Framework for investment decision-making under risk and uncertainty for infrastructure asset management

A study has been conducted to investigate current practices on decision-making under risk and uncertainty for infrastructure project investments. It was found that many European countries such as the UK, France, Germany including Australia use scenarios for the investigation of the effects of risk and uncertainty of project investments. Different alternative scenarios are mostly considered during the engineering economic cost-benefit analysis stage. For instance, the World Bank requires an analysis of risks in all project appraisals. Risk in economic evaluation needs to be addressed by calculating sensitivity of the rate of return for a number of events. Risks and uncertainties of project developments arise from various sources of errors including data, model and forecasting errors. It was found that the most influential factors affecting risk and uncertainty resulted from forecasting errors. Data errors and model errors have trivial effects. It was argued by many analysts that scenarios do not forecast what will happen but scenarios indicate only what can happen from given alternatives. It was suggested that the probability distributions of end-products of the project appraisal, such as cost-benefit ratios that take forecasting errors into account, are feasible decision tools for economic evaluation. Political, social, environmental as well as economic and other related risk issues have been addressed and included in decision-making frameworks, such as in a multi-criteria decisionmaking framework. But no suggestion has been made on how to incorporate risk into the investment decision-making process.

Reasoning with imprecise trade-offs in decision making under certainty and uncertainty

In many real world situations, we make decisions in the presence of multiple, often conflicting and non-commensurate objectives. The process of optimizing systematically and simultaneously over a set of objective functions is known as multi-objective optimization. In multi-objective optimization, we have a (possibly exponentially large) set of decisions and each decision has a set of alternatives. Each alternative depends on the state of the world, and is evaluated with respect to a number of criteria. In this thesis, we consider the decision making problems in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the current state of the world, under which the decisions are to be made, is known in advance. In the second scenario, the current state of the world is unknown at the time of making decisions. For decision making under certainty, we consider the framework of multiobjective constraint optimization and focus on extending the algorithms to solve these models to the case where there are additional trade-offs. We focus especially on branch-and-bound algorithms that use a mini-buckets algorithm for generating the upper bound at each node of the search tree (in the context of maximizing values of objectives). Since the size of the guiding upper bound sets can become very large during the search, we introduce efficient methods for reducing these sets, yet still maintaining the upper bound property. We define a formalism for imprecise trade-offs, which allows the decision maker during the elicitation stage, to specify a preference for one multi-objective utility vector over another, and use such preferences to infer other preferences. The induced preference relation then is used to eliminate the dominated utility vectors during the computation. For testing the dominance between multi-objective utility vectors, we present three different approaches. The first is based on a linear programming approach, the second is by use of distance-based algorithm (which uses a measure of the distance between a point and a convex cone); the third approach makes use of a matrix multiplication, which results in much faster dominance checks with respect to the preference relation induced by the trade-offs. Furthermore, we show that our trade-offs approach, which is based on a preference inference technique, can also be given an alternative semantics based on the well known Multi-Attribute Utility Theory. Our comprehensive experimental results on common multi-objective constraint optimization benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed enhancements allow the algorithms to scale up to much larger problems than before. For decision making problems under uncertainty, we describe multi-objective influence diagrams, based on a set of p objectives, where utility values are vectors in Rp, and are typically only partially ordered. These can be solved by a variable elimination algorithm, leading to a set of maximal values of expected utility. If the Pareto ordering is used this set can often be prohibitively large. We consider approximate representations of the Pareto set based on ϵ-coverings, allowing much larger problems to be solved. In addition, we define a method for incorporating user trade-offs, which also greatly improves the efficiency.

The role of psychological and physiological factors in decision making under risk and in a dilemma

We study the difference in the result of two different risk elicitation methods by linking estimates of risk attitudes to gender, age, personality traits, a decision in a dilemma situation, and physiological states measured by heart rate variability (HRV). Our results indicate that differences between the methods can partly be explained by gender, but not by personality traits. Furthermore, HRV is linked to risktaking in the experiment for at least one of the methods, indicating that more stressed individuals display more risk aversion. Finally, we and that risk attitudes are not predictive of the ability to decide in a dilemma, but personality traits are. Surprisingly, there is also no apparent relationship between the physiological state during the dilemma situation and the ability to make a decision.

Investment decision-making under risk (reliability) and uncertainty for infrastructure asset management

Risks and uncertainties are inevitable in engineering projects and infrastructure investments. Decisions about investment in infrastructure such as for maintenance, rehabilitation and construction works can pose risks, and may generate significant impacts on social, cultural, environmental and other related issues. This report presents the results of a literature review of current practice in identifying, quantifying and managing risks and predicting impacts as part of the planning and assessment process for infrastructure investment proposals. In assessing proposals for investment in infrastructure, it is necessary to consider social, cultural and environmental risks and impacts to the overall community, as well as financial risks to the investor. The report defines and explains the concept of risk and uncertainty, and describes the three main methodology approaches to the analysis of risk and uncertainty in investment planning for infrastructure, viz examining a range of scenarios or options, sensitivity analysis, and a statistical probability approach, listed here in order of increasing merit and complexity. Forecasts of costs, benefits and community impacts of infrastructure are recognised as central aspects of developing and assessing investment proposals. Increasingly complex modelling techniques are being used for investment evaluation. The literature review identified forecasting errors as the major cause of risk. The report contains a summary of the broad nature of decision-making tools used by governments and other organisations in Australia, New Zealand, Europe and North America, and shows their overall approach to risk assessment in assessing public infrastructure proposals. While there are established techniques to quantify financial and economic risks, quantification is far less developed for political, social and environmental risks and impacts. The report contains a summary of the broad nature of decision-making tools used by governments and other organisations in Australia, New Zealand, Europe and North America, and shows their overall approach to risk assessment in assessing public infrastructure proposals. While there are established techniques to quantify financial and economic risks, quantification is far less developed for political, social and environmental risks and impacts. For risks that cannot be readily quantified, assessment techniques commonly include classification or rating systems for likelihood and consequence. The report outlines the system used by the Australian Defence Organisation and in the Australian Standard on risk management. After each risk is identified and quantified or rated, consideration can be given to reducing the risk, and managing any remaining risk as part of the scope of the project. The literature review identified use of risk mapping techniques by a North American chemical company and by the Australian Defence Organisation. This literature review has enabled a risk assessment strategy to be developed, and will underpin an examination of the feasibility of developing a risk assessment capability using a probability approach.

Responsibility effects in decision making under risk

We systematically explore decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsibility for somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own in situations of payoff equality. In the gain domain we confirm the intuition that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. This is however not attributable to a 'cautious shift' as often thought. Indeed, looking at risk attitudes in the loss domain, we find an increase in risk seeking under responsibility. This raises issues about the nature of various decision biases under risk, and to what extent changed behavior under responsibility may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility versus naive corrections from perceived biases. To further explore this issue, we designed a second experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small or very large probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we find increased risk aversion, thus confirming our earlier finding. For small probabilities however, we find an increase of risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. The latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule dictating caution under responsibility, and can be explained through flexible self-correction models predicting an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory. An additional accountability mechanism does not change risk behavior, except for mixed prospects, in which it reduces loss aversion. This indicates that loss aversion is of a fundamentally different nature than probability weighting or utility curvature. Implications for debiasing are discussed.

Precautionary principles: a jurisdiction-free framework for decision-making under risk

Fundamental principles of precaution are legal maxims that ask for preventive actions, perhaps as contingent interim measures while relevant information about causality and harm remains unavailable, to minimize the societal impact of potentially severe or irreversible outcomes. Such principles do not explain how to make choices or how to identify what is protective when incomplete and inconsistent scientific evidence of causation characterizes the potential hazards. Rather, they entrust lower jurisdictions, such as agencies or authorities, to make current decisions while recognizing that future information can contradict the scientific basis that supported the initial decision. After reviewing and synthesizing national and international legal aspects of precautionary principles, this paper addresses the key question: How can society manage potentially severe, irreversible or serious environmental outcomes when variability, uncertainty, and limited causal knowledge characterize their decision-making? A decision-analytic solution is outlined that focuses on risky decisions and accounts for prior states of information and scientific beliefs that can be updated as subsequent information becomes available. As a practical and established approach to causal reasoning and decision-making under risk, inherent to precautionary decision-making, these (Bayesian) methods help decision-makers and stakeholders because they formally account for probabilistic outcomes, new information, and are consistent and replicable. Rational choice of an action from among various alternatives-defined as a choice that makes preferred consequences more likely-requires accounting for costs, benefits and the change in risks associated with each candidate action. Decisions under any form of the precautionary principle reviewed must account for the contingent nature of scientific information, creating a link to the decision-analytic principle of expected value of information (VOI), to show the relevance of new information, relative to the initial ( and smaller) set of data on which the decision was based. We exemplify this seemingly simple situation using risk management of BSE. As an integral aspect of causal analysis under risk, the methods developed in this paper permit the addition of non-linear, hormetic dose-response models to the current set of regulatory defaults such as the linear, non-threshold models. This increase in the number of defaults is an important improvement because most of the variants of the precautionary principle require cost-benefit balancing. Specifically, increasing the set of causal defaults accounts for beneficial effects at very low doses. We also show and conclude that quantitative risk assessment dominates qualitative risk assessment, supporting the extension of the set of default causal models.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments.

We instillate rational cognition and learning in seemingly riskless choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. the theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status quo bias drawn from a field study.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.

Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

Non-Deteriorating Choice

We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. A selection function is non-deteriorating if there exists an ordering over the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are at least as good as the reference option. We characterize non-deteriorating selection functions in an abstract framework and in an economic environment.

Ranking Sets of Objects

We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set rankings include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertainty, rankings of opportunity sets, set rankings that appear in matching theory, and the structure of assembly preferences. The survey is prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, edited by Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter number is provisional.

What Is a Commody? Two Axiomatic Anwers

We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.