Embodied Autonomy in Digital Ecosystems: From Bio-Inspired Agents to Cognitive Systems

This paper proposes to promote autonomy in digital ecosystems so that it provides agents with information to improve the behavior of the digital ecosystem in terms of stability. This work proposes that, in digital ecosystems, autonomous agents can provide fundamental services and information. The final goal is to run the ecosystem, generate novel conditions and let agents exploit them. A set of evaluation measures must be defined as well. We want to provide an outline of some global indicators, such as heterogeneity and diversity, and establish relationships between agent behavior and these global indicators to fully understand interactions between agents, and to understand the dependence and autonomy relations that emerge between the interacting agents. Individual variations, interaction dependencies, and environmental factors are determinants of autonomy that would be considered. The paper concludes with a discussion of situations when autonomy is a milestone

Cognitive systems associated with the hippocampus of the human brain and their role in behaviour and neurodegenerative disease

Cognitive systems research involves the synthesis of ideas from natural and artificial systems in the analysis, understanding, and design of all intelligent systems. This chapter discusses the cognitive systems associated with the hippocampus (HC) of the human brain and their possible role in behaviour and neurodegenerative disease. The hippocampus (HC) is concerned with the analysis of highly abstract data derived from all sensory systems but its specific role remains controversial. Hence, there have been three major theories concerning its function, viz., the memory theory, the spatial theory, and the behavioral inhibition theory. The memory theory has its origin in the surgical destruction of the HC, which results in severe anterograde and partial retrograde amnesia. The spatial theory has its origin in the observation that neurons in the HC of animals show activity related to their location within the environment. By contrast, the behavioral inhibition theory suggests that the HC acts as a ‘comparator’, i.e., it compares current sensory events with expected or predicted events. If a set of expectations continues to be verified then no alteration of behavior occurs. If, however, a ‘mismatch’ is detected then the HC intervenes by initiating appropriate action by active inhibition of current motor programs and initiation of new data gathering. Understanding the cognitive systems of the hippocampus in humans may aid in the design of intelligent systems involved in spatial mapping, memory, and decision making. In addition, this information may lead to a greater understanding of the course of clinical dementia in the various neurodegenerative diseases in which there is significant damage to the HC.

Towards architectural foundations for cognitive self-aware systems

In this talk we address a proposal concerning a methodology for extracting universal, domain neutral, architectural design patterns from the analysis of biological cognition. This will render a set of design principles and design patterns oriented towards the construction of better machines. Bio- inspiration cannot be a one step process if we we are going to to build robust, dependable autonomous agents; we must build solid theories first, departing from natural systems, and supporting our designs of artificial ones.

Cognitive neuroimaging: Cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuroimaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory.

Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Anticipatory engineering: anticipation in sensory-motor systems of human

In visual tracking experiments, distributions of the relative phase be-tween target and tracer showed positive relative phase indicating that the tracer precedes the target position. We found a mode transition from the reactive to anticipatory mode. The proposed integrated model provides a framework to understand the antici-patory behaviour of human, focusing on the integration of visual and soma-tosensory information. The time delays in visual processing and somatosensory feedback are explicitly treated in the simultaneous differential equations. The anticipatory behaviour observed in the visual tracking experiments can be ex-plained by the feedforward term of target velocity, internal dynamics, and time delay in somatosensory feedback.

Conceptual spaces and consciousness: Integrating cognitive and affective processes

In the book Conceptual Spaces: the Geometry of Thought [2000] Peter Gärdenfors proposes a new framework for cognitive science. Complementary to symbolic and subsymbolic [connectionist] descriptions, conceptual spaces are semantic structures constructed from empirical data representing the universe of mental states. We argue that Gärdenfors' modeling can be used in consciousness research to describe the phenomenal conscious world, its elements and their intrinsic relations. The conceptual space approach affords the construction of a universal state space of human consciousness, where all possible kinds of human conscious states could be mapped. Starting from this approach, we discuss the inclusion of feelings and emotions in conceptual spaces, and their relation to perceptual and cognitive states. Current debate on integration of affect/emotion and perception/cognition allows three possible descriptive alternatives: emotion resulting from basic cognition; cognition resulting from basic emotion, and both as relatively independent functions integrated by brain mechanisms. Finding a solution for this issue is an important step in any attempt of successful modeling of natural or artificial consciousness. After making a brief review of proposals in this area, we summarize the essentials of a new model of consciousness based on neuro-astroglial interactions. © 2011 World Scientific Publishing Company.

Spectrum Sensing Algorithms for Cognitive Radio Applications

Future wireless communications systems are expected to be extremely dynamic, smart and capable to interact with the surrounding radio environment. To implement such advanced devices, cognitive radio (CR) is a promising paradigm, focusing on strategies for acquiring information and learning. The first task of a cognitive systems is spectrum sensing, that has been mainly studied in the context of opportunistic spectrum access, in which cognitive nodes must implement signal detection techniques to identify unused bands for transmission. In the present work, we study different spectrum sensing algorithms, focusing on their statistical description and evaluation of the detection performance. Moving from traditional sensing approaches we consider the presence of practical impairments, and analyze algorithm design. Far from the ambition of cover the broad spectrum of spectrum sensing, we aim at providing contributions to the main classes of sensing techniques. In particular, in the context of energy detection we studied the practical design of the test, considering the case in which the noise power is estimated at the receiver. This analysis allows to deepen the phenomenon of the SNR wall, providing the conditions for its existence and showing that presence of the SNR wall is determined by the accuracy of the noise power estimation process. In the context of the eigenvalue based detectors, that can be adopted by multiple sensors systems, we studied the practical situation in presence of unbalances in the noise power at the receivers. Then, we shift the focus from single band detectors to wideband sensing, proposing a new approach based on information theoretic criteria. This technique is blind and, requiring no threshold setting, can be adopted even if the statistical distribution of the observed data in not known exactly. In the last part of the thesis we analyze some simple cooperative localization techniques based on weighted centroid strategies.

How Minds Work: A Cognitive Theory of Everything - a Tutorial on the IDA Model of Cognition

The IDA model of cognition is a fully integrated artificial cognitive system reaching across the full spectrum of cognition, from low-level perception/action to high-level reasoning. Extensively based on empirical data, it accurately reflects the full range of cognitive processes found in natural cognitive systems. As a source of plausible explanations for very many cognitive processes, the IDA model provides an ideal tool to think with about how minds work. This online tutorial offers a reasonably full account of the IDA conceptual model, including background material. It also provides a high-level account of the underlying computational “mechanisms of mind” that constitute the IDA computational model.

Verbalization of Dependencies Between Concepts Built Through Fuzzy Cognitive Maps

The new computing paradigm known as cognitive computing attempts to imitate the human capabilities of learning, problem solving, and considering things in context. To do so, an application (a cognitive system) must learn from its environment (e.g., by interacting with various interfaces). These interfaces can run the gamut from sensors to humans to databases. Accessing data through such interfaces allows the system to conduct cognitive tasks that can support humans in decision-making or problem-solving processes. Cognitive systems can be integrated into various domains (e.g., medicine or insurance). For example, a cognitive system in cities can collect data, can learn from various data sources and can then attempt to connect these sources to provide real time optimizations of subsystems within the city (e.g., the transportation system). In this study, we provide a methodology for integrating a cognitive system that allows data to be verbalized, making the causalities and hypotheses generated from the cognitive system more understandable to humans. We abstract a city subsystem—passenger flow for a taxi company—by applying fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs). FCMs can be used as a mathematical tool for modeling complex systems built by directed graphs with concepts (e.g., policies, events, and/or domains) as nodes and causalities as edges. As a verbalization technique we introduce the restriction-centered theory of reasoning (RCT). RCT addresses the imprecision inherent in language by introducing restrictions. Using this underlying combinatorial design, our approach can handle large data sets from complex systems and make the output understandable to humans.

Emotions and the Engineering of Adaptiveness in Complex Systems

A major challenge in the engineering of complex and critical systems is the management of change, both in the system and in its operational environment. Due to the growing of complexity in systems, new approaches on autonomy must be able to detect critical changes and avoid their progress towards undesirable states. We are searching for methods to build systems that can tune the adaptability protocols. New mechanisms that use system-wellness requirements to reduce the influence of the outer domain and transfer the control of uncertainly to the inner one. Under the view of cognitive systems, biological emotions suggests a strategy to configure value-based systems to use semantic self-representations of the state. A method inspired by emotion theories to causally connect to the inner domain of the system and its objectives of wellness, focusing on dynamically adapting the system to avoid the progress of critical states. This method shall endow the system with a transversal mechanism to monitor its inner processes, detecting critical states and managing its adaptivity in order to maintain the wellness goals. The paper describes the current vision produced by this work-in-progress.

Emotions and the Engineering of Adaptiveness in Complex Systems

A major challenge in the engineering of complex and critical systems is the management of change, both in the system and in its operational environment. Due to the growing of complexity in systems, new approaches on autonomy must be able to detect critical changes and avoid their progress towards undesirable states. We are searching for methods to build systems that can tune the adaptability protocols. New mechanisms that use system-wellness requirements to reduce the influence of the outer domain and transfer the control of uncertainly to the inner one. Under the view of cognitive systems, biological emotions suggests a strategy to configure value-based systems to use semantic self-representations of the state. A method inspired by emotion theories to causally connect to the inner domain of the system and its objectives of wellness, focusing on dynamically adapting the system to avoid the progress of critical states. This method shall endow the system with a transversal mechanism to monitor its inner processes, detecting critical states and managing its adaptivity in order to maintain the wellness goals. The paper describes the current vision produced by this work-in-progress.

Cognitive neuroimaging: Cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the Study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and Subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuromiaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory. (C) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Identifying constraints on children with movement difficulties : implications for pedagogues and clinicians

A constraints- based framework for understanding processes of movement coordination and control is predicated on a range of theoretical ideas including the work of Bernstein (1967), Gibson (1979), Newell (1986) and Kugler, Kelso & Turvey (1982). Contrary to a normative perspective that focuses on the production of idealized movement patterns to be acquired by children during development and learning (see Alain & Brisson, 1986), this approach formulates the emergence of movement co- ordination as a function of the constraints imposed upon each individual. In this framework, cognitive, perceptual and movement difficulties and disorders are considered to be constraints on the perceptual- motor system, and children’s movements are viewed as emergent functional adaptations to these constraints (Davids et al., 2008; Rosengren, Savelsbergh & van der Kamp, 2003). From this perspective, variability of movement behaviour is not viewed as noise or error to be eradicated during development, but rather, as essentially functional in facilitating the child to satisfy the unique constraints which impinge on his/her developing perceptual- motor and cognitive systems in everyday life (Davids et al., 2008). Recently, it has been reported that functional neurobiological variability is predicated on system degeneracy, an inherent feature of neurobiological systems which facilitates the achievement of task performance goals in a variety of different ways (Glazier & Davids, 2009). Degeneracy refers to the capacity of structurally different components of complex movement systems to achieve different performance outcomes in varying contexts (Tononi et al., 1999; Edelman & Gally, 2001). System degeneracy allows individuals with and without movement disorders to achieve their movement goals by harnessing movement variability during performance. Based on this idea, perceptual- motor disorders can be simply viewed as unique structural and functional system constraints which individuals have to satisfy in interactions with their environments. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate how the interaction of structural and functional organismic, and environmental constraints can be harnessed in a nonlinear pedagogy by individuals with movement disorders.

General theory of stigmergy : modelling stigma semantics

Stigmergy is a biological term used when discussing a sub-set of insect swarm-behaviour describing the apparent organisation seen during their activities. Stigmergy describes a communication mechanism based on environment-mediated signals which trigger responses among the insects. This phenomenon is demonstrated in the behavior of ants and their food gathering process when following pheromone trails, where the pheromones are a form of environment-mediated communication. What is interesting with this phenomenon is that highly organized societies are achieved without an apparent management structure. Stigmergy is also observed in human environments, both natural and engineered. It is implicit in the Web where sites provide a virtual environment supporting coordinative contributions. Researchers in varying disciplines appreciate the power of this phenomenon and have studied how to exploit it. As stigmergy becomes more widely researched we see its definition mutate as papers citing original work become referenced themselves. Each paper interprets these works in ways very specific to the research being conducted. Our own research aims to better understand what improves the collaborative function of a Web site when exploiting the phenomenon. However when researching stigmergy to develop our understanding we discover a lack of a standardized and abstract model for the phenomenon. Papers frequently cited the same generic descriptions before becoming intimately focused on formal specifications of an algorithm, or esoteric discussions regarding sub-facets of the topic. None provide a holistic and macro-level view to model and standardize the nomenclature. This paper provides a content analysis of influential literature documenting the numerous theoretical and experimental papers that have focused on stigmergy. We establish that stigmergy is a phenomenon that transcends the insect world and is more than just a metaphor when applied to the human world. We present from our own research our general theory and abstract model of semantics of stigma in stigmergy. We hope our model will clarify the nuances of the phenomenon into a useful road-map, and standardise vocabulary that we witness becoming confused and divergent. Furthermore, this paper documents the analysis on which we base our next paper: Special Theory of Stigmergy: A Design Pattern for Web 2.0 Collaboration.