Contracting-out asset maintenance : how arrangements adapt over time

Technological and societal change, along with organisational and market change (driven by contracting-out and privatisation), are “creating a new generation of infrastructures” [1]. While inter-organisational contractual arrangements can improve maintenance efficiency through consistent and repeatable patterns of action - unanticipated difficulties in implementation can reduce the performance of these arrangements. When faced with unsatisfactory performance of contracting-out arrangements, government organisations may choose to adapt and change these arrangements over time, with the aim of improving performance. This paper enhances our understanding of ‘next generation infrastructures’ by examining adaptation of the organisational arrangements for the maintenance of these assets, in a case study spanning 20 years.

Control Patterns in Contracting-Out Relationships: It Matters What You Do, Not Who You Are

The contracting-out of public services has often been accompanied by a strong academic focus on the emergence of new governance forms, and a general neglect of the processes and practices through which contracted-out services are controlled and monitored. To fill this gap, we draw on contracting-out and inter-organizational control literatures to explore the adoption of control mechanisms for public service provision at the municipal level and the variables that can explain their choice. Our results, based on a survey of Italian municipalities, show that in the presence of contracting-out, market-, hierarchy- and trust-based controls display different intensities, can co-exist and are explained by different variables. Service characteristics are more effective in explaining market- and hierarchy-based controls than relationship characteristics. Trust-based controls are the most widespread, but cannot be explained by the variables traditionally identified in contracting-out and inter-organizational control studies.

Jurisdictional differences in contracting out GBE audits : the impact on audit pricing

This paper examines audit costs for government business enterprises in various Australian jurisdictions, focusing on whether contracting private-sector suppliers induces competitive pricing and hence lower-priced audits. One jurisdiction (New South Wales) is shown to have low levels of contracting-out. It is argued that this lowers price competition and therefore, we predict, audit costs in NSW will be higher than elsewhere in Australia. An empirical comparison shows that, controlling for other factors, NSW is statistically significantly more expensive than other Australian jurisdictions. Alternative explanations relating to variation in audit quality, jurisdiction differences and relative cost are also discussed.

The use of contracting out : a case study of decision-making and organisational learning in local government

One objective of government is to provide services at least cost whilst maintaining or improving service quality. While this may be an important objective, questions are being asked whether services can be provided more efficiently and effectively by the private rather than by the government sector. The shift of service provision from the public to the private sector is known as outsourcing or contracting out. The objective in this study is to critically examine whether the contracting out of services by local government to the private sector is an efficient management practice.

The contracting out of Parks and Grounds Maintenance services for the City of Kingston in the State of Victoria, Australia, is used as an exploratory case study to identify the variables associated with management decision-making in the contracting out process. Factors relevant to the contracting out decision such as the criteria used in selecting a contractor; the evaluation of a contractor’s performance; and any subsequent changes to management practice relating to the contracting out of the services are identified and discussed.

Political forces were found to be an important consideration in the initial contracting out decision, and the selection of a contractor was influenced by the potential to avoid costs. It was also found that under-bidding and associated cost /profit constraints lead to contractors engaging in non-sustainable environmental practices which resulted in the degradation of the local government’s Parks and Gardens assets. A sustainable asset management philosophy as opposed to an avoidable costs approach now underpins the contracting out process to ensure the preservation of such assets. Further, administrative processes have been revised to make tender specifications more prescriptive, critical components of services have been brought back in-house, and management practices have been amended so that a greater degree of control is exercised over contractors’ activities.

Business contracting-out practices.

"Summary 87-8."

Contracting out for federal support services

Mode of access: Internet.

Contracting out for federal support services : potential savings and budgetary impacts.

"October 1982"--P. [1] of cover.

Contracting out : potential for reducing federal costs.

"June 1987"--Cover.

The arbitration of two "management rights" issues; work assignments and contracting out, labor-management conference, New York City, February 4, 1960.

Mode of access: Internet.

Distant relations : limits to relational contracting in domestic violence programmes

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the applicability of relational contract theory in situations where government departments contract with non-government welfare organisations to deliver human service programmes. Its limits are highlighted by an assessment of programmes for domestically violent men that epitomise “management of incomplete contracts” central to the theory.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on an evaluation of contracted-out programmes for perpetrators of domestic violence in Australia that set out to compare and contrast distinct models of service delivery by documenting programme logic, service delivery effectiveness and effects on programme participants. It reflects on the difficulties of monitoring such programmes and considers the implications of this for contracting theory and for human service practice.

Findings – In contrast to critiques of contracting-out in a neo-liberal environment that emphasise how accountability and reporting requirements limit the autonomy of contracted agencies, this paper highlights considerable variation in how programmes were managed and delivered despite standardised service delivery contracts developed by the government department funding the programmes. This leads to a consideration of “incomplete contracts” where service delivery outcomes are hard to measure or there is limited knowledge of the contracted agencies by the contracting government department.

Originality/value – The paper highlights a situation in which the recommendations of relational contracting theory can exacerbate the difficulties of quality assurance rather than minimise them. It then argues a need for workforce development in the government departments and the contracted agencies, to enable a nuanced monitoring of the programmes' service delivery and promotion of quality assurance processes.