Annotation taken, in the perspective of criminal and constitutional law, as well as in criminology, to the decision of the portuguese constitutional court, of January 13, 2011 – with respect to the problems of “consent” and “medical act”

1 – Summary of the decision taken by the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of January 13, 2011; 2 – Complete text of the decision of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of January 13, 2011, Judge Maria João ANTUNES (Reporter), Judge Carlos Pamplona de OLIVEIRA, Judge José Borges SOEIRO, Judge Gil GALVÃO, Judge Rui Manuel Moura RAMOS (President) –in terms of the tribunalconstitucional.pt, August 1, 2011; 3 – Brief annotation to the problem of the “medical act”; 3.1 – Plus some conclusions on the brief annotation to the problem of the “medical act”; 3.2 – Brief annotation to the problem of “consent”– continuation of the previous comments; 4 – Conclusions. It must never be forgotten that “consent” does not stand as the only cause of exclusion of unlawfulness.

The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

Die deutsche Europapolitik unter den Vorgaben des Bundesverfassungsgerichts = The German European policy under the provisions of the Federal Constitutional Court. ZEI Discussion Paper No. C 218, 2013

No abstract.

A Critique of Kosovo’s Internationalized Constitutional Court. EDAP 2014/02

The quality and the sustainability of the democratic institutions established in post-independence Kosovo under the guidance of the international community depend to a large extent on the performance of its constitutional court. The considerable international investment in that court reflects this assessment. One of the reasons why Kosovo’s international supervision has recently been terminated is that such court has been deemed to be functioning well. But its performance has not yet adequately been scrutinized. This essay reviews its most significant judgments, including decisions that deposed a president, annulled a presidential election, prevented a general election, and abolished the inviolability of parliament. The analysis of the reasons and effects of such rulings leads to the conclusion that the court gravely lacks independence and is subject to heavy political interference, which also the international judges do not seem immune from. The performance of the court is both a manifestation and a cause of Kosovo’s acute governance problems, which its international supervision has failed to remedy. The international community’s approach towards the court is also an illustration of the reasons why statebuilding in Kosovo led to unsatisfactory results, despite unprecedented investment.

A digest of the laws of the United States & the State of South-Carolina now of force, relating to the militia : with an appendix, containing the patrol laws; the laws of the government of slaves and free persons of colour; the decisions of the Constitutional Court and Court of Appeals of South- Carolina therein; and an abstract from the rules and regulations of the United States' Army /

Mode of access: Internet.

Reports of judicial decisions in the Constitutional court, of the state of South-Carolina; held at Charleston and Columbia, during the years 1812, 13, 14, 15, and 16. To which is added, two cases determined in the Court of equity in the year eighteen hundred & twenty-two.

Mode of access: Internet.

Reports of cases determined in the Constitutional Court of South Carolina.

"Appendix. Note A. On the subject of nudum pactum, in connexion with the Statute of frauds ... " v. 3, p. [569]-595.

Reports of cases determined in the Constitutional Court of South-Carolina /

Includes cases from 1823-1824.

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.

Minimum Vital of Drinking Water in the Jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court

The minimum vital of drinking water for vulnerable people isprotected by the Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence,locally and nationally. The Constitutional Court has created asolid jurisprudential line on the right to water in relation to thesuspension of water supply service for the customer’s failure topay for the service; this Court has also defined the conditionsnecessary for the companies to refrain from suspending serviceand the minimum amount necessary for survival. Compliance withthese sentences has been limited to the orders pronounced to thebenefit of the company that provides such service, including theexecution of payment agreements for accessing the water supply.The implementation of the free minimum vital of drinking water inColombia has been defined through targeting and requirements thatare set only to benefit market laws, such as payment agreements,except for Bogota that, from the point of view of human rights,has proposed the respect for the minimum vital of drinking waterfor all social strata.

In Search for the European solidarity: The rule of law within the European Union in the framework of constitutional pluralism

The dissertation examines the rule of law within the European Union in the theoretical framework of constitutional pluralism. The leading lines of constitutional pluralism are examined with relation to the traditional and prevailing, monistic and hierarchical conceptions on how to perceive legal orders in Europe. The theoretical part offers also historical perspective by highlighting some of the turning points for the Union constitutional legal order in the framework of European integration. The concept of rule of law is examined in legal terms and its meaning to the Union constitutional constellation as a constitutional principle and a common value is observed. The realization of the rule of law at supranational and national level is explored with a view to discover that recent developments in some of the Member States give rise to concern about the viability of the rule of law within the European Union. It is recognized that the inobservance of the rule of law at national level causes a threat to the supranational constitutional legal order. The relationship between the supranational and national legal orders is significant in this respect and therefore particularly the interaction between the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the ECJ) and the Member States’ (constitutional/supreme) courts takes focus. It is observed that functioning dialogue between the supranational and national courts based on mutual respect and judicial deference is an important prerequisite for the realization of the rule of law within Europe. In order to afford a concrete example, a recent case C-62/14 Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag is introduced and analysed in relation to the notorious relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the ECJ. The implications of the ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag is assessed with reference to some of the pressing issues of constitutionalism within Europe and some institutional aspects are also brought forward. Lastly, the feasibility of constitutional pluralism as a theoretical setting is measured against the legal reality of today’s Europe and its many constitutions. The hierarchical idea of one ultimate source of power, stemming from the traditional approaches to legal systems, is then assessed with relation to the requirement of the realization of the rule of law within the European Union from the supranational and national point of view.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.