Performance partnership agreement /

"Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Policy" -- Cover.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

Refashioning local government and inner-city regeneration: The Salford experience

This paper explores the role of local government in urban regeneration in England. The first part describes local-central government relations during recent decades. It concludes that 'actually occurring' regeneration fuses top-down and bottom-up priorities and preferences, as well as path dependencies created by past decisions and local relations. The second part illustrates this contention by examining the regeneration of inner-city Salford over a 25-year period. It describes Salford City Council's approach in achieving the redevelopment of the former Salford Docks and how this created the confidence for the council to embark on further regeneration projects. Yet the top-down decision-making model has failed to satisfy local expectations, creating apathy which threatens the Labour government's desire for active citizens in regeneration projects.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Directory of public employment relations boards and agencies : a guide to administrative machinery for the conduct of state and local government employee-management relations /

"LAB-411".

New technology, industrial relations and white collar trade unions : the case of the National and Local Government Officers Association

The decade since 1979 has seen the most rapid introduction of microelectronic technology in the workplace. In particular, the scope offered for the application of this new technology to the area of white collar work has meant that it is a sector where trade unions have been confronted with major challenges. However the application of this technology has also provided trade unions with opportunities for exerting influence to reshape traditional attitudes to both industrial relations and the nature of work. Recent academic research on the trade union response to the introduction of new technology at the workplace suggests that, despite the resources and apparent sophistication of modern trade unions, they have not in general been able to take advantage of the opportunities offered during this period of radical technological change,the argument being that this is due both to structural weaknesses and the inappropriateness of the system of collective bargaining where new technology issues are concerned. Despite the significance of the Public Sector in employment terms, research into the response of public sector white collar trade unions to technological change has been fairly limited. This thesis sets out the approach of the National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO), the largest solely white collar union in the world with over three quarters of a million members employed in a wide range of public service industries. The thesis examines NALGO's response at national level and, through detailed case studies, at local level in respect of Local Government and Water Industry NALGO members. The response is then evaluated and conclusions drawn in terms of a framework based upon an assessment of the key factors relevant in judging the ability of NALGO to respond effectively to the challenges brought about by the technological revolution of the last ten years.

Organised for inward investment? Development agencies, local government, and firms in the inward investment process

Inward investment promotion and aftercare remain central aspects of local economic development for English Regional Development Agencies, Scottish and Welsh development bodies, and local authorities in Britain. In many cases, partnership and consultation mechanisms have become integral to attracting inward investment and providing aftercare. Inward investment is thus an important area in which to explore interinstitutional relations between agents operating along diverse spatial boundaries and with different responsibilities. In this paper we analyse the local and regional institutional structures and relations characterising the inward investment process in Britain using new survey data from local authorities, regional bodies, and inward investors. We find that promotional activities have clearly defined structures which are chiefly led by the regional level. Aftercare is characterised by more collaborative arrangements involving both regional bodies and local government. However, many bodies are little used, with competition and tension between partners remaining frequent within English regions, regardless of recent institutional changes designed to reduce such problems. In Scotland and Wales, however, their national institutions are not only widely used, but they create high levels of satisfaction from firms. Hence, England has yet to respond to the effective challenges of Scotland and Wales. The analysis also highlights the limited importance of all national, regional, and local public institutions in attracting inward investors and their subsequent aftercare. The critical inputs to business decisions appear to be driven chiefly by more general supply-side conditions (for example, general skills versus local public packages) and the general attractions of a particular location.

The role of operations management in public sector policy and practice alignment: a local government analysis

In responding to the demand for change and improvement, local government has applied a plethora of operations management-based methods, tools and techniques. This article explores how these methods, specifically in the form of performance management models, are used to improve alignment between central government policy and local government practice, an area which has thus far been neglected in the literature. Using multiple case studies from Environmental Waste Management Services, this research reports that models derived in the private sector are often directly ‘implanted’ into the public sector. This has challenged the efficacy of all performance management models. However, those organisations which used models most effectively did so by embedding (contextualisation) and extending (reconceptualisation) them beyond their original scope. Moreover, success with these models created a cumulative effect whereby other operations management approaches were probed, adapted and used.