Coalition formation during technology adoption

The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is a prominent framework that addresses the challenge of organisations to understand and promote the factors that lead to acceptance of new technologies. Nevertheless, our understanding of one of the model's key variables – social influence – remains limited. Drawing upon earlier studies that address the role of referent individuals to technology acceptance, this paper introduces the notion of ‘coalition’ as a social group that can affect the opinion of other members within an organisation. Our empirical study centres on an organisation that has recently decided to introduce Big Data into its formal operations. Through a unique empirical approach that analyses sentiments expressed by individuals about this technology on the organisation's online forum, we demonstrate the emergence of a central referent, and in turn the dynamics of a coalition that builds around this referent as the attitudes of individuals converge upon the Big Data issue. Our paper contributes to existing TAM frameworks by elaborating the social influence variable and providing a dynamic lens to the technology acceptance process. We concurrently offer a methodological tool for organisations to understand social dynamics that form about a newly introduced technology and accelerate its acceptance by employees.

Basic Income Grant in Namibia, a Viewpoint on the Proposal and on the Work of the BIG Coalition

This thesis studies the basic income grant proposal in Namibia. The proposal suggests a monthly grant of N$100 (approximately 10€) to all those Namibian citizens who do not receive the state pension. This thesis concentrates on the Basic Income Grant (BIG) Coalition and on its work. The formation and transformation of the coalition during the time period between 2003 and 2009 is analyzed with the help of data collected during two field work periods in 2008 and 2009. The data includes interviews, newspaper articles, observations and other background material. The analysis of this material is mainly conducted from organizational viewpoint. The final part of the thesis applies the results to the theory of Mosse, whose propositions about policy and practice will be discussed in relation to the basic income grant pilot project. The thesis argues that social legitimacy has been a vital resource for the work of the BIG Coalition and it has sought for it in various ways. The concept of social legitimacy originates from the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik, who propose that organizations are dependent on their environments, and on the resources provided by the surrounding environment. This thesis studies the concept of social legitimacy in the context of resource dependence theory. Social legitimacy is analyzed in the relations between the coalition and its environment, in the formation of the coalition, in the responses towards criticism, and finally in relation to the propositions concerning policy and practice. The work of the coalition in the pilot project will be analyzed through the propositions of Mosse concerning policy and practice. The results will describe and analyze key events in the formation of the BIG Coalition from the South African proposal until the end of the basic income pilot project. This BIG pilot project conducted in 2008-2009 is one of the most well-known activities of the coalition. The clashes between the coalition and its environment will be analyzed through four case studies. It will be shown that the project has been conducted in order to gain more legitimacy to the basic income grant proposal. The conclusion questions the legitimacy of the BIG Coalition as a research and development organization, and requests for more transparent research on the basic income proposal in Namibia.

Coalition Formation With Communication Ranges and Moving Targets

A team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication ranges and limited resources are deployed in a region to search and destroy stationary and moving targets. When a UAV detects a target, depending on the target resource requirement, it is tasked to form a coalition over the dynamic network formed by the UAVs. In this paper, we develop a mechanism to find potential coalition members over the network using principles from internet protocol and introduce an algorithm using Particle Swarm Optimization to generate a coalition that destroys the target is minimum time. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out to study how coalition are formed and the effects of coalition process delays.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Coalition and distribution in fuzzy dynamic supply chain systems

In this paper, two models of coalition and income's distribution in FSCS (fuzzy supply chain systems) are proposed based on the fuzzy set theory and fuzzy cooperative game theory. The fuzzy dynamic coalition choice's recursive equations are constructed in terms of sup-t composition of fuzzy relations, where t is a triangular norm. The existence of the fuzzy relations in FSCS is also proved. On the other hand, the approaches to ascertain the fuzzy coalition through the choice's recursive equations and distribute the fuzzy income in FSCS by the fuzzy Shapley values are also given. These models are discussed in two parts: the fuzzy dynamic coalition choice of different units in FSCS; the fuzzy income's distribution model among different participators in the same coalition. Furthermore, numerical examples are given aiming at illustrating these models., and the results show that these models are feasible and validity in FSCS.

US imperialism in action: An audit-based appraisal of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq

This paper drawing from audit reports reflects upon the post-Iraq war administration the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It argues that the CPA’s compliance with basic levels of decent public administration were akin to Guantanamo’s compliance with basic levels of natural justice. The audit reports demonstrate that the CPA was a chaotic administration which spent billions without proper controls or procedures and left precious Iraqi oil revenues open to fraudulent acts. The CPA failed to comply with its obligations under UN resolutions. It identifies the geopolitical/economic implications of the US government which was partly motivated by economic concerns but it was also motivated by political concerns—the imposition of US hegemony. It then turns to the broader economic imperatives of the falling rate of profit and the imposition of neoliberalism (market fundamentalism).

Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Trusting Groups in Coalition Formation using Social Distance

In environments where distributed team formation is key, and defections are possible, the use of trust as social capital allows social norms to be defied and compared. An agent can use this information, when invited to join a group or collation, to decide whether or not its utility will be increased by joining. In this work a social network approach is used to define and reason about the relationships contained in the agent community. Previous baseline work is extended with two decision making mechanisms. These are compared by simulating an abstract grid-like environment, and preliminary results are reported.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,