The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

Troca de serviços e incentivos em sistemas P2P

Trabalho apresentado no âmbito do Mestrado em Engenharia Informática, como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática

Detecting Free Riders in Collective Brands through a Hierarchical Choice Process

Free-riding behaviors exist in tourism and they should be analyzed from a comprehensive perspective; while the literature has mainly focused on free riders operating in a destination, the destinations themselves might also free ride when they are under the umbrella of a collective brand. The objective of this article is to detect potential free-riding destinations by estimating the contribution of the different individual destinations to their collective brands, from the point of view of consumer perception. We argue that these individual contributions can be better understood by reflecting the various stages that tourists follow to reach their final decision. A hierarchical choice process is proposed in which the following choices are nested (not independent): “whether to buy,” “what collective brand to buy,” and “what individual brand to buy.” A Mixed Logit model confirms this sequence, which permits estimation of individual contributions and detection of free riders.

Monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union with country-size asymmetry

Within a country-size asymmetric monetary union, idiosyncratic shocks and national fiscal stabilization policies cause asymmetric cross-border effects. These effects are a source of strategic interactions between noncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies: on the one hand, due to larger externalities imposed on the union, large countries face less incentives to develop free-riding fiscal policies; on the other hand, a larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank incentives the use of fiscal policy to, deliberately, influence monetary policy. Additionally, the existence of non-distortionary government financing may also shape policy interactions. As a result, optimal policy regimes may diverge not only across the union members, but also between the latter and the monetary union. In a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model for a monetary union, we consider two fiscal policy scenarios: (i) lump-sum taxes are raised to fully finance the government budget and (ii) lump-sum taxes do not ensure balanced budgets in each period; therefore, fiscal and monetary policies are expected to impinge on debt sustainability. For several degrees of country-size asymmetry, we compute optimal discretionary and dynamic non-cooperative policy games and compare their stabilization performance using a union-wide welfare measure. We also assess whether these outcomes could be improved, for the monetary union, through institutional policy arrangements. We find that, in the presence of government indebtedness, monetary policy optimally deviates from macroeconomic to debt stabilization. We also find that policy cooperation is always welfare increasing for the monetary union as a whole; however, indebted large countries may strongly oppose to this arrangement in favour of fiscal leadership. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank proves to be fruitful to improve the union’s welfare.

Voting and Peer Effects: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique*

Voter education campaigns often aim to increase voter particpation and political accountability. We follow randomized interventions implemented nationwide during the 2009 Mozambican elections using a free newspaper, leaflets, and text messaging. We investigate whether treatment effects were transmitted through social networks (kinship and chatting) and geographical proximity. For individuals personally targeted by the campaign, we estimate the reinforcement effect of proximity to other targeted individuals. For untargeted individuals, we estimate the diffusion of the campaign depending on a proximity to targeted individuals. We find evidence for both effects, similar across the different treatments and across the different connectedness measures. We observe that the treatments worked through the networks by raising the levels of information and interest about the election, in line with the average treatment effects of voter education on voter participation. We interpret this result as a free riding effect, likely to occur for costly actions

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Inequality and a repeated joint project

Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort.

Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy

Free‐riding is often associated with self‐interested behaviour. However if there is a global mixed pollutant, free‐riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For behaviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. We propose a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting in their own self‐interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did. We show that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in self‐interested fashion.

The determinants of pricing in pharmaceuticals: Are U.S. prices really higher than those of Canada?

This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers.Another key finding is that the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers casts doubt on the ability of countries to pursue "free-riding" regulation.

Analyse en identification partielle de la décision d'émigrer des étudiants africains

La migration internationale d’étudiants est un investissement couteux pour les familles dans beaucoup de pays en voie de développement. Cependant, cet investissement est susceptible de générer des bénéfices financiers et sociaux relativement importants aux investisseurs, tout autant que des externalités pour d’autres membres de la famille. Cette thèse s’intéresse à deux aspects importants de la migration des étudiants internationaux : (i) Qui part? Quels sont les déterminants de la probabilité de migration? (ii) Qui paie? Comment la famille s’organise-t-elle pour couvrir les frais de la migration? (iii) Qui y gagne? Ce flux migratoire est-il au bénéfice du pays d’origine? Entreprendre une telle étude met le chercheur en face de défis importants, notamment, l’absence de données complètes et fiables; la dispersion géographique des étudiants migrants en étant la cause première. La première contribution importante de ce travail est le développement d’une méthode de sondage en « boule de neige » pour des populations difficiles à atteindre, ainsi que d’estimateurs corrigeant les possibles biais de sélection. A partir de cette méthodologie, j’ai collecté des données incluant simultanément des étudiants migrants et non-migrants du Cameroun en utilisant une plateforme internet. Un second défi relativement bien documenté est la présence d’endogénéité du choix d’éducation. Nous tirons avantage des récents développements théoriques dans le traitement des problèmes d’identification dans les modèles de choix discrets pour résoudre cette difficulté, tout en conservant la simplicité des hypothèses nécessaires. Ce travail constitue l’une des premières applications de cette méthodologie à des questions de développement. Le premier chapitre de la thèse étudie la décision prise par la famille d’investir dans la migration étudiante. Il propose un modèle structurel empirique de choix discret qui reflète à la fois le rendement brut de la migration et la contrainte budgétaire liée au problème de choix des agents. Nos résultats démontrent que le choix du niveau final d’éducation, les résultats académiques et l’aide de la famille sont des déterminants importants de la probabilité d’émigrer, au contraire du genre qui ne semble pas affecter très significativement la décision familiale. Le second chapitre s’efforce de comprendre comment les agents décident de leur participation à la décision de migration et comment la famille partage les profits et décourage le phénomène de « passagers clandestins ». D’autres résultats dans la littérature sur l’identification partielle nous permettent de considérer des comportements stratégiques au sein de l’unité familiale. Les premières estimations suggèrent que le modèle « unitaire », où un agent représentatif maximise l’utilité familiale ne convient qu’aux familles composées des parents et de l’enfant. Les aidants extérieurs subissent un cout strictement positif pour leur participation, ce qui décourage leur implication. Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent expliquer les cas de participation d’un aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ces derniers. Finalement, le troisième chapitre présente le cadre théorique plus général dans lequel s’imbriquent les modèles développés dans les précédents chapitres. Les méthodes d’identification et d’inférence présentées sont spécialisées aux jeux finis avec information complète. Avec mes co-auteurs, nous proposons notamment une procédure combinatoire pour une implémentation efficace du bootstrap aux fins d’inférences dans les modèles cités ci-dessus. Nous en faisons une application sur les déterminants du choix familial de soins à long terme pour des parents âgés.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

Should kids pay their own way?

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised such that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this paper, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.