On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

On Complexity of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.

A economia política da corrupção

The aim of this paper is to show that corruption shoud be an important subject for economic analysis and modern positive political economy. I sustain that one could construct general models of corrupt behavior with the notion of definition of corruption linked with the notion of institutions and incentives. Socondly, I discuss critically the weberian notions of public action to purpose finally, a political economy approach to the problem. The main conclusion of this essay is that economics and modern political economy could be extremely useful tools in the study of this social and economic fact.

Determinação da densidade mineral e da elasticidade óssea após a aplicação de ondas de choque extracorpóreas no terceiro metacarpiano de equinos atletas

The porpoise of this study was to evaluate the effects of extracorporeal shock waves in third metacarpus bone from healthy horses by determination of bone elasticity. It were used 20 Thoroughbred horses, male and female, with two years old, on top of training and selected as the state healthy. At the beginning of the experiment (D0), all animals were submitted for evaluation of bone elasticity held in the third metacarpus bone. The animals were divided into two groups (Control Group - CG and Experimental Group - EG). The application of extracorporeal shock wave therapy (ESWT) was performed on the right forelimb of the animals in the experimental group in the same place evaluated for bone elasticity and was used apparatus for extracorporeal therapy of waves with 0.15 mJ/mm2 energy flux density and 2000 pulses with E6R20 probe, with focus feature of the shock wave of 20 mm. The ESWT were repeated every 21 days, a total of three sessions (D0, D21 and D42). The analysis of bone elasticity determination was realized at D21, D42 and D72. The average of speed ultrasound differed between groups at D21, D42 and D72, and the animals from EG had lower bone mineral density after applications of ESWT. There was also difference in the analysis of bone mass (Z-Score) between the groups at D21 and D42, which animals from EG showed a significant decrease in bone mass. The risk of fracture was higher in animals from experimental group at D21. It was concluded that ESWT is able to promote change in bone mineral density.

Avaliação por ultrassonografia quantitativa do osso terceiro metacarpiano de equinos atletas tratados com ondas de choque extracorpóreas

Pós-graduação em Medicina Veterinária - FMVZ

Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.

State-business relations in the smaller gulf monarchies -- the role of business actors in the decision-making process

The Arab monarchies of the Gulf have been undergoing striking socio-economic changes caused by the ending of the rent-based welfare state model on which they had largely relied since the 1950s. In this perspective, this paper aims at examining the comparative role of local business communities in affecting the orientations and the outcomes of the policies implemented during the period of high oil prices in the 2000s. This paper pays a special attention to the impact of the Arab Spring on the state-business relations in two of the smaller Gulf monarchies (Bahrain and Oman).

The stakes of politics and electoral administration : a comparative study of Southeast Asian democracies

Elections play a crucial role in political stability in post-democratization, and electoral administrations are the key to the electoral process. However, not all newly democratized countries have established reliable electoral administration. New democracies in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, have independent election commissions which have different characteristics, especially in terms of neutrality. Based on three cases, this paper claims that the stakes of politics are the major determinant of the variations in neutrality. The high stakes of politics in Thailand brought about the partisan election commission, while the low stakes in Indonesia made the electoral system relatively neutral. Like Thailand, the high stakes of politics in the Philippines also cause political intervention in the electoral administration.

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con- stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autoc- racies, very rarely fight each other. We examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two po- litical regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can deter democratic leaders from engaging in military con- flicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, implying that democracies in which the executives are subject to term limits should be more conflict prone. To assess the validity of our predictions, we construct a large dataset on countries with executive term limits. Our analysis of inter-state conflicts for the 1816-2001 period suggests that electoral incentives are indeed behind the democratic peace phenomenon: while democratic dyads are in general less likely to be involved in conflicts than any other dyads, this result does not hold for democracies in which the executive faces binding term limits; moreover, the dispute patterns of democracies with term limits depend on whether the executive is in the last or penultimate mandate.