Productivity and Credit Constraints: Firm-Level Evidence from Propensity Score Matching. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 3, September 2011

Drawing on a unique, farm-level panel dataset with 37,409 observations and employing a matching estimator, this paper analyses how farm access to credit affects farm input allocation and farm efficiency in the Central and Eastern European transition countries. We find that farms are asymmetrically credit constrained with respect to inputs. Farm use of variable inputs and capital investment increases up to 2.3% and 29%, respectively, per €1,000 of additional credit. Our estimates also suggest that farm access to credit increases total factor productivity up to 1.9% per €1,000 of additional credit, indicating that an improvement in access to credit results in an adjustment in the relative input intensities on farms. This finding is further supported by a negative effect of better access to credit on labour, suggesting that these two are substitutes. Interestingly, farms are found not to be credit constrained with respect to land.

Household portfolio allocation, risk attitudes and credit constraints : evidence from the eurozone

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira

Credit borrowing constraints in a DSGE framework: income vs. housing

Credit market in Brazil distinguishes from advanced economies in many aspects. One of them is related to collaterals for households borrowing. This work proposes a DSGE framework, based on Gerali et al.(2010), to analyse one pecularity of Brazillian credit market: payroll-deducted personal loans. To original model, we added the possibility to households contract long term debt and compare to differents types of credit constrains: one based on housing and other based on future income. We callibrate and estimate the model to Brazil, using Bayesian technique. Results show that, in a economy where credit constraints are based on income, responses to shocks appear to be stronger, at first, but dissipate faster. This occurs because income responds quickly to shock than housing prices, so does amount available to loans. In order to smooth consumption, agents compensate lower income and borrowing by increasing working hours, restoring loans and debt in a shorter time.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Do borrowing constraints decrease intergenerational mobility? evidence from Brazil

In this paper, we find evidence that suggests that borrowing constraints may be an important determinant of intergenerational mobility in Brazil. This result contrasts sharply with studies for developed countries, such as Canada and the US, where credit constraints do not seem to play an important role in generating persistence of inequality. Moreover, we find that the social mobility is lower in Brazil in comparison with developed countries. We follow the methodology proposed by Grawe (2001), which uses quantile regression, and obtain two results. First, the degree of intergenerational persistence is greater for the upper quantiles. Second, the degree of intergenerational persistence declines with income at least for the upper quantiles. Both findings are compatible with the presence of borrowing constraints affecting the degree of intergenerational persistence, as predicted by the theory.

Household borrowing constraints and monetary policy in emerging economies

Credit markets in emerging economies can be distinguished from those in advanced economies in many respects, including the collateral required for households to borrow. This work proposes a DSGE framework to analyze one peculiarity that characterizes the credit markets of some emerging markets: payroll-deducted personal loans. We add the possibility for households to contract long-term debt and compare two different types of credit constraints with one another, one based on housing and the other based on future income. We estimate the model for Brazil using a Bayesian technique. The model is able to solve a puzzle of the Brazilian economy: responses to monetary shocks at first appear to be strong but dissipate quickly. This occurs because income – and the amount available for loans – responds more rapidly to monetary shocks than housing prices. To smooth consumption, agents (borrowers) compensate for lower income and for borrowing by working more hours to repay loans and erase debt in a shorter time. Therefore, in addition to the income and substitution effects, workers consider the effects on their credit constraints when deciding how much labor to supply, which becomes an additional channel through which financial frictions affect the economy.

How does credit access affect children's time allocation? Evidence from rural India

Using a unique dataset obtained from rural Andhra Pradesh, India that contains direct observations of household access to credit and detailed time use, results of this study indicate that credit market failures lead to a substantial reallocation of time used by children for activities such as schooling, household chores, remunerative work, and leisure. The negative effects of credit constraints on schooling amount to a 60% decrease of average schooling time. However, the magnitude of decrease due to credit constraints is about half that of the increase in both domestic and remunerative child labor, the other half appearing to come from a reduction in leisure.

Microfinance, Efficiency and Agricultural Production in Bangladesh

The objectives of this study were to make a detailed and systematic empirical analysis of microfinance borrowers and non-borrowers in Bangladesh and also examine how efficiency measures are influenced by the access to agricultural microfinance. In the empirical analysis, this study used both parametric and non-parametric frontier approaches to investigate differences in efficiency estimates between microfinance borrowers and non-borrowers. This thesis, based on five articles, applied data obtained from a survey of 360 farm households from north-central and north-western regions in Bangladesh. The methods used in this investigation involve stochastic frontier (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA) in addition to sample selectivity and limited dependent variable models. In article I, technical efficiency (TE) estimation and identification of its determinants were performed by applying an extended Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier production function. The results show that farm households had a mean TE of 83% with lower TE scores for the non-borrowers of agricultural microfinance. Addressing institutional policies regarding the consolidation of individual plots into farm units, ensuring access to microfinance, extension education for the farmers with longer farming experience are suggested to improve the TE of the farmers. In article II, the objective was to assess the effects of access to microfinance on household production and cost efficiency (CE) and to determine the efficiency differences between the microfinance participating and non-participating farms. In addition, a non-discretionary DEA model was applied to capture directly the influence of microfinance on farm households production and CE. The results suggested that under both pooled DEA models and non-discretionary DEA models, farmers with access to microfinance were significantly more efficient than their non-borrowing counterparts. Results also revealed that land fragmentation, family size, household wealth, on farm-training and off farm income share are the main determinants of inefficiency after effectively correcting for sample selection bias. In article III, the TE of traditional variety (TV) and high-yielding-variety (HYV) rice producers were estimated in addition to investigating the determinants of adoption rate of HYV rice. Furthermore, the role of TE as a potential determinant to explain the differences of adoption rate of HYV rice among the farmers was assessed. The results indicated that in spite of its much higher yield potential, HYV rice production was associated with lower TE and had a greater variability in yield. It was also found that TE had a significant positive influence on the adoption rates of HYV rice. In article IV, we estimated profit efficiency (PE) and profit-loss between microfinance borrowers and non-borrowers by a sample selection framework, which provided a general framework for testing and taking into account the sample selection in the stochastic (profit) frontier function analysis. After effectively correcting for selectivity bias, the mean PE of the microfinance borrowers and non-borrowers were estimated at 68% and 52% respectively. This suggested that a considerable share of profits were lost due to profit inefficiencies in rice production. The results also demonstrated that access to microfinance contributes significantly to increasing PE and reducing profit-loss per hectare land. In article V, the effects of credit constraints on TE, allocative efficiency (AE) and CE were assessed while adequately controlling for sample selection bias. The confidence intervals were determined by the bootstrap method for both samples. The results indicated that differences in average efficiency scores of credit constrained and unconstrained farms were not statistically significant although the average efficiencies tended to be higher in the group of unconstrained farms. After effectively correcting for selectivity bias, household experience, number of dependents, off-farm income, farm size, access to on farm training and yearly savings were found to be the main determinants of inefficiencies. In general, the results of the study revealed the existence substantial technical, allocative, economic inefficiencies and also considerable profit inefficiencies. The results of the study suggested the need to streamline agricultural microfinance by the microfinance institutions (MFIs), donor agencies and government at all tiers. Moreover, formulating policies that ensure greater access to agricultural microfinance to the smallholder farmers on a sustainable basis in the study areas to enhance productivity and efficiency has been recommended. Key Words: Technical, allocative, economic efficiency, DEA, Non-discretionary DEA, selection bias, bootstrapping, microfinance, Bangladesh.

Participation of Smallholders in Agroforestry Agri-Environmental Scheme: A lesson from the rural Mount Kenya region

The likelihood of smallholder farmers not participating in agroforestry agri-environmental schemes and payments for ecosystem services (PES) may be due to limited farmland endowment and formal credit constraints. These deficits may lead to an ‘exclusive club’ of successful farmers, which are not necessarily poor, enjoying the benefits of agri-environmental schemes and PES although agrienvironmental schemes and PES have been devised as a means of fostering rural sustainable development and improving the livelihood of poor smallholder farmers. Smallholder farmers in parts of rural Kenya continue to enroll in ‘The International Small Group Tree Planting Programme’ (TIST), an agri-environmental scheme, promoting agroforestry, carbon sequestration and conservation agriculture (CA). The question remains if these farmers are really poor? This study examines factors that determine the participation of smallholder farmers in TIST in parts of rural Kenya. We use survey data compiled in 2013 on 210 randomly selected smallholder farmers from Embu, Meru and Nanyuki communities; the sample consists of TIST and non-TIST members. A random utility model and logit regression were used to test a set of non-monetary and monetary factors that influence participation in the TIST. The utility function is conceptualized to give non-monetary factors, particularly the common medium of communication in rural areas – formal and informal – a central role. Furthermore, we investigate other factors (incl. credit accessibility and interest rate) that reveal the nature of farmers participating in TIST. The findings suggest that spread of information via formal and informal networks is a major driver of participation in the TIST program. Furthermore, variables such credit constrains, age and labour supply positively correlate with TIST participation, while for education the opposite is true. It is important to mention that these correlations, although somewhat consistent, were all found to be weak. The results indicate that participation in the TIST program is not influenced by farm size; therefore we argue that the TIST scheme is NOT an ‘exclusive club’ comprising wealthy and successful farmers. Older farmers’ being more likely to join the TIST is an argument for their long- rather than widely assumed short-term planning horizon and a new contribution to the literature. Given the importance of poverty alleviation and climate smart agriculture in developing countries, sustainable policy should strengthening the social and human capital as well as informal networks in rural areas. Extension services should effectively communicate benefits to less educated and credit constrained farmers.

The role of income inequality on fiscal multipliers

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Double Degree in Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics and University of Maastricht

Essais en économie avec frictions financières

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats.

Essais sur les frictions financières dans les modèles d'équilibre général dynamique

Cette thèse examine les effets des imperfections des marchés financiers sur la macroéconomie. Plus particulièrement, elle se penche sur les conséquences de la faillite dans les contrats financiers dans une perspective d'équilibre général dynamique. Le premier papier construit un modèle qui utilise l'avantage comparatif des banques dans la gestion des situations de détresse financière pour expliquer le choix des firmes entre les prêts bancaires et les prêts du marché financier. Le modèle réussit à expliquer pourquoi les firmes plus petites préfèrent le financement bancaire et pourquoi les prêts bancaires sont plus répandus en Europe. Le premier fait est expliqué par le lien négatif entre la valeur nette de l'entreprise et la probabilité de faire faillite. Le deuxième fait s'explique par le coût fixe d'émission de bons plus élevé en Europe. Le deuxième papier examine l'interaction entre les contraintes de financement affectant les ménages et les firmes. Une interaction positive pourrait amplifier et augmenter la persistance de l'effet d'un choc agrégé sur l'économie. Je construis un nouveau modèle qui contient des primes de financement externes pour les firmes et les ménages. Dans le modèle de base avec prix et salaires flexibles, j'obtiens une faible interaction négative entre les coûts de financement des firmes et des ménages. Le facteur clé qui explique ce résultat est l'effet du changement contre cyclique du coût de financement des ménages sur leur offre de travail et leur demande de prêts. Dans une période d'expansion, cet effet augmente les taux d'intérêt, réduit l'investissement et augmente le coût de financement des entreprises. Le troisième papier ajoute les contraintes de financement des banques dans un modèle macroéconomiques avec des prêts hypothécaires et des fluctuations dans les prix de l'immobilier. Les banques dans le modèle ne peuvent pas complètement diversifier leurs prêts, ce qui génère un lien entre les risques de faillite des ménages et des banques. Il y a deux effets contraires des cycles économiques qui affectent la prime de financement externe de la banque. Premièrement, il y a un lien positif entre le risque de faillite des banques et des emprunteurs qui contribue à rendre le coût de financement externe des banques contre cyclique. Deuxiément, le lissage de la consommation par les ménages rend la proportion de financement externe des banques pro cyclique, ce qui tend à rendre le coût de financement bancaire pro cyclique. En combinant ces deux effets, le modèle peut reproduire des profits bancaires et des ratios d'endettement bancaires pro cycliques comme dans les données, mais pour des chocs non-financiers les frictions de financement bancaire dans le modèle n'ont pas un effet quantitativement significatif sur les principales variables agrégées comme la consommation ou l'investissement.

Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices