Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

A Logic Framework of Normative-based Contract Management

We explore of the feasibility of the computationally oriented institutional agency framework proposed by Governatori and Rotolo testing it against an industrial strength scenario. In particular we show how to encode in defeasible logic the dispute resolution policy described in Article 67 of FIDIC.

It's all in the contract: Rethinking feminist critiques of contract

This article examines contemporary feminist arguments about contract. It does not aim to advance new arguments for or against contract but to call into question the dominant feminist position which is that contract has to be cast aside and/or that alternative approaches to contract have to be developed in order to advance the position of women. In a reworking of Elizabeth Kingdom's anti-essentialist approach to rights, Sullivan argues that a feminist but non-essentialist approach to contract is both possible and desirable. Sullivan explores a number of concrete situations in the Australian context where contract approaches have been deployed in law and public policy and demonstrates that contract may be detrimental or advantageous to the position of women. Sullivan argues, therefore, for a strategic and critical feminist approach to the utilisation of the language and practice of contract.

An integrated system to support electricity tariff contract definition

This paper presents an integrated system that helps both retail companies and electricity consumers on the definition of the best retail contracts and tariffs. This integrated system is composed by a Decision Support System (DSS) based on a Consumer Characterization Framework (CCF). The CCF is based on data mining techniques, applied to obtain useful knowledge about electricity consumers from large amounts of consumption data. This knowledge is acquired following an innovative and systematic approach able to identify different consumers’ classes, represented by a load profile, and its characterization using decision trees. The framework generates inputs to use in the knowledge base and in the database of the DSS. The rule sets derived from the decision trees are integrated in the knowledge base of the DSS. The load profiles together with the information about contracts and electricity prices form the database of the DSS. This DSS is able to perform the classification of different consumers, present its load profile and test different electricity tariffs and contracts. The final outputs of the DSS are a comparative economic analysis between different contracts and advice about the most economic contract to each consumer class. The presentation of the DSS is completed with an application example using a real data base of consumers from the Portuguese distribution company.

No right to perform a contract?

Thesis submitted in Trinity Term 2001 for the degree of Master of Philosophy, Worcester College, Oxford

Contract law

Livro editado para celebrar dos 10 anos da Faculdade de Direito da UNL