Corporate valuation and governance: evidence from Colombia

We examine for the first time the association of different measures of ownership and control, and separation ratios with firm’s value and performance for 108 non-financial firms that traded their stock during the period 1998 to 2002. We found that large blockholders exert a positive influence upon firm’s valuation and performance, which validates the positive monitoring approach of large shareholders, but also found that this relation is not monotone implying that when separation of control and ownership tends to increase, a negative effect is exerted on firm’s valuation. Furthermore, we report first estimates of a survey of corporate governance practices conducted in 2004 for 43 Colombian non-financial companies. The index’s scores suggest that implementation of good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor as measured by the average of the Index that is below half the maximum attainable value. Regrettably, we did not find any support to recent theories that predict a positive association between good governance practices, measured by the CGI, and performance. At most there exists a positive relationship for sub-index but the results were not statistically significant in general.

Ownership, control and corporate valuation of Brazilian companies

We study the direct and indirect ownership structure of Brazilian corporations and their market value and risk by the end of 1996 and 1998. Ownership is quite concentrated with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that indirect control structures may be used to concentrate control even more rather than to keep control of the company with a smaller share of total capital. The greater the concentration of voting rights then less the value of the fmn should be due to potential expropriation ofrninority shareholders. We fmd evidence that when there is a majority shareholder and when indirect ownership structures are used without the loss of control, corporate valuations are greater when control is dilluted through the indirect ownership structure. This evidence is consistent with the existence of private benefits of control that can be translated as potential minority shareholder expropriation.

Case study preparation: The whatsApp acquisition from Facebook

The purpose of this work project is to analyze the acquisition of WhatsApp from Facebook occurred on 19th February 2014. The main research has the aim to understand if the price tag of $19 billion paid by Mark Zuckerberg was fair. Along the reaction of Facebook’s EPS on the keydays after the purchase, a balanced assessment of the acquisition was obtained and discussed. Results suggest that the price tag could be reasonable. However, taking into account the industry in which the two companies operate, where competition is quite intense, Facebook should assess this deal in a longerterm perspective.

US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous Credit Risk

This paper develops a reduced form three-factor model which includes a liquidity proxy of market conditions which is then used to provide implicit prices. The model prices are then compared with observed market prices of credit default swaps to determine if swap rates adequately reflect market risks. The findings of the analysis illustrate the importance of liquidity in the valuation process. Moreover, market liquidity, a measure of investors. willingness to commit resources in the credit default swap (CDS) market, was also found to improve the valuation of investors. autonomous credit risk. Thus a failure to include a liquidity proxy could underestimate the implied autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk is defined as the fractional credit risk which does not vary with changes in market risk and liquidity conditions.

Corporate cash-pool valuation in a multi-firm context: a closed formula

Following our earlier paper on the subject, we present a general closed formula to value the interest savings due to a multi-firm cash-pool system. Assuming normal distribution of the accounts the total savings can be expressed as the product of three independent factors representing the interest spread, the number and the correlation of the firms, and the time-dependent distribution of the cash accounts. We derive analytic results for two special processes one characterizing the initial build-up period and the other describing the mature period. The value gained in the stationary system can be thought of as the interest, paid at the net interest spread rate on the standard deviation of the account. We show that pooling has substantial value already in the transient period. In order to increase the practical relevance of our analysis we discuss possible extensions of our model and we show how real option pricing technics can be applied here.

Agency problems of corporate philanthropy

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance (summary section only)

“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.

Corporate Governance in China (summary section only)

The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.

Décentralisation financière et pays en dévelopement: concepts, mesure et évaluation

Ce texte présente ce qu’est la décentralisation fiscale, fait ressortir ses forces et ses faiblesses et identifie les raisons de son succès, le tout dans le contexte de huit pays en développement en faisant appel à de l’information sur l’Argentine, la Chine, la Colombie, l’Inde, l’Indonésie, le Maroc, le Pakistan et la Tunisie. Le texte est divisé en trois parties. La première expose les concepts pertinents, la seconde présente un certain nombre d’indicateurs quantitatifs et la troisième évalue les conditions de succès de la décentralisation.

Fundamental Approach to Valuation of Securities -A Study with reference to Information Technology(IT) Sector Shares in Indian Stock Market

Department of Applied Economics,Cochin University of Science and Technology

Corporate governance and its influence on the investment decision process of equity market's professionals: An inside view of how corporate governance issues influence the decision-making process of sell-side and buy-side professionals when analyzing Brazilian listed companies

Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past two decades, being subject of numerous researches all over the world. Governance is pictured as a broad and diverse theme, evolving through different routes to form distinct systems. This scenario together with 2 types of agency problems (investor vs. management and minorities vs. controlling shareholders) produce different definitions for governance. Usually, studies investigate whether corporate governance structures influence firm performance, and company valuation. This approach implies investors can identify those impacts and later take them into consideration when making investment decisions. However, behavioral finance theory shows that not always investors take rational decisions, and therefore the modus operandi of those professionals needs to be understood. So, this research aimed to investigate to what extent Brazilian corporate governance standards and practices influence the investment decision-making process of equity markets' professionals from the sell-side and buy-side. This exploratory study was carried out through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative phase, 8 practitioners were interviewed and 3 dimensions emerged: understanding, pertinence and practice. Based on the interviews’ findings, a questionnaire was formulated and distributed to buy-siders and sell-siders that cover Brazilian stocks. 117 respondents from all over the world contributed to the study. The data obtained were analyzed through structural equation modeling and descriptive statistics. The 3 dimensions became 5 constructs: definition (institutionalized governance, informal governance), pertinence (relevance), practice (valuation process, structured governance assessment) The results of this thesis suggest there is no definitive answer, as the extent to which governance will influence an investment decision process will depend on a number of circumstances which compose the context. The only certainty is the need to present a “corporate governance behavior”, rather than simply establishing rules and regulations at firm and country level.

Investment Valuation with Tax-optimized Financing Decisions and a Tax-optimized Default Alternative

In this paper we evaluate an indivisible investment project that is carried out in a corporation under very simple premises. In particular, we discuss a one-period model with certainty, the pure domestic case and proportional tax rates. Surprisingly, the decision problem turns out to be rather complex if one has to make allowance for different taxation of the corporation and its owner. Altogether there are more than 10 cases that have to be distinguished if the firm's managers want to make a correct decision, depending on the relation of personal and corporate tax rates.

A Simple Accounting-based Valuation Model for the Debt Tax Shield

This paper describes a simple way to integrate the debt tax shield into an accounting-based valuation model. The market value of equity is determined by forecasting residual operating income, which is calculated by charging operating income for the operating assets at a required return that accounts for the tax benefit that comes from borrowing to raise cash for the operations. The model assumes that the firm maintains a deterministic financial leverage ratio, which tends to converge quickly to typical steady-state levels over time. From a practical point of view, this characteristic is of particular help, because it allows a continuing value calculation at the end of a short forecast period.

The Impact of Relationship Conflict on subjective Family Firm Valuation

The present paper empirically investigates the impact of family relationship conflict on subjective firm valuation by family firm owner managers. Drawing on the emerging socioemotional wealth perspective of corporate ownership, we find a U-shaped relationship between relationship conflict inside the family firm and subjective family firm valuation. This finding suggests that negatively valenced emotions induced by the conflict, at low levels of conflict, lead to emotion congruent withdrawal behavior and hence lower valuation. With conflicts gaining in fervor and severity, owner-managers start endowing and pricing sunk costs related to the conflict. This finding suggests that emotions do indeed have spill-over effects on monetary value perceptions and that negatively valenced emotions induced by relationship conflict are not linearly appraised. Rather, to understand the impact of negative emotions on corporate ownership appraisal and attachment it is required to reconcile the emotion congruency with the prospect theory perspective.