The institutional choices of politicians : how and why legislators shape Lower Chambers

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu’en dépit de leurs différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des coalitions procédurales. L’analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l’agenda législatif, structuré les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité. Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les présidences d’assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l’existence d’un pouvoir de véto sur l’agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu’en Argentine. L’étude du cas argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à l’opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir. Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. A l’inverse, elle met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu’alors, entre l’Argentine et le Chili concernant le contrôle de l’agenda législatif. Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l’hypothèse générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l’hypothèse générale. Les chapitre III et IV, qui concernent respectivement l’Argentine et le Chili, décrivent le système politique de chaque pays et l’organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitre IV et VI, respectivement pour l’Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles régissant les chambres, l’évolution de l’autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l’hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche.

The increasing criminalization of economic law : a competition law perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartel conduct and to consider the appropriateness and effectiveness of extending the criminal law to this conduct. In addition, it will consider some of the legal implications, including the exposure of directors of companies to potential racketeering charges.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper first examines cartel theory and the justification for prohibition. The paper then identifies the emerging trend toward criminalization of hard core cartel conduct, followed by an assessment of potential justifications for criminalization. Implications of criminalization, including the potential impact of organized crime legislation on offenders and regulators, will then be considered.
Findings – There is a clear trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartels. The paper argues that this trend is appropriate, both because of the moral culpability it attracts and because of its potential to enhance general deterrence. The paper also argues that cartel conduct, in jurisdictions in which it is criminalized, will constitute “organized crime” as defined in the Palermo Convention and, as such, expose participants to potential money laundering and asset forfeiture consequences.
Originality/value – This paper is of value to governments and regulators considering adoption or implementation of a criminal cartel regime and to practitioners in advising clients about potential consequences of cartel conduct within a criminal regime.

A normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity

Although cartel behaviour is almost universally (and rightly) condemned, it is not clear why cartel participants deserve the full wrath of the criminal law and its associated punishment. To fill this void, I develop a normative (or principled) justification for the criminalisation of conduct characteristic of ‘hard core’ cartels. The paper opens with a brief consideration of the rhetoric commonly used to denounce cartel activity, eg that it ‘steals from’ or ‘robs’ consumers. To put the discussion in context, a brief definition of ‘hard core’ cartel behaviour is provided and the harms associated with this activity are identified. These are: welfare losses in the form of appropriation (from consumer to producer) of consumer surplus, the creation of deadweight loss to the economy, the creation of productive inefficiency (hindering innovation of both products and processes), and the creation of so-called X-inefficiency. As not all activities which cause harm ought to be criminalised, a theory as to why certain harms in a liberal society can be criminalised is developed. It is based on JS Mill's harm to others principle (as refined by Feinberg) and on a choice of social institutions using Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance.’ The theory is centred on the value of individual choice in securing one's own well-being, with the market as an indispensable instrument for this. But as applied to the harm associated with cartel conduct, this theory shows that none of the earlier mentioned problems associated with this activity provide sufficient justification for criminalisation. However, as the harm from hard core cartel activity strikes at an important institution which permits an individual's ability to secure their own well-being in a liberal society, criminalisation of hard core cartel behaviour can have its normative justification on this basis.

Feminist Disability Theory: Domestic Violence Against Women with a Disability

Women with a disability continue to experience social oppression and domestic violence as a consequence of gender and disability dimensions. Current explanations of domestic violence and disability inadequately explain several features that lead women who have a disability to experience violent situations. This article incorporates both disability and material feminist theory as an alternative explanation to the dominant approaches (psychological and sociological traditions) of conceptualising domestic violence. This paper is informed by a study which was concerned with examining the nature and perceptions of violence against women with a physical impairment. The emerging analytical framework integrating material feminist interpretations and disability theory provided a basis for exploring gender and disability dimensions. Insight was also provided by the women who identified as having a disability in the study and who explained domestic violence in terms of a gendered and disabling experience. The article argues that material feminist interpretations and disability theory, with their emphasis on gender relations, disablism and poverty, should be used as an alternative tool for exploring the nature and consequences of violence against women with a disability.

Why do so few hold stocks : theory and evidence

This study develops a life-cycle model where investors make investment decisions in a realistic environment. Model results show that personal illiquid projects (housing and children), fixed costs (once-off/per-period participation costs plus variable/fixed transaction costs) and endogenous risky human capital (with permanent, transitory and disastrous shocks) together are able to address both the non-participation puzzle and the age-effects puzzle. Empirical implications of the model are examined using Heckman’s two-step method with the latest five Surveys of Consumer Finance (SCF). Regression results show that liquidity, informational cost and human capital are indeed the major determinants of participation and asset allocation decisions at different stages of an investor’s life.

Linking Theory and Practice: Performing a Reality Check on a Model of IS Success

The issue of ‘rigour vs. relevance’ in IS research has generated an intense, heated debate for over a decade. It is possible to identify, however, only a limited number of contributions on how to increase the relevance of IS research without compromising its rigour. Based on a lifecycle view of IS research, we propose the notion of ‘reality checks’ in order to review IS research outcomes in the light of actual industry demands. We assume that five barriers impact the efficient transfer of IS research outcomes; they are lack of awareness, lack of understandability, lack of relevance, lack of timeliness, and lack of applicability. In seeking to understand the effect of these barriers on the transfer of mature IS research into practice, we used focus groups. We chose DeLone and McLean’s IS success model as our stimulus because it is one of the more widely researched areas of IS.

Building an organizational change communication theory

The difficulty of communicating during organizational change has intensified with the prevalence of continuously changing organizations (Buchanan, Claydon & Doyle, 1999). The difficulty faced by managers is compounded by the lack of studies examining organizational communication within a context of organizational change (Eisenberg, Andrews, Murphy, & Laine-Timmerman, 1999; Lewis & Seibold, 1996). Not surprisingly then, is there a paucity of organizational change theory to guide further research and practitioners. This paper addresses the lack of organizational change communication research and contributes to theoretical development of communication during organizational change. A model of change communication during continuous change is presented from the analysis of two longitudinal empirical studies. Central constructs of the model are the monologic change communication, the dialogic change communication and the background talk of change. Further Van de Ven and Poole's (1995) Process Theories of Change are extended to consider the sequencing of the three constructs. The findings suggest that the sequencing of the dominant change communication approaches is informed by an alignment of individual communication competences and organizational change communication expectations.