Compulsory licensing of standard-essential patents and injunctive relief as abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU

When a dominant undertaking holding a standard-essential patent uses its exclusive right to the IP to seek injunctions against those wishing to produce either de jure or de facto standard compliant products, it creates a conflict between the exclusive right to the use of the IP on the one hand and the possible abuse of dominance due to the exclusionary conduct on the other. The aim of the thesis is to focus on the issues concerning abuse of dominance in violation of Article 102 TFEU when the holder of the standard-essential patent seeks an injunction against a would-be licensee. The thesis is mainly based on the most recent ECJ case law in Huawei and the Commission’s recent decisions in Samsung and Motorola. The case law in Europe prior to those decisions was mainly focused on the German case law from Orange Book Standard which provided IP holders great leverage due to the almost automatic granting of injunctions against infringers. The ECJ in Huawei set out the requirements for when a de jure standard-essential patent holder would not be violating Article 102 TFEU when seeking an injunction, requiring that negotiations in good faith must take place prior to the seeking of the injunction and that all offers must comply with FRAND terms, thus limiting the scope of case law derived from Orange Book Standard in Germany. The ECJ chose not to follow all of the reasoning the Commission had laid out in Samsung and Motorola which provided a more licensee-friendly approach on the matter, but rather chose a compromise between the IP holder friendly German case law and the Commission’s decisions. However, the ECJ did not disclose how FRAND terms themselves should be interpreted, but rather left it for the national courts to decide. Furthermore, the thesis strongly argues that Huawei did not change the fact that only vertically integrated IP holders who have made a FRAND declaration are subject to the terms laid out in Huawei, thus leaving non-practicing entities such as patent trolls and entities that have not made a FRAND declaration outside its scope. The resulting conclusion from the thesis is that while the ECJ in Huawei presented new exceptional circumstances for when an IP holder could be abusing its dominant position when it seeks an injunction, it still left many more questions answered, such as the meaning of FRAND and whether deception in giving a FRAND declaration is prohibited under Article 102 TFEU or not.

Patenting genetic materials' unresolved issues and promoting competition in biotechnology

This paper addresses the broader unresolved issues posed by the patenting of genetic materials that are central to dealing with the tension between the patenting and competition schemes, namely distinguishing between what has already been 'discovered' and economically useful innovations (including the thresholds for novelty and non-obviousness), the exclusion of some subject matter from patenting and the restrictions on access to genetic resources to facilitate further innovation. The possible solutions of raising the threshold patenting standards, taking advantage of international intellectual property law developments and compulsory licensing are examined as ways to ameliorate the possibly detrimental consequences of current genetic material patenting practices. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Multinational drug corporations, intellectual property rights and the Canadian state : a historical and critical analysis

This study critically analyzes the historical role and influence of multinational drug cotpOrations and multinational corporations in general; the u.s. government and the Canadian state in negotiating the global recognition ofIntellectual Property Rights (IPR) under GATT/NAFTA. This process began in 1969 when the Liberal government, in response to high prices for brand-name drugs amended the Patent Act to introduce compulsory licensing by reducing monopoly protection from 20 to seven years. Although the financial position ofthe multinational drug industry was not affected, it campaigned vigorously to change the 1969 legislation. In 1987, the Patent Act was amended to extend protection to 10 years as a condition for free trade talks with the u.s. Nonetheless, the drug industry was not satisfied and accused Canada of providing a bad example to other nations. Therefore, it continued to campaign for global recognition ofIPR laws under GATT. Following the conclusion of the GATTI Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) in 1991, the multinational drug industry and the American government, to the surprise of many, were still not satisfied and sought to implement harsher conditions under NAFTA. The Progressive Conservative government readily agreed without any objections or consideration for the social consequences. As a result, Bill C-91 was introduced. It abandoned compulsory licenses and was made retroactive from December 21, 1991. It is the contention of this thesis that the economic survival of multinational corporations on a global scale depends on the role and functions of the modem state. Similarly, the existence of the state depends on the ideological-political and socioeconomic assistance it gives to multinational corporations on a national and international scale. This dialectical relation of the state and multinational corporations is explored in our theoretical and historical analysis of their role in public policy.

Accès aux médicaments : comment expliquer et améliorer la situation au Brésil

Le Brésil figure parmi les plus grands marchés consommateurs de médicaments. Cependant, le droit à l'accès aux médicaments, prévu dans sa Constitution Fédérale, ne fait pas partie de sa réalité. Cette situation est attribuable à plusieurs facteurs: le Brésil n'est pas capable de répondre à ses besoins internes et la consommation de médicaments n'est pas équilibrée. En réaction à cette constatation, nous analyserons la situation juridique actuelle du Brésil, afin d'indiquer les lacunes et barrières au plein accès aux médicaments et, surtout, de trouver une solution qui pourrait améliorer cette situation. Les organismes gouvernementaux brésiliens jouant un rôle important dans le développement des nouveaux médicaments sont présentés et, ensuite, l'encadrement juridique applicable à la recherche clinique et à l'autorisation de mise en marché des nouveaux médicaments est analysé; un bref survol de la législation applicable aux médicaments génériques est fait. Dans un deuxième moment de l'étude, la question d'accès aux nouveaux médicaments est mise en lumière: la législation brésilienne relative aux brevets, ainsi que le régime de licence obligatoire sont abordés; de plus, nous évaluons la compatibilité de ce régime avec l'Accord sur les ADPIC et nous évoquons les conflits internationaux qu'il a suscités. En vue de trouver des solutions aux difficultés brésiliennes identifiées, nous concluons notre étude avec l'examen de l'initiative canadienne pour favoriser l'accès aux médicaments aux pays du Sud (RCAN). Nous constatons que l'utilisation du RCAM pourrait, à court terme, favoriser l'accès aux médicaments au Brésil et, à moyen terme, aider à réduire les conflits internationaux. Finalement, à long terme, nous croyons que le Brésil pourrait jouer un rôle de leader international en adoptant une loi semblable à celle du Canada et, ainsi, il serait capable d'aider d'autres pays dans le besoin, qui n'ont aucune capacité de production locale, comme par exemple, plusieurs pays en Afrique.

Licença compulsória para medicamentos como política pública: o caso do anti-retroviral efavirenz

O objetivo deste estudo é avaliar o processo de implementação da Licença Compulsória no caso do anti-retroviral efavirenz. Esta pesquisa é de caráter descritivo, o meio de investigação foi o estudo de caso e foi conduzido com entrevistas semi-estruturadas contendo questões abertas para um conjunto de atores representativos da área da Saúde Pública que participaram do processo da licença compulsória residentes nos estados do Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo e no Distrito Federal durante os meses de outubro a dezembro de 2009. Permitiu-se que esses indivíduos se expressassem mais ou menos livremente de forma que eles produzissem discursos. Para a análise dos discursos, utilizou-se a técnica do Discurso do Sujeito Coletivo (DSC). Os resultados demonstraram que o Brasil possui capacitação tecnológica para desenvolver e produzir anti-retrovirais em um prazo relativamente curto. Os resultados mostram ainda que a Licença Compulsória ajudou a refrear os gastos com anti-retrovirais e que o instrumento pode ser utilizado para garantir o acesso da população a medicamentos anti-retrovirais de alto custo e estratégicos para o Sistema Único de Saúde em um ambiente de recursos limitados sempre que se chegar a um impasse na negociação para redução de preços com os laboratórios farmacêuticos transnacionais.

Patentes e licenciamentos compulsórios de medicamentos: o marco regulatório internacional e a ação dos países em desenvolvimento

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Licenciamento provisório da patente: inibidores de protease no tratamento da Hepatite C crônica

Pós-graduação em Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento (Biotecnologia Médica) - FMB

An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.

Commentary on Foreign Reprints Act 1847

Legislation enabling colonial territories to import unauthorised foreign reprints subject to the payment of an import duty, to be collected for the benefit of British publishers.
The commentary explores the background to the Foreign Reprints Act 1847, and in particular, the differences between the British and colonial markets for literary works, and the introduction of 'responsible government' in the colonies. It also considers the movement in the late 1860s and early 1870s, on the part of the British book trade, to have the legislation repealed, as well as the efforts of the Canadian legislature to replace the import scheme with a system of compulsory licensing, set against the backdrop of increasingly fractious Anglo-Canadian copyright relations. The Canadian demands for compulsory licensing scheme were by and large abandoned, and the 1847 Act remained on the statute books until the passing of the Copyright Act 1911.

Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.

Licensing in an international market

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically superior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for sufficiently large technological differences between the firms under both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing.

Inclusion of children identified as having special educational needs (SEN) within the Austrian compulsory educational system

Este artigo pretende descrever vários aspetos da segregação, integração e inclusão dentro do sistema educativo obrigatório austríaco. Após uma introdução que contém definições e um resumo internacional, será brevemente descrito o sistema educativo da Áustria. Subsequentemente, três temas de interesse serão debatidos. Primeiro será caracterizada a situação atual referente à inclusão de crianças com necessidades educativas especiais. Esta situação difere bastante entre estados federais. Serão descritos os desenvolvimentos que conduziram à situação atual. Em segundo serão apresentados estudos empíricos recentes relativos ao movimento austríaco que almeja a inclusão. Em terceiro e a título exemplificativo serão apresentados em detalhe alguns desenvolvimentos recentes, alguns planos e visões futuras de três estados federais austríacos.

Licensing in an international triopoly

We study the effects of entry of two foreign firms on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the incumbent is technologically superior to the entrants. We consider two different situations: (i) the cost-reducing innovation is licensed to both entrants; (ii) the cost- reducing innovation is licensed to just one of the entrants. We analyse three kind of license: (lump- sum) fixed-fee; (per-unit) royalty; and two-part tariff, that is a combination of a fixed-fee and a royalty. We prove that a two part tariff is never an optimal licensing scheme for the incumbent. Moreover, (i) when the technology is licensed to the two entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only output royalty; and (ii) when the technology is licensed to just one of the entrants, the optimal contract consists of a licensing with only a fixed-fee.