The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

A influência exercida pelo amicus curiae nos votos dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal nos acórdãos das ações direta de inconstitucionalidade decididas majoritariamente

O projeto de pesquisa ora apresentado à banca de qualificação da Escola de Direito do Rio de Janeiro da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Poder Judiciário, situa-se na área de concentração das práticas jurisdicionais de fim. O problema de pesquisa é o processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal, com o objetivo específico de estudar a influência exercida por atores externos ao Tribunal nas decisões de seus Ministros. Dentro desta problemática, o recorte escolhido foi a análise da influência exercida por agentes que participam formalmente dos processos sob a jurisdição do Supremo, atuando como amici curiae nas ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade. A dissertação está estruturada em está estruturado em 3 (três) seções, da seguinte forma: a primeira seção faz uma introdução da problemática escolhida e da metodologia utilizada, assim como os indicadores para a realização da análise da existência ou não da influência dos argumentos trazidos pelo amicus curiae. A segunda seção traz breve descrição acerca do controle concentrado de constitucionalidade e o papel do amicus curiae na ação direta de inconstitucionalidade. Traz, ainda, o estudo feito por Damares Medina, a diferença deste trabalho com relação ao primeiro e as ADI estudadas. A terceira seção traz uma análise do processo decisório nos tribunais e a influência exercida pelo amicus curiae nas decisões majoritárias do Supremo Tribunal Federal, em especial, o caso das ações direta de inconstitucionalidade, bem como a análise dos dados encontrados nas 53 (cinqüenta e três) ADI estudadas. Por fim, tem-se a conclusão deste trabalho.

Como são julgados os juízes? Uma análise do controle disciplinar do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (2005-2013)

Uma das principais modificações introduzidas pela Reforma do Judiciário (Emenda Constitucional 45/2004) foi a criação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ). Dentre suas competências constitucionais, a do controle dos deveres funcionais dos magistrados por meio dos Processos Administrativos Sancionadores foi bastante questionada, chegando a ser objeto de controle concentrado de constitucionalidade pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). A composição do Conselho foi também alvo de reiteradas críticas, pois considerável parte dos conselheiros (6 dos 15, representando 40% do total) é composta por membros não oriundos da magistratura – vindos do Ministério Público, da Advocacia, além dos Juristas indicados pelo Congresso Nacional -, os conselheiros não-juízes. O Poder Judiciário, historicamente hermético e corporativista, passava a ser controlado por um órgão novo, um Conselho de Justiça que não contava apenas com conselheiros juízes entre seus membros. O presente trabalho estudou o CNJ a partir desses dois pontos mais controversos, com enfoque no controle disciplinar exercido pelo órgão sobre a magistratura nacional. Conselhos de Justiça, em especial em sua feição disciplinar, devem lidar com e existente tensão entre controle (ou accountability) e independência judicial. Observamos a atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça em vista dessa constante tensão ao longo de sua historia: por meio de uma análise que percorreu um período que vai da instalação do CNJ, em 2005, até o final do ano de 2013. Identificamos, com isso, as estratégias de legitimação institucional utilizadas para o exercício da competência disciplinar, analisamos as normas jurídicas surgidas nesse período, bem como descrevemos qual o perfil dos atores que ocuparam as cadeiras do colegiado enquanto conselheiros. Como resultado dessa observação, importante destacar que o Conselho Nacional de Justiça jogou luz sobre um Poder historicamente fechado, mas que ainda apresenta problemas de transparência. A dificuldade de localizar dados sobre matérias mais sensíveis (processos administrativos sancionadores) e as ausências de envio de informações quando solicitadas foram marcantes na pesquisa. Sobre o comportamento do órgão, mobilizamos a variável do profissionalismo (com especial enfoque na origem de carreira) para interpretar esse processo. Esperávamos um Conselho com duas características: corporativista e pouco harmônico. As análises empíricas quantitativas, que compuseram um retrato de todos os Processos Administrativos Sancionadores julgados até o final de 2013 pelo CNJ, mostraram um cenário inverso: um colegiado não corporativista e coeso. Mesmo em vista dessas características globais, identificamos que existem importantes diferenças no comportamento decisório e, quando elas estão presentes, o elemento da carreira é influente.

Associações religiosas e jurisdição constitucional: a legitimidade ativa e a laicidade do Estado

O estudo tem como objetivo verificar a constitucionalidade da Proposta de Emenda à Constituição (PEC) nº 99/2011, em tramitação perante o Congresso Nacional. A PEC propõe positivar Associações Religiosas de âmbito nacional como legitimados ao ensejo da jurisdição constitucional. Como forma de viabilizar o estudo proposto, será analisada a evolução do controle de constitucionalidade concentrado no Brasil e a ratio para a adoção do rol de legitimados ativos, especialmente na Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Nesse sentido, faz-se necessário inicialmente analisar o entendimento e as iniciativas do Supremo Tribunal Federal para reduzir o número de ações do controle concentrado propostas, para então entender a necessidade da inclusão das Associações Religiosas no artigo 103 da Constituição da República. Torna-se igualmente indispensável conceituar “Poder Constituinte Derivado”, buscando identificar os limites à alteração da Constituição e analisar se a referida PEC violaria algum dos limites materiais. Conforme se demonstrará, a PEC violaria a laicidade do Estado e os direitos individuais tutelados na CRFB/88, tais quais a igualdade, o pluralismo religioso e a liberdade de crença, todos cláusulas pétreas, consoante o disposto no artigo 60 da Constituição.

Repercussão geral e súmula vinculante: os efeitos no controle difuso

Brazil since its first republican constitution has adopted systems of laws control. The review activity was given to three state powers or functions state, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. However, it appears that in the country along the constitutional history, has stood considerably the jurisdictional control of the most important control. Initially, back in 1891, Brazil adopted the jurisdictional control of diffuse from U.S, whose role in monitoring of standards is delivered to all organs of the judiciary, which may face a case, put on trial, ascertain whether or not the possibility of applying a law, removing its impact in case of unconstitutionality. In 1969, entered in the second legal model of judicial review, the concentrated control of constitutionality, whose inspiration comes from the positivist theory of Hans Kelsen, and was adopted by the Austrian Constitution of 1920. According to the abstract control the supervision of law is given to a Court or Constitutional Court, responsible for the analysis of the legal constitutionality independent of its application to a specific case. In Brazil the role of concentrated control was handed over exclusively to the Supreme Court, which serves as the Constitutional Court, which accumulates that function with other constitutionally provided jurisdiction. Throughout this period, from 1891 until today, Brazil has maintained a dual system of judicial control of legal constitutionality, where they coexist and harmonize the diffuse control exercised by any organ of the Judiciary, and concentrated control of competence the Supreme Court. However, one must recognize that with the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988, the concentrated control has emerged on the national stage due to two important factors: the expansion of the legal capacity to sue and the inclusion of other ways control, besides the already known Direct Claim of Unconstitutionality. This concentrated control and projection of the Supreme Court s attempt to become a true constitutional court, led to a relative weakening of diffuse control even when performed by the Brazilian Constitutional Court. In order to become a true constitutional court, all decisions handed down by the Supreme in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction should have the same weight and the same measure, or at least bring improvement to similar effects, once is the responsible for the final word when it comes to constitutional interpretation. Thus, the writs of certiorari and stare decisis were responsible for profound changes in the diffuse control, allowing the Supreme Court can strengthen its decisions even in the diffuse control. These two institutions have substantially changed the legal status of diffuse control, allowing an extension of the effects of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court, so that you can no longer be said that the effects of this control to restrict the disputing parties in the process

Aspects of the design and control of manufacturing systems subject to demand uncertainty

The recent explosive growth in advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) and continued development of sophisticated information technologies (IT) is expected to have a profound effect on the way we design and operate manufacturing businesses. Furthermore, the escalating capital requirements associated with these developments have significantly increased the level of risk associated with initial design, ongoing development and operation. This dissertation has examined the integration of two key sub-elements of the Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) system, namely the manufacturing facility and the production control system. This research has concentrated on the interactions between production control (MRP) and an AMT based production facility. The disappointing performance of such systems has been discussed in the context of a number of potential technological and performance incompatibilities between these two elements. It was argued that the design and selection of operating policies for both is the key to successful integration. Furthermore, policy decisions are shown to play an important role in matching the performance of the total system to the demands of the marketplace. It is demonstrated that a holistic approach to policy design must be adopted if successful integration is to be achieved. It is shown that the complexity of the issues resulting from such an approach required the formulation of a structured design methodology. Such a methodology was subsequently developed and discussed. This combined a first principles approach to the behaviour of system elements with the specification of a detailed holistic model for use in the policy design environment. The methodology aimed to make full use of the `low inertia' characteristics of AMT, whilst adopting a JIT configuration of MRP and re-coupling the total system to the market demands. This dissertation discussed the application of the methodology to an industrial case study and the subsequent design of operational policies. Consequently a novel approach to production control resulted. A central feature of which was a move toward reduced manual intervention in the MRP processing and scheduling logic with increased human involvement and motivation in the management of work-flow on the shopfloor. Experimental results indicated that significant performance advantages would result from the adoption of the recommended policy set.