724 resultados para Contractual governance


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There is growing evidence that client firms expect outsourcing suppliers to transform their business. Indeed, most outsourcing suppliers have delivered IT operational and business process innovation to client firms; however, achieving strategic innovation through outsourcing has been perceived to be far more challenging. Building on the growing interest in the IS outsourcing literature, this paper seeks to advance our understanding of the role that relational and contractual governance plays in achieving strategic innovation through outsourcing. We hypothesized and tested empirically the relationship between the quality of client-supplier relationships and the likelihood of achieving strategic innovation, and the interaction effect of different contract types, such as fixed-price, time and materials, partnership and their combinations. Results from a pan-European survey of 248 large firms suggest that high-quality relationships between clients and suppliers may indeed help achieve strategic innovation through outsourcing. However, within the spectrum of various outsourcing contracts, only the partnership contract, when included in the client contract portfolio alongside either fixed-price, time and materials or their combination, presents a significant positive effect on relational governance and is likely to strengthen the positive effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation.

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The authors investigate channel incentives as extra-contractual governance processes that maintain and extend marketing channel relationships. More specifically, instrumental incentives are monetary-based payments made by a manufacturer in a unilateral channel arrangement to motivate distributor compliance, while equity incentives are bilateral expectations of fair treatment that motivate both parties to continue to cooperate with one another. A model of the antecedents and performance consequences of channel incentives is conceptualized and tested on 314 marketing channel relationships using a structural equation modeling methodology. The findings support the conceptual model and suggest that unique facets of the channel relationship explain the type of incentive mechanism in use.

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"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"

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Este trabalho buscou investigar a interação entre os mecanismos de governança contratual e relacional na relação comprador-fornecedor e seus impactos sobre os resultados de projetos complexos. A governança dos relacionamentos interorganizacionais e sua importância estratégica para o desempenho das firmas e para a obtenção de vantagens competitivas têm sido tema de muitas pesquisas recentes na área de estratégia, bem como em áreas correlatas. Mais especificamente, é crescente a importância de tais relacionamentos na literatura de gestão, especialmente em contextos envolvendo economias emergentes. A literatura apresenta uma convergência acerca de dois tipos principais de governança nos relacionamentos interorganizacionais: a governança contratual, que se refere aos contratos e regras formalmente estabelecidas entre as firmas para geralmente coibir comportamentos oportunistas, e a governança relacional, que se baseia principalmente na confiança e em normas relacionais para coordenar tais relacionamentos. Embora diversos estudos tenham investigado a interação entre essas governanças, não há um consenso na literatura sobre a natureza dessa interação. Este estudo teve por objetivo investigar a interação dos mecanismos de governança contratual e relacional por meio de um estudo de caso sobre a implantação de um megaprojeto na indústria brasileira do petróleo offshore, envolvendo tecnologia inovadora. Os resultados indicam que os mecanismos de governança contratual e relacional desempenham importantes funções no relacionamento comprador-fornecedor e que a interação entre eles impacta os resultados do projeto em termos de prazo, custo e qualidade. Tais mecanismos atuam de forma simultânea e influenciam uns aos outros em grande medida. Percebe-se ainda que o nível de influência de cada um desses mecanismos varia ao longo do tempo, a depender do contexto. Por fim, conclui-se que os resultados do projeto, no contexto estudado, não podem ser plenamente explicados apenas pela interação entre esses mecanismos. Tais resultados precisam ser contextualizados, uma vez que diversos fatores do ambiente institucional atuam como moderadores da interação entre governanças.

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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to understand how reverse resource exchanges and resource dependencies are managed in the service supply chain (SSC) of returnable transport packaging (RTP). Design/methodology/approach: A single case study was conducted in the context of automotive logistics focusing on the RTP SSC. Data were collected through 16 interviews, primarily with managers of a logistics service provider (LSP) and document analysis of contractual agreements with key customers of the packaging service. Findings: Resource dependencies among actors in the SSC result from the importance of the RTP for the customer’s production processes, the competition among users for RTP and the negative implications of the temporary unavailability of RTP for customers and the LSP (in terms of service performance). Amongst other things, the LSP is dependent on its customers and third-party users (e.g. the customer’s suppliers) for the timely return of package resources. The role of inter-firm integration and collaboration, formal contracts as well as customers’ power and influence over third-party RTP users are stressed as key mechanisms for managing LSP’s resource dependencies. Research limitations/implications: A resource dependence theory (RDT) lens is used to analyse how reverse resource exchanges and associated resource dependencies in SSCs are managed, thus complementing the existing SSC literature emphasising the bi-directionality of resource flows. The study also extends the recent SSC literature stressing the role of contracting by empirically demonstrating how formal contracts can be mobilised to explicate resource dependencies and to specify, and regulate, reverse exchanges in the SSC. Practical implications: The research suggests that logistics providers can effectively manage their resource dependencies and regulate reverse exchanges in the SSC by deploying contractual governance mechanisms and leveraging their customers’ influence over third-party RTP users. Originality/value: The study is novel in its application of RDT, which enhances our understanding of the management of reverse exchanges and resource dependencies in SSCs.

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This paper develops a process model of how and why complementarity and substitution form over time between contractual and relational governance in the context of information systems outsourcing. Our analysis identifies four distinct process patterns that explain this formation as the outcome of interaction processes between key elements of both contractual and relational governance. These patterns unveil the dynamic nature of complementarity and substitution. In particular, we show that the relationship between contractual and relational governance oscillates between complementarity and substitution. Those oscillations are triggered mainly by three types of contextual events (goal fuzziness, goal conflict, and goal misalignment). Surprisingly, substitution of informal control did not occur as an immediate reaction to external events but emerged as a consequence of preceding complementarity. Thus, our study challenges the prevailing view of an either/or dichotomy of complementarity and substitution by showing that they are causally connected over time.

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In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

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This study considers the question of the relationship between private labour regulation and workers' capacity to take collective action through the lens of an empirical study of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) 'performance standards' system of social and environmental conditionality. The study covered some 150 IFC client businesses in four world regions, drawing on data made public by the IFC as well as the results of a dedicated field survey that gathered information directly from workers, managers and union representatives. The study found that the application of the performance standards system has had remarkably little impact on union membership and social dialogue. In those few cases where change could be causally linked to the standards, the effect depended on the presence of workers' organizations that already had the capacity to take effective action on behalf of their members. The study also uncovered some prima facie evidence of breaches of freedom of association rights occurring with no reaction from IFC. The study concludes that the lack of impact is largely due to the private contractual structure that supposedly guarantees standards compliance.

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We develop a new governance perspective on port–hinterland linkages and related port impacts. Many stakeholders in a port’s hinterland now demand tangible economic benefits from port activities, as a precondition for supporting port expansion and infrastructural investments. We use a governance lens to assess this farsighted contracting challenge. We find that most contemporary economic impact assessments of port investment projects pay scant attention to the contractual relationship challenges in port-hinterland relationships. In contrast, we focus explicitly on the spatial distribution of such impacts and the related contractual relationship issues facing port authorities or port users and their stakeholders in the port hinterland. We introduce a new concept, the Port Hinterland Impact (PHI) matrix, which focuses explicitly on the spatial distribution of port impacts and related contractual relationship challenges. The PHI matrix offers insight into port impacts using two dimensions: logistics dedicatedness, as an expression of Williamsonian asset specificity in the sphere of logistics contractual relationships, and geographic reach, with a longer reach typically reflecting the need for more complex contacting to overcome ‘distance’ challenges with external stakeholders. We use the PHI matrix in our empirical, governance-based analysis of contractual relationships between the port authorities in Antwerp and Zeebrugge, and their respective stakeholders.