Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

Approaches Regarding the Competition in Romanian Sugar Market

This paper proposes an economic instrument designed to assess the competitive nature of the sugar industry in Romania. In the first part of the paper is presented the theoretical background underlying index (HHI) and its calculation methodology. Then comes the results of a first application of this index for a total of 10 plants in the sugar industry, the robustness of these results is discussed. We believe HHI is a proactive tool that may prove useful competition authority, in its pursuit of continuous monitoring of various industries in the economy and in the internal decision-making on resource allocation institution (Peacock, and Prisecaru, 2013).The starting point of our research is to free competition in the European market with competitors much stronger than Romanian plants, plants that produce at a price lower than the domestic ones. In our study we will see if it is a concentration of production in factories around the strongest in Romania, concentration accompanied by the collapse of those who could not resist the market.The market concentration, competition policy, we will follow using the HHI index, for evaluation of impact analysis on existing trade, the number and size of competitors, protecting existing sales structures, avoiding disruptions in the competitive environment, etc.

“Nova” lei da concorrência de 2012 é mais justiça?

Quando foi publicado o “novo” Regime Jurídico da Concorrência (RJC) no D.R. de 8/5/12, logo se falou de “grande reforma no sector da concorrência” por “iluminados”. Acontece que de acordo com o art. 101º do RJC, a lei só entraria em vigor passados 60 dias. Até aqui tudo normal. É preciso uma “vacatio legis” para a adaptação dos destinatários, incluindo a Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC). Abstract: When published the "new" Legal Framework for Competition (RJC) in DR 05.08.12, soon spoke of "major reform in the competitive sector" by "enlightened". It turns out that according to art. 101 of the RJC, the law would only enter into force after 60 days. So far so normal. It takes a "vacatio legis" to adapt the recipients, including the Competition Authority (CA).

Zon-Optimus merger: Case study

The present Work Project was performed as a Case Study, analysing the merger between Zon, a leading Portuguese Pay TV operator and Optimus, the third largest mobile company in Portugal. The Case Study was developed with the purpose of understanding the value creation of the Zon-Optimus merger, being analysed the: (i) industry trends, (ii) parties’ contribution, (iii) pre-merger events, (iv) merger rationale, (v) deal structure and valuation, (vi) competition authority decision and (vii) competitive advantages and future strategy. Was also attached a Teaching Note where synergies, implied valuations, exchange ratios, shareholder agreements, swot analysis, among others, were duly analysed.

Determinant factors to merger control decisions in Portugal

The present paper aims to investigate the determinant factors of Portuguese merger control. Our sample comprises 652 M&A cases occurred between January of 2003 and September of 2015. Through a probit model we have tested the relevance of product and geographic market, entry barriers, type of concentration, merger effects, year of decision and the President of the Competition Authority at the time. The results suggests that the conglomerate and vertical effects, the existence of barriers to entry as well as the number of regulatory agencies listened are the main explanatory variables to determine a need for an in-depth investigation and to make a final decision. According to the evidence, cases cleared at Phase 1 are increasing over time. The number of prohibited mergers is close to zero.

PT Multimedia

The purpose of the present case – and accompanying Teaching Notes – is to better understand the spin-off of PT Multimédia, by Portugal Telecom, after receiving a Public Takeover Offer from Sonaecom, in 2006. The Government and the Competition Authority had never looked in a serious way at PT’s dominant position and the lack of room for competition in the TMT sector – PT was the owner of both the cable and copper networks, having access to privileged information from its competitors with control over the wholesale and retail businesses. In 2006, the company received a takeover offer from Sonaecom, the TMT subsidiary from the Portuguese conglomerate Sonae. The offer was voted and rejected by a majority of PT shareholders, but the whole process triggered several recommendations from the regulatory bodies. As a result, PT divested its cable business with the spin-off of PT Multimédia, giving birth to a new competitor and a totally different landscape in the telecommunications sector in Portugal.

A Retail benchmarking approach to eficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network covera.

Human Capital, the Structure of Production, and Growth

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Kilpailustrategia ja sen toteuttaminen yrityskaupoilla

Työn tavoitteena oli kuvailla yritysten kilpailustrategiaa ja sen toteuttamista yrityskaupoilla. Työssä on ensin käyty läpi kilpailustrategian ja kilpailuedun teoriaa ja edelleen yrityskauppoja kilpailustrategian toteuttamisessa. Työn soveltavassa osuudessa on tarkasteltu esimerkkiyrityksenä Sonera Oyj:tä ja kahta sen toteuttamaa yritysjärjestelyä vuosina 2000 ja 2001. Soveltavan osuuden osalta pääasiallisena lähteenä on käytetty yrityskauppojen kilpailuoikeudellisen arvioinnin julkisia asiakirjoja ja tarkasteltu niissä esiintyviä huomioita Sonera Oyj :n kilpailustrategiasta yleisesti sekä erityisesti edellä mainittuihin yrityskauppoihin liittyen. Kilpailustrategioiden kuvaamiseen on useita erilaisia malleja, jotka ovat osittain päällekkäisiä ja osittain toisistaan eroavia. Yritykset voivat toteuttaa kilpailustrategiaa esimerkiksi sisäisellä kehityksellä, alliansseilla sekä muilla liittoutumilla muiden yritysten kanssa ja yritysostoilla. Yrityskaupat ovat siis yksi keino toteuttaa valittua kilpailustrategiaa. Yrityskauppojen taustalla on kuitenkin usein muitakin tekijöitä ja tavoitteita kuin kilpailustrategiaan liittyviä. Kilpailuviranomaisen ja yrityksen näkemykset kilpailutilanteesta ovat usein ymmärrettävästi poikkeavat. Yrityskauppavalvonnan tavoitteena on turvata markkinoiden kilpailullinen rakenne ja arvioinnissa ei lähtökohtaisesti olla kiinnostuneita kaupan taustalla olevista kilpailustrategioista tai motiiveista vaan arviointi keskittyy kaupan vaikutuksiin. Kuitenkin voidaan sanoa, että syntyvän yrityskeskittymän käyttäytymiseen liittyvien väitteiden täytyy olla yhteneviä yrityksen realistisen kilpailustrategian kannalta.

Determinantes dos impactos sobre a estrutura de mercado brasileira das fusões e aquisições recentes

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o recente processo de fusões e a aquisições na economia brasileira, no tocante aos seus impactos sobre a concentração. Busca-se verificar correlações entre a natureza da operação e algumas variáveis econômicas referentes às empresas envolvidas. Através de dados dos relatórios de julgamento dos atos de concentração do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) e dos pareceres econômicos formulados pela Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico do Ministério da Fazenda (SEAE), realiza-se um estudo econométrico através do modelo logit. A suposição é de que operações de natureza horizontal possuem efeitos prejudiciais maiores sobre a concentração de mercado do que as de natureza vertical e/ou conglomerado. O resultado obtido mostra que a desnacionalização de empresas e as operações ocorridas em alguns setores aumentam a concentração, enquanto que nas operações de abrangência mundial este efeito é menor.

Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

Gestão coletiva de direitos autorais da execução pública musical no Brasil: o processo de reforma do sistema ECAD pela lei 12.853 de 2013

Este trabalho se propõe a fazer uma análise do processo da reforma legislativa trazida pela lei 12.853/13 ao sistema brasileiro de gestão coletiva de direitos autorais da execução pública musical, centralizado na figura do Escritório Central de Arrecadação e Distribuição. Para tanto, é feita uma descrição de como esse sistema funcionava anteriormente, quais as críticas a ele apresentadas e quais mudanças a nova lei trouxe. Aborda-se o conceito de gestão coletiva, a organização deste setor no Brasil, a CPI do Senado Federal sobre o Ecad, o julgamento deste órgão por ilícitos antitruste pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, o processo legislativo da reforma e as ADIs propostas no Supremo Tribunal Federal contra ela. Assim é exposto como o discurso de autonomia na gestão coletiva é substituído pelo da regulação, que se mostra mais adequado à realidade brasileira para sanar grande parte dos problemas encontrados no setor e melhorar a situação de titulares e usuários de direitos autorais. Neste campo eivado de conflitos e disputas, agora está nas mãos do Supremo Tribunal Federal decidir pela constitucionalidade da nova lei.