MASCEM improvement for agent based coalitions

This paper presents MASCEM - Multi-Agent Simulator for Electricity Markets improvement towards an enlarged model for Seller Agents coalitions. The simulator has been improved, both regarding its user interface and internal structure. The OOA, used as development platform, version was updated and the multi-agent model was adjusted for implementing and testing several negotiations regarding Seller agents’ coalitions. Seller coalitions are a very important subject regarding the increased relevance of Distributed Generation under liberalised electricity markets.

Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions

In this paper, we characterize two power indices introduced in [1] using two different modifications of the monotonicity property first stated by [2]. The sets of properties are easily comparable among them and with previous characterizations of other power indices.

Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Coparenting and Toddler's Interactive Styles in Family Coalitions

The current study examined the coparenting and toddler's interactive styles in family coalitions. According to structural family theory, boundaries between generations are clear in alliances, but disturbed in coalitions: the parents look to the child to regulate their conflictual relationship and the child attempts to meet this need. In a normative sample studied longitudinally during the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation (LTP, N=38), 15 coalition cases were detected. Styles of coparenting and of child's interactions were determined and compared in coalition and alliance cases at 18 months. Findings confirm the structural family model by showing the specific ways in which the coparenting and the toddler's interactive styles are associated in 3 different patterns of coalitions: binding, detouring, and triangulation. They illustrate how the child's triangular capacity, or her ability to simultaneously communicate with both parents, is used to regulate the parents' relationship. They suggest that the LTP observational paradigm is a promising assessment method of early family interactions. They point to the importance of assessing early the child's contribution to family coalitions.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered