Relationship between attack and skipping in taekwondo contests

Santos, VGF, Franchini, E, and Lima-Silva, AE. Relationship between attack and skipping in Taekwondo contests. J Strength Cond Res 25(6): 1743-1751, 2011-The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between attack time (AT) and skipping time (ST) during the 2007 Taekwondo World Championship and 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. A total of 22 matches (65 rounds, 13 semifinals, and 8 finals) from the World Championship and 23 matches (63 rounds, 22 rounds with 16 athletes each and 1 quarterfinal round) from the Olympic Games, both in the male category, were assessed using time-motion analysis. The AT was considered as the total time during which the athlete attacked or tried to attack, whereas ST was the total time without attempting to attack. The ratio of AT to ST was similar to 1:7 based on the data pooled from the 2 competitions. The AT/ST ratio was significantly lower for the World Championship than for the Olympic Games (p <= 0.05). In the Olympic Games, no consistent differences across weight divisions were found. However, during the World Championship, the heavier weight divisions (>78 kg) exhibited a lower average AT, lower summed AT, lower attack numbers (ANs) and higher average ST than lighter weight divisions (<58 kg, p <= 0.05). For both competitions, the ST was lower, and the ANs and AT/ST ratio were higher in round 3 than in round 1 or 2. In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that matches in the Olympic Games were less cadenced than in the World Championship, but that in both competitions, the intensity of the match increased in round 3. Practically, these data suggest that coaches need to structure Taekwondo training sessions in a manner that allows the work/pause ratio to mirror the physical demand imposed during competitions.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results

General signaling results in dynamic Tullock contests have been missing for long. The reason is the tractability of the problems. In this paper, an uninformed contestant with valuation vx competes against an informed opponent with valuation, either high vh or low vl. We show that; (i) When the hierarchy of valuations is vh ≥ vx ≥ vl, there is no pooling. Sandbagging is too costly for the high type. (ii) When the order of valuations is vx ≥ vh ≥ vl, there is no separation if vh and vl are close. Sandbagging is cheap due to the proximity of valuations. However, if vh and vx are close, there is no pooling. First period cost of pooling is high. (iii) For valuations satisfying vh ≥ vl ≥ vx, there is no separation if vh and vl are close. Bluffing in the first period is cheap for the low valuation type. Conversely, if vx and vl are close there is no pooling. Bluffing in the first stage is too costly. JEL: C72, C73, D44, D82. KEYWORDS: Signaling, Dynamic Contests, Non-existence, Sandbag Pooling, Bluff Pooling, Separating

The distribution of talent across contests

Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? Towhat extent do contestants avoid competition? In this paper, we show, theoreticallyand empirically, that the distribution of abilities plays a crucial role in determiningcontest choice. Sorting exists only when the proportion of high-ability contestantsis sufficiently small. As this proportion increases, contestants shy away from competitionand sorting decreases, such that, reverse sorting becomes a possibility. Wetest our theoretical predictions using a large panel data set containing contest choiceover three decades. We use exogenous variation in the participation of highly-ablecompetitors to provide empirical evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition,and sorting.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

Spurring innovation through idea contests : data analysis and process improvements

This research concerns the Urban Living Idea Contest conducted by Creator Space™ of BASF SE during its 150th anniversary in 2015. The main objectives of the thesis are to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Urban Living Idea Contest (ULIC) and propose a number of improvement suggestions for future years. More than 4,000 data points were collected and analyzed to investigate the functionality of different elements of the contest. Furthermore, a set of improvement suggestions were proposed to BASF SE. Novelty of this thesis lies in the data collection and the original analysis of the contest, which identified its critical elements, as well as the areas that could be improved. The author of this research was a member of the organizing team and involved in the decision making process from the beginning until the end of the ULIC.

From the buzzing in Turing’s head to machine intelligence contests

This paper presents an analysis of three major contests for machine intelligence. We conclude that a new era for Turing’s test requires a fillip in the guise of a committed sponsor, not unlike DARPA, funders of the successful 2007 Urban Challenge.

Variable assessment of wing colouration in aerial contests of the red-winged damselfly Mnesarete pudica (Zygoptera, Calopterygidae)

Wing pigmentation is a trait that predicts the outcome of male contests in some damselflies. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that males would have the ability to assess wing pigmentation and adjust investment in a fight according to the costs that the rival may potentially impose. Males of the damselfly Mnesarete pudica exhibit red-coloured wings and complex courtship behaviour and engage in striking male– male fights. In this study, we investigated male assessment behaviour during aerial contests. Theory suggests that the relationship between male resource-holding potential (RHP) and contest duration describes the kind of assessment adopted by males: self-assessment, opponent-only assessment or mutual assessment. A recent theory also suggests that weak and strong males exhibit variations in the assessment strategies adopted. We estimated male RHP through male body size and wing colouration (i.e. pigmentation, wing reflectance spectra and transmission spectra) and studied the relationship between male RHP and contest duration from videodocumented behavioural observations of naturally occurring individual contests in the field. The results showed that males with more opaque wings and larger red spots were more likely to win contests. The relationships between RHP and contest durations partly supported the self-assessment and the mutual assessment models. We then experimentally augmented the pigmented area of the wings, in order to evaluate whether strong and weak males assess rivals’ RHP through wing pigmentation. Our experimental manipulation, however, clearly demonstrated that strong males assess rivals’ wing pigmentation. We finally suggest that there is a variation in the assessment strategy adopted by males

Variable assessment of wing colouration in aerial contests of the red-winged damselfly Mnesarete pudica (Zygoptera, Calopterygidae)

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