States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

The Food Crisis: Implications for Labor

Food prices have gone up to prohibitive levels for many of the world’s poor. The vast majority of those who are hungry in the world today are working in agriculture, either as small landholders or as waged agricultural workers. The majority of the food producers have not benefited from rising prices. Apparently, the bargaining power of many producers, just as that of the end consumers, has been weakened vis-à-vis the buyers and retailers of agricultural produce. This powerlessness is also in the face of governments that fail to provide an appropriate infrastructure for smallholders and social protection. The first part of the book provides an introduction to the immediate and structural causes of the food crisis. The second part contains contributions that not only highlight the plight of rural labour but also develop tools for measuring the decent work deficit. The last part emphasizes income security as a major precondition for food security. It looks at the experiences of Brazil and India with the extension of social protection for the poor.

Energy gain induced by boundary crisis

We consider a nonlinear system and show the unexpected and surprising result that, even for high dissipation, the mean energy of a particle can attain higher values than when there is no dissipation in the system. We reconsider the time-dependent annular billiard in the presence of inelastic collisions with the boundaries. For some magnitudes of dissipation, we observe the phenomenon of boundary crisis, which drives the particles to an asymptotic attractive fixed point located at a value of energy that is higher than the mean energy of the nondissipative case and so much higher than the mean energy just before the crisis. We should emphasize that the unexpected results presented here reveal the importance of a nonlinear dynamics analysis to explain the paradoxical strategy of introducing dissipation in the system in order to gain energy.

Contingent or structural crisis in British agriculture?

The British agricultural sector is either already in or rapidly approaching some sort of crisis. Two features are particularly significant in the political response to the current situation. First, there is an increasingly neoliberal approach to agricultural policy. Sec end, agricultural policy per se is being subsumed with wider rural policies. In this paper we question the rationality of both these trends, both theoretically through 'new wave regulation theory' and by relating the British situation to the recent experiences of the agricultural sectors in Australia and New Zealand.

Impact of the Subprime Crisis in the Provision of Credit Risk of Major National Banks

Financial institutions are directly exposed to the credit risk, that is, the risk of the borrower not fulfill with their obligations, paying their debts in its stated periods established previously. The bank predict this type of risk, including them in their balance-sheets. In 2006/2007 there was the impact of a new financial crisis that spread around the world, known as the crisis of subprime. The objective of this study is to analyze if the provisions for credit risk or liquidation increased the sprouting of the crisis of subprime in ten major national banks, chosen accordant to their total assets. To answer this question, the balance-sheets of each one of these banks in the period of 2005 to 2007 were analyzed. This research is characterized, as for its objectives, as descriptive and as for the procedures as documentary research. It is also characterized as having a qualitative approach. The results show that the crisis of subprime has caused little impact in the credit risk provision of the analyzed institutions. It was noticed a slight increase in the provision indicators at the peak of the crisis in 2006. These percentages were reduced in, 2007, probably reflecting the economic stability of Brazil and the stagnation of the crisis Of subprime in that year, at least in relation to in our country.