A rights management approach to securing data distribution in coalitions

As network capacity has increased over the past decade, individuals and organisations have found it increasingly appealing to make use of remote services in the form of service-oriented architectures and cloud computing services. Data processed by remote services, however, is no longer under the direct control of the individual or organisation that provided the data, leaving data owners at risk of data theft or misuse. This paper describes a model by which data owners can control the distribution and use of their data throughout a dynamic coalition of service providers using digital rights management technology. Our model allows a data owner to establish the trustworthiness of every member of a coalition employed to process data, and to communicate a machine-enforceable usage policy to every such member.

Geographical information systems : an effective planning and decision-making platform for community health coalitions in Australia

The development of locally-based healthcare initiatives, such as community health coalitions that focus on capacity building programs and multi-faceted responses to long-term health problems, have become an increasingly important part of the public health landscape. As a result of their complexity and the level of investment, it has become necessary to develop innovative ways to help manage these new healthcare approaches. Geographical Information Systems (GIS) have been suggested as one of the innovative approaches that will allow community health coalitions to better manage and plan their activities. The focus of this paper is to provide a commentary on the use of GIS as a tool for community coalitions and discuss some of the potential benefits and issues surrounding the development of these tools.

Building community coalitions for the promotion of physical activity: 10,000 steps Rockhampton

The 10,000 Steps Rockhampton project is a multi-strategy community-wide, physical activity intervention based on the simultaneous implementation of five strategies, each identified as 'best practice' for the promotion of physical activity. Several community partners were engaged to develop and implement the strategies during the first eighteen months of the project. These included: the local media (TV, newspaper and radio); the local Division of General Practice and other health professional groups; the Heart Foundation and ‘Just Walk It’; the local council; and several large worksites. A local physical activity task force was also formed to administer a 'micro-grants' scheme, and to guide the development of community based strategies. The presentation will focus on the critical elements involved in developing and maintaining relationships with community partners. These include identification and ‘courting’ of potential partners, strategies for keeping them engaged, and the challenges of maintaining the balance between ‘top-down’ (evidence-based) and ‘bottom-up’ (community-driven) strategies. Data on implementation and uptake of the key strategies will also be presented. These include: 1) process data on the number of health

Multiple UAV Coalitions for a Search and Prosecute Mission

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to carry resources in support of search and prosecute operations. Often to completely prosecute a target, UAVs may have to simultaneously attack the target with various resources with different capacities. However, the UAVs are capable of carrying only limited resources in small quantities, hence, a group of UAVs (coalition) needs to be assigned that satisfies the target resource requirement. The assigned coalition must be such that it minimizes the target prosecution delay and the size of the coalition. The problem of forming coalitions is computationally intensive due to the combinatorial nature of the problem, but for real-time applications computationally cheap solutions are required. In this paper, we propose decentralized sub-optimal (polynomial time) and decentralized optimal coalition formation algorithms that generate coalitions for a single target with low computational complexity. We compare the performance of the proposed algorithms to that of a global optimal solution for which we need to solve a centralized combinatorial optimization problem. This problem is computationally intensive because the solution has to (a) provide a coalition for each target, (b) design a sequence in which targets need to be prosecuted, and (c) take into account reduction of UAV resources with usage. To solve this problem we use the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) technique. Through simulations, we study the performance of the proposed algorithms in terms of mission performance, complexity of the algorithms and the time taken to form the coalition. The simulation results show that the solution provided by the proposed algorithms is close to the global optimal solution and requires far less computational resources.

Building coalitions, creating change: an agenda for gender transformative research in development Workshop Report 3-5 October 2012, Penang, Malaysia

There is compelling evidence that increased gender equity can make a significant contribution towards alleviating poverty and increasing food security. But past efforts to integrate gender into agricultural research and development practice have failed to address the inequalities that limit women’s access to agricultural inputs, markets, resources and advice. A Gender Transformative Approach (GTA) goes beyond just considering the symptoms of gender inequality, and addresses the social norms, attitudes, behaviors and social systems that underlie them. The CGIAR Research Program on Aquatic Agricultural Systems (AAS) has placed the GTA at the heart of its gender strategy. This workshop was an opportunity for researchers, practitioners and donors working in this area to address the challenge of how to translate this approach into actual research and development practice. The workshop recommended that a GTA should be adopted alongside, not instead of, existing efforts to reverse gender disparities in resources, technologies and markets. It is through this pairing that improved social and material outcomes can be achieved, with the expectation that when achieved together, both types of outcomes will be more lasting than if achieved individually.

Building coalitions, creating change: An agenda for gender transformative research in agricultural development

The CGIAR Research Program on Aquatic Agricultural Systems (AAS) has developed its Gender Research in Development Strategy centered on a transformative approach. Translating this strategy into actual research and development practice poses a considerable challenge, as not much (documented) experience exists in the agricultural sector to draw on, and significant innovation is required. A process of transformative change requires reflecting on multiple facets and dimensions simultaneously. This working paper is a collation of think pieces, structured around broad the mes and topics, reflecting on what works (and what does not) in the application of gender transformative approaches in agriculture and other sectors, and seeking to stimulate a discussion on the way forward for CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) and other programs to build organizational capacities and partnerships.

Growth Coalitions and Rural Development Police in the EU and the US

A recent issue of EuroChoices (7:1) was devoted to a discussion of comparative US-EU rural development policies. This article discusses the concept of growth coalitions, well developed in urban literature but less so in rural literature. Some light is shed on the different positions of rural and environmental issues in EU and US policies. The agricultural lobby is the dominant actor in agricultural growth coalitions because it perceives land in terms of its exchange value. Environmental and rural development actors perceive land in terms of its use value and its contributions to quality of life: they form a rural development coalition, seeing the need to balance growth with quality of life, but they have less political power than the agricultural growth coalition. In the European context, rural and environmental agendas are linked to a multi-functional agricultural agenda allowing common ground between these two coalitions and greater visibility in the policy arena. In the US, rural interests and environmental groups are more often in opposition to agriculture. This reduces their political visibility and clout. The challenge is how to link the power of the agricultural growth coalitions with rural development coalitions to achieve a broader balance of concerns and a more effective rural development policy.

MASCEM improvement for agent based coalitions

This paper presents MASCEM - Multi-Agent Simulator for Electricity Markets improvement towards an enlarged model for Seller Agents coalitions. The simulator has been improved, both regarding its user interface and internal structure. The OOA, used as development platform, version was updated and the multi-agent model was adjusted for implementing and testing several negotiations regarding Seller agents’ coalitions. Seller coalitions are a very important subject regarding the increased relevance of Distributed Generation under liberalised electricity markets.

Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Coalitions ou (ré)élections? Atelier sur la dissolution parlementaire et la responsabilité ministérielle

Enregistrement audio de "Coalitions ou (ré)élections? Atelier sur la dissolution parlementaire et la responsabilité ministérielle", tenu à l'Université de Montréal le 21 janvier 2009

Decisive Coalitions and Coherence Properties

In a seminal contribution, Hansson has demonstrated that the family of decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter. If the population under consideration is infinite, his result implies the existence of nondictatorial social welfare functions. He goes on to show that if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity as the coherence property imposed on a social relation, the set of decisive coalitions is a filter. We examine the structure of decisive coalitions and analogous concepts with alternative coherence properties, namely, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency, and without assuming that the social relation is complete.

Agreements with overlapping coalitions

Dans certaines circonstances, des actions de groupes sont plus performantes que des actions individuelles. Dans ces situations, il est préférable de former des coalitions. Ces coalitions peuvent être disjointes ou imbriquées. La littérature économique met un fort accent sur la modélisation des accords où les coalitions d’agents économiques sont des ensembles disjoints. Cependant on observe dans la vie de tous les jours que les coalitions politiques, environnementales, de libre-échange et d’assurance informelles sont la plupart du temps imbriquées. Aussi, devient-il impératif de comprendre le fonctionnement économique des coalitions imbriquées. Ma thèse développe un cadre d’analyse qui permet de comprendre la formation et la performance des coalitions même si elles sont imbriquées. Dans le premier chapitre je développe un jeu de négociation qui permet la formation de coalitions imbriquées. Je montre que ce jeu admet un équilibre et je développe un algorithme pour calculer les allocations d’équilibre pour les jeux symétriques. Je montre que toute structure de réseau peut se décomposer de manière unique en une structure de coalitions imbriquées. Sous certaines conditions, je montre que cette structure correspond à une structure d’équilibre d’un jeu sous-jacent. Dans le deuxième chapitre j’introduis une nouvelle notion de noyau dans le cas où les coalitions imbriquées sont permises. Je montre que cette notion de noyau est une généralisation naturelle de la notion de noyau de structure de coalitions. Je vais plus loin en introduisant des agents plus raffinés. J’obtiens alors le noyau de structure de coalitions imbriquées que je montre être un affinement de la première notion. Dans la suite de la thèse, j’applique les théories développées dans les deux premiers chapitres à des cas concrets. Le troisième chapitre est une application de la relation biunivoque établie dans le premier chapitre entre la formation des coalitions et la formation de réseaux. Je propose une modélisation réaliste et effective des assurances informelles. J’introduis ainsi dans la littérature économique sur les assurances informelles, quatre innovations majeures : une fusion entre l’approche par les groupes et l’approche par les réseaux sociaux, la possibilité d’avoir des organisations imbriquées d’assurance informelle, un schéma de punition endogène et enfin les externalités. Je caractérise les accords d’assurances informelles stables et j’isole les conditions qui poussent les agents à dévier. Il est admis dans la littérature que seuls les individus ayant un revenu élevé peuvent se permettre de violer les accords d’assurances informelles. Je donne ici les conditions dans lesquelles cette hypothèse tient. Cependant, je montre aussi qu’il est possible de violer cette hypothèse sous d’autres conditions réalistes. Finalement je dérive des résultats de statiques comparées sous deux normes de partage différents. Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, je propose un modèle d’assurance informelle où les groupes homogènes sont construits sur la base de relations de confiance préexistantes. Ces groupes sont imbriqués et représentent des ensembles de partage de risque. Cette approche est plus générale que les approches traditionnelles de groupe ou de réseau. Je caractérise les accords stables sans faire d’hypothèses sur le taux d’escompte. J’identifie les caractéristiques des réseaux stables qui correspondent aux taux d’escomptes les plus faibles. Bien que l’objectif des assurances informelles soit de lisser la consommation, je montre que des effets externes liés notamment à la valorisation des liens interpersonnels renforcent la stabilité. Je développe un algorithme à pas finis qui égalise la consommation pour tous les individus liés. Le fait que le nombre de pas soit fini (contrairement aux algorithmes à pas infinis existants) fait que mon algorithme peut inspirer de manière réaliste des politiques économiques. Enfin, je donne des résultats de statique comparée pour certaines valeurs exogènes du modèle.