumptions T (theory). However, when we deal with programming logic we need an efficient algorithm in order to find such implications. In this work we use a logic rather similar to human logic. Indeed, human reasoning requires an extension of the first order logic able to reach a conclusion depending on not definitely true6 premises belonging to a incomplete set of knowledge. Thus, we implemented a defeasible logic7 framework able to manipulate defeasible rules. Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic logic designed for efficient defeasible reasoning by Nute (see Chapter 2). Those kind of applications are useful in laws area especially if they offer an implementation of an argumentation framework that provides a formal modelling of game. Roughly speaking, let the theory is the set of laws, a keyclaim is the conclusion that one of the party wants to prove (and the other one wants to defeat) and adding dynamic assertion of rules, namely, facts putted forward by the parties, then, we can play an argumentative challenge between two players and decide if the conclusion is provable or not depending on the different strategies performed by the players. Implementing a game model requires one more meta-interpreter able to evaluate the defeasible logic framework; indeed, according to Göedel theorem (see on page 127), we cannot evaluate the meaning of a language using the tools provided by the language itself, but we need a meta-language able to manipulate the object language8. Thus, rather than a simple meta-interpreter, we propose a Meta-level containing different Meta-evaluators. The former has been explained above, the second one is needed to perform the game model, and the last one will be used to change game execution and tree derivation strategies.

Embedding defeasible logic into logic programming

Defeasible reasoning is a simple but efficient approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that has recently attracted considerable interest and that has found various applications. Defeasible logic and its variants are an important family of defeasible reasoning methods. So far no relationship has been established between defeasible logic and mainstream nonmonotonic reasoning approaches. In this paper we establish close links to known semantics of logic programs. In particular, we give a translation of a defeasible theory D into a meta-program P(D). We show that under a condition of decisiveness, the defeasible consequences of D correspond exactly to the sceptical conclusions of P(D) under the stable model semantics. Without decisiveness, the result holds only in one direction (all defeasible consequences of D are included in all stable models of P(D)). If we wish a complete embedding for the general case, we need to use the Kunen semantics of P(D), instead.

Norm modifications in defeasible logic

This paper proposes a framework based on Defeasible Logic (DL) to reason about normative modifications. We show how to express them in DL and how the logic deals with conflicts between temporalised normative modifications. Some comments will be given with regard to the phenomenon of retroactivity.

RuleOMS: A rule-based online management system

We propose an architecture for a rule-based online management systems (RuleOMS). Typically, many domain areas face the problem that stakeholders maintain databases of their business core information and they have to take decisions or create reports according to guidelines, policies or regulations. To address this issue we propose the integration of databases, in particular relational databases, with a logic reasoner and rule engine. We argue that defeasible logic is an appropriate formalism to model rules, in particular when the rules are meant to model regulations. The resulting RuleOMS provides an efficient and flexible solution to the problem at hand using defeasible inference. A case study of an online child care management system is used to illustrate the proposed architecture.

Inconsistent-tolerant base revision through Argument Theory Change

Reasoning and change over inconsistent knowledge bases (KBs) is of utmost relevance in areas like medicine and law. Argumentation may bring the possibility to cope with both problems. Firstly, by constructing an argumentation framework (AF) from the inconsistent KB, we can decide whether to accept or reject a certain claim through the interplay among arguments and counterarguments. Secondly, by handling dynamics of arguments of the AF, we might deal with the dynamics of knowledge of the underlying inconsistent KB. Dynamics of arguments has recently attracted attention and although some approaches have been proposed, a full axiomatization within the theory of belief revision was still missing. A revision arises when we want the argumentation semantics to accept an argument. Argument Theory Change (ATC) encloses the revision operators that modify the AF by analyzing dialectical trees-arguments as nodes and attacks as edges-as the adopted argumentation semantics. In this article, we present a simple approach to ATC based on propositional KBs. This allows to manage change of inconsistent KBs by relying upon classical belief revision, although contrary to it, consistency restoration of the KB is avoided. Subsequently, a set of rationality postulates adapted to argumentation is given, and finally, the proposed model of change is related to the postulates through the corresponding representation theorem. Though we focus on propositional logic, the results can be easily extended to more expressive formalisms such as first-order logic and description logics, to handle evolution of ontologies.

A defeasible reasoning model of inductive concept learning from examples and communication

This paper introduces a logical model of inductive generalization, and specifically of the machine learning task of inductive concept learning (ICL). We argue that some inductive processes, like ICL, can be seen as a form of defeasible reasoning. We define a consequence relation characterizing which hypotheses can be induced from given sets of examples, and study its properties, showing they correspond to a rather well-behaved non-monotonic logic. We will also show that with the addition of a preference relation on inductive theories we can characterize the inductive bias of ICL algorithms. The second part of the paper shows how this logical characterization of inductive generalization can be integrated with another form of non-monotonic reasoning (argumentation), to define a model of multiagent ICL. This integration allows two or more agents to learn, in a consistent way, both from induction and from arguments used in the communication between them. We show that the inductive theories achieved by multiagent induction plus argumentation are sound, i.e. they are precisely the same as the inductive theories built by a single agent with all data. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Applications of Nonclassical Logic Methods for Purposes of Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining

* The work is partially supported by Grant no. NIP917 of the Ministry of Science and Education – Republic of Bulgaria.

The logic of ADHD : a brief review of fallacious reasoning

This paper has two central purposes: the first is to survey some of the more important examples of fallacious argument, and the second is to examine the frequent use of these fallacies in support of the psychological construct: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The paper divides 12 familiar fallacies into three different categories—material, psychological and logical—and contends that advocates of ADHD often seem to employ these fallacies to support their position. It is suggested that all researchers, whether into ADHD or otherwise, need to pay much closer attention to the construction of their arguments if they are not to make truth claims unsupported by satisfactory evidence, form or logic.