Caso INTERSTAF: mercadeo electrónico como estrategia de integración con los clientes

El término Mercadeo Electrónico (ME) se refiere a nuevos procesos dentro de una compañía para generar comunicación entre el cliente y el negocio. Este proceso usa los cambios tecnológicos generados en los procesos de comunicación previos, como Internet que ha roto con las barreras culturales, económicas, políticas y geográficas –distancia de conexión-. El desarrollo de el ME ha incrementado substancialmente junto con la caída de los costos en las telecomunicaciones y los equipos en la tecnología de información. Esta tesis se aproxima a aspectos de usar algunas tecnologías para el desarrollo de la comunicación entre Inter Staff y sus clientes. El uso de diferentes tipos de publicidades virtual (en especial las usadas en la social media y los diferentes procesos en ésta), diseño y desarrollo de estrategias de mercadeo electrónico son algunos de los resultados obtenidos en éste escrito. El primer capítulo de la tesis presenta un análisis del termino Marketing, objetivos, procesos, herramientas de los medios y Mercadeo electrónico como estrategia. El segundo capítulo de la tesis presenta una introducción a sector de los agentes de aduana. ¿Cómo funcionan? Historia y objetivos. El tercer capítulo desarrolla el Plan de Mercadeo Electrónico. Éste contiene los objetivos, procesos y metas para aplicarlo como estrategia en la empresa.

Relationships between NPM, the use of PM practices and the organizational performance: empirical evidence from government agencies

Purpose – this paper has two main purposes: (1)explore if government agencies more oriented to NPM postulates are more willing to use PM practices and to improve their performance; and (2) investigate whether the fit between the use of PM practices and the organizationa performance is dependent upon from the capacity of agencies to adapt its structures to changes introduced by NPM reforms. Design/methodology/approach - this paper is based on the survey method and provides empirical evidence from Portuguese government agencies.Findings (mandatory) - Our findings suggest that government agencies that made structural arrangements under the NPM reforms are more willing to use PM practices and will perform better than other agencies. In addition, this paper show that therelationship between the use of PM practices and the organizational performance is dependent upon from the agencies capacity to adopt new structural arrangements under the NPM reforms.Practical implications – this paper has three main contributions: (1) contribute to knowledge about the relationship between the introduction of NPM changes in the use of PM practices; (2) contribute to clarify whether agencies more oriented to NPM postulates are improving performance; and (3) help to clarify the way the organizations should adapt their structures for to be more effective in the use of PM practices. Originality/value - The quantitative empirical research, based on the unique survey applied to Portuguese government agencies on this field, allow us to add to prior research mainly based on case studies and oriented to local governments (Budding, 2004).

Accountability and co-production of information and control: social observatories and their relationship with government agencies

Abstract:Through the development of a proposal to categorize accountability into four stages - classical, cross-sectional, systemic, and diffused -, this article aims to identify characteristics of co-production of information and socio-political control of public administration in the work of Brazilian social observatories in relationship with government control agencies. The study analyses data from 20 social observatories and, particularly, three experiences of co-production of information and control, based on a systemic perspective on accountability and a model with four categories: Political and cultural; valuing; systemic-organizational, and production. The conclusions summarize characteristics of these practices, specific phases in the accountability processes, as well as the potentialities and challenges of co-production of information and control, which not only influences, but it is also influenced by the accountability system.

A wireless sensor network platform for structural health monitoring: enabling accurate and synchronized measurements through COTS+custom-based design

Structural health monitoring has long been identified as a prominent application of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), as traditional wired-based solutions present some inherent limitations such as installation/maintenance cost, scalability and visual impact. Nevertheless, there is a lack of ready-to-use and off-the-shelf WSN technologies that are able to fulfill some most demanding requirements of these applications, which can span from critical physical infrastructures (e.g. bridges, tunnels, mines, energy grid) to historical buildings or even industrial machinery and vehicles. Low-power and low-cost yet extremely sensitive and accurate accelerometer and signal acquisition hardware and stringent time synchronization of all sensors data are just examples of the requirements imposed by most of these applications. This paper presents a prototype system for health monitoring of civil engineering structures that has been jointly conceived by a team of civil, and electrical and computer engineers. It merges the benefits of standard and off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and communication technologies with a minimum set of custom-designed signal acquisition hardware that is mandatory to fulfill all application requirements.

A importância das consultoras no processo de internacionalização das micro, pequenas e médias empresas em Portugal

Relatório de Estágio Apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Empreendedorismo e Internacionalização, sob orientação da Mestre Inês Veiga Pereira

Regulation in the Age of Globalization: The Difussion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe and Latin America

One of the most notable characteristics of the change in governance of the past two decades has been the restructuring of the state, most notably the delegation of authority from politicians and ministries to technocrats and regulatory agencies. Our unique dataset on the extent of these reforms in seven sectors in 36 countries reveals the widespread diffusion of these reforms in recent decades. In 1986 there were only 23 agencies across these sectors and countries (less than one agency per country); by 2002 this number had increased more than seven-fold, to 169. On average these 36 countries each have more than four agencies in the seven sectors studied. Yet the widespread diffusion of these reforms is characterized by cross-regional and cross-sectoral variations. Our data reveal two major variations: first, reforms are more widespread in economic regulation that in social spheres; second, regulatory agencies in the social spheres are more widespread in Europe than in Latin America. Why these variations in the spread of the reforms? In this paper we present for the first time the regulatory gaps across regions and sectors and then move on to offer some explanations for these gaps in a way that sheds some light on the nature of these reforms and on their limits. Our explanatory framework combines diffusion and structural explanations and in doing so sheds new light on the global diffusion of public policy ideas.

Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation and the Emergence of Temporary Work Agencies

Labour market regulations aimed at enhancing job-security are dominant in several OECD countries. These regulations seek to reduce dismissals of workers and fluctuations in employment. The main theoretical contribution is to gauge the effects of such regulations on labour demand across establishment sizes. In order to achieve this, we investigate an optimising model of labour demand under uncertainty through the application of real option theory. We also consider other forms of employment which increase the flexibility of the labour market. In particular, we are modelling the contribution of temporary employment agencies (Zeitarbeit) allowing for quick personnel adjustments in client firms. The calibration results indicate that labour market rigidities may be crucial for understanding sluggishness in firms´ labour demand and the emergence and growth of temporary work.

The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion

The autonomous regulatory agency has recently become the ‘appropriate model’ of governance across countries and sectors. The dynamics of this process is captured in our data set, which covers the creation of agencies in 48 countries and 16 sectors since the 1920s. Adopting a diffusion approach to explain this broad process of institutional change, we explore the role of countries and sectors as sources of institutional transfer at different stages of the diffusion process. We demonstrate how the restructuring of national bureaucracies unfolds via four different channels of institutional transfer. Our results challenge theoretical approaches that overemphasize the national dimension in global diffusion and are insensitive to the stages of the diffusion process. Further advance in study of diffusion depends, we assert, on the ability to apply both cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis to the same research design and to incorporate channels of transfer with different causal mechanisms for different stages of the diffusion process.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.