Submission to expert panel on constitutional recognition of Indigenous people

Submission recommended addition of a new 'self-enacting' preamble and enacting words to the Commownealth Constitution, and replacement of the 'race power' by a series of more specific powers relating to the recognition of native title and laws of the indigenous people.

La souveraineté de l'État et le droit à des élections libres dans le contexte européen : essai fondé sur la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme (1987-2008)

L'une des critiques fondamentales adressées au mécanisme de contrôle et de surveillance de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme en matière électorale tient au risque qu'il portera atteinte à la souveraineté de l'État. En effet, certains auteurs estiment que l'autonomie constitutionnelle de l'État dans le domaine électoral, jusqu'à tout récemment strictement protégée, s'affaiblit sous l'influence de la protection des droits de l'homme dans le système européen. Le présent mémoire a pour but de déterminer les conditions imposées aux autorités étatiques par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme en vue d'assurer l'exercice efficace du droit à des élections libres. Ensuite, il analysera les effets de ces conditions sur la souveraineté des États parties à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Notre étude s'intéresse, dans un premier temps, à l'examen du principe de la souveraineté de l'État et de son évolution progressive sous l'influence des droits de l'homme. Dans un deuxième temps, elle présentera le droit à des élections libres et ses manifestations théoriques et jurisprudentielles. L'étude des affaires tranchées par la Cour européenne permettra de remarquer que la déférence qui est accordée à la souveraineté des États s'accompagne d'une certaine limitation de la marge d'appréciation des autorités étatiques en cas de privation de l'exercice efficace du droit à des élections libres. Ensuite, les acquis théoriques et conceptuels seront appliqués à l'étude des restrictions électorales relevant des mesures législatives, administratives et judiciaires des États ainsi que des conditions imposées par la Cour européenne. À cet égard, l'analyse de ces conditions nous permettra de saisir l'étendue de la limitation de la liberté d'action des États en matière électorale. Cette recension analytique nous permettra de conclure que le mécanisme de contrôle de la Cour européenne entraîne de multiples effets limitatifs sur la souveraineté des États.

Local government autonomy : needs for state constitutional statutory, and judicial clarification / [by Michael E. Libonati]

"October 1993."

Police accountability in Ireland: an analysis of the problems posed by the legal, constitutional and political dimensions and how they might be addressed

The concept of police accountability is not susceptible to a universal or concise definition. In the context of this thesis it is treated as embracing two fundamental components. First, it entails an arrangement whereby an individual, a minority and the whole community have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the formulation of the principles and policies governing police operations. Second, it presupposes that those who have suffered as victims of unacceptable police behaviour should have an effective remedy. These ingredients, however, cannot operate in a vacuum. They must find an accommodation with the equally vital requirement that the burden of accountability should not be so demanding that the delivery of an effective police service is fatally impaired. While much of the current debate on police accountability in Britain and the USA revolves around the issue of where the balance should be struck in this accommodation, Ireland lacks the very foundation for such a debate as it suffers from a serious deficit in research and writing on police generally. This thesis aims to fill that gap by laying the foundations for an informed debate on police accountability and related aspects of police in Ireland. Broadly speaking the thesis contains three major interrelated components. The first is concerned with the concept of police in Ireland and the legal, constitutional and political context in which it operates. This reveals that although the Garda Siochana is established as a national force the legal prescriptions concerning its role and governance are very vague. Although a similar legislative format in Britain, and elsewhere, have been interpreted as conferring operational autonomy on the police it has not stopped successive Irish governments from exercising close control over the police. The second component analyses the structure and operation of the traditional police accountability mechanisms in Ireland; namely the law and the democratic process. It concludes that some basic aspects of the peculiar legal, constitutional and political structures of policing seriously undermine their capacity to deliver effective police accountability. In the case of the law, for example, the status of, and the broad discretion vested in, each individual member of the force ensure that the traditional legal actions cannot always provide redress where individuals or collective groups feel victimised. In the case of the democratic process the integration of the police into the excessively centralised system of executive government, coupled with the refusal of the Minister for Justice to accept responsibility for operational matters, project a barrier between the police and their accountability to the public. The third component details proposals on how the current structures of police accountability in Ireland can be strengthened without interfering with the fundamentals of the law, the democratic process or the legal and constitutional status of the police. The key elements in these proposals are the establishment of an independent administrative procedure for handling citizen complaints against the police and the establishment of a network of local police-community liaison councils throughout the country coupled with a centralised parliamentary committee on the police. While these proposals are analysed from the perspective of maximising the degree of police accountability to the public they also take into account the need to ensure that the police capacity to deliver an effective police service is not unduly impaired as a result.

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive’s governing legitimacy. Inspired by Tilly (1984), we compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies the elected government of Ireland’s parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e. democratic) legitimacy while the executive government of Hong Kong’s administrative state favors output (i.e. performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

The Dynamics of Decentralization in Italy: Towards a Federal Solution? European Diversity and Autonomy Papers, EDAP/04 2013

This paper analyses the recent process of state decentralisation in Italy from the perspectives of political science and constitutional law. It considers the conflicting pressures and partisan opportunism of the decentralising process, and how these have adversely affected the consistency and completeness of the new constitutional framework. The paper evaluates the major institutional reforms affecting state decentralisation, including the 2001 constitutional reform and the more recent legislation on fiscal federalism. It argues that while the legal framework for decentralisation remains unclear and contradictory in parts, the Constitutional Court has performed a key role in interpreting the provisions and giving life to the decentralised system, in which regional governments now perform a much more prominent role. This new system of more decentralised multi-level government must nevertheless contend with a political culture and party system that remains highly centralised, while the administrative apparatus has undergone no comparable shift to take account of state decentralisation, leading to the duplication of bureaucracy at all territorial levels and continuing conflicts over policy jurisdiction. Unlike in federal systems these conflicts cannot be resolved in Italy through mechanisms of “shared rule”, since formal inter-governmental coordination structure are weak and entirely consultative.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Law, Rights and Reproduction: Reproductive Autonomy in Ethical Rationalism

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can expect to hold over our procreative capacities. This creates a multi-dimensional problem for the law in terms of access to services which prevent conception, access to services which terminate a pregnancy and recompensing those whose choices to avoid procreating are frustrated. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. In order to evaluate these three issues in relation to reproductive autonomy, I set out to investigate how the Gewirthian theory of ethical rationalism can be used to understanding the intersection between law, rights, and autonomy. As such, I assert that it is because of agents’ ability to engage in practical reason that the concept of legal enterprise should be grounded in rationality. Therefore, any attempt to understand notions of autonomy must be based on the categorical imperative derived from the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). As a result, I claim that (a) a theory of legal rights must be framed around the indirect application of the PGC and (b) a model of autonomy must account for the limitations drawn by the rational exercise of reason. This requires support for institutional policies which genuinely uphold the rights of agents. In so doing, a greater level of respect for and protection of reproductive autonomy is possible. This exhibits the full conceptual metamorphosis of the PGC from a rational moral principle, through an ethical collective principle, a constitutional principle of legal reason, a basis for rights discourse, and to a model of autonomy. Consequently, the law must be reformed to reflect the rights of agents in these situations and develop an approach which demonstrates a meaningful respect of autonomy. I suggest that this requires rights of access to services, rights to reparation and duties on the State to empower productive agency.

Maternal support for autonomy : relationships with persistence for children with Down syndrome and typically developing children

Maternal behaviors and child mastery behaviors were examined in 25 children with Down syndrome and 43 typically developing children matched for mental age (24–36 months). During a shared problem-solving task, there were no group differences in maternal directiveness or support for autonomy, and mothers in the two groups used similar verbal strategies when helping their child. There were also no group differences in child mastery behaviors, measured as persistence with two optimally challenging tasks. However, the two groups differed in the relationships of maternal style with child persistence. Children with Down syndrome whose mothers were more supportive of their autonomy in the shared task displayed greater persistence when working independently on a challenging puzzle, while children of highly directive mothers displayed lower levels of persistence. For typically developing children, persistence was unrelated to maternal style, suggesting that mother behaviors may have different causes or consequences in the two groups.

Voter behaviour and constitutional change in Australia since 1967

Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last referendum in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times. This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums. In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the =yes‘ and =no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated. Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.

Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: a Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis

Legislation regulating advance directives exists in six Australian jurisdictions. In all of these jurisdictions, legislation was enacted to enshrine the common law right of a competent adult to refuse treatment in advance, even if that treatment was required to sustain life. It was thought that enshrining the common law would also enshrine the principle of autonomy on which the common law was based. This article explores whether this is the case by examining the legislative restrictions that are imposed on a competent adult who wishes to complete an advance directive refusing treatment. The article reviews the legislation in all Australian jurisdictions and concludes that, while many of the legislative restrictions can be justified, many cannot as they effectively erode rather than promote the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment.