Judicial Creativity in Constitutional Interpretation

The focus of study in this thesis is on the necessity and extent of judicial creativity in interpreting provisions in certain crucial areas in the Constitution of India. Judicial innovation was essential to adapt the constitutional provisions to modern changed context. Creativity of the Court has been mainly in the creation and introduction of certain new concepts not found in any specific provision of the Constitution which, but were essential for its meaningful interpretation.Independence of the judiciary, basic structure and certain elements of social justice cherished as ideal by the makers of the Constitution are some such concepts infused into the Constitution by the judiciary. The second aspect of creativity lies in the attempt of the Court to construe provisions in the Constitution with a view to upholding and maintaining the concepts so infused into the Constitution. Introduction of those concepts into the Constitution was necessary and is justified. all important features of the Constitution like democratic form of government, federal structure, judicial review, independence of judiciary and rule of law were thus included in the doctrine to prevent their alteration by amendments.As a result of such a construction, the nature of those directive principles itself has changed. They ceased to be mere directives for state action but became mandate for it. If left to legislative or executive will for their implementation, the directives would have remained enforceable as ordinary right.To conclude, notwithstanding the errors committed by the Supreme Court in construing the provisions in the above areas, they stand testimony to its creative and innovative response in interpreting the Constitution. If this trend is continued, it will be possible to achieve through the judicial process, maintenance of independence of the judiciary, avoidance of destruction of the Constitution through the process of amendment and realisation of social justice envisaged in the directive principles. It can be hoped that the Court would maintain its energetic and vibrant mind and rise up to the occasions and extend the same to other areas in future.

The Benefits of Multilingualism for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa

Taking the South African experience as an example, this article considers the interpretive benefits to be reaped from having access to bi- and multilingual versions of a statutory text. The discussion takes place against the backdrop of a history of statutory bi- and multilingualism in the said jurisdiction as well as, at present, constitutional guarantees of language rights and the “parity of esteem” of eleven official languages. It is argued that, if invoked with due discretion and in a non-rigid way, statutory multilingualism can be a boon to statutory and constitutional interpretation. The South African courts – whose traditional approach to statutory inter-pretation has tended to be literalist, formalistic and formulaic – are, generally speaking, to be commended for their supple use of bilingualism as an aid to interpretation over the years. The advent of constitutional multilingualism and the (potential) availability of statutory texts (and the Constitution) in more than two languages, have moreover created conditions conducive to the further development and refinement of reliance on multilingualism in statutory and constitutional interpretation – certain challenges notwithstanding.

General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of Constitutional Law

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theroy: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. These two purposes should suggest particular answers to the first three questions.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

Expanding our Constitutional Horizons: A Comprehensive Study of Quasi-Constitutionality in Canada

A number of laws in Canada which uphold rights are referred to as quasi-constitutional by the courts in recognition of their special importance. Quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted through the regular legislative process, although they are being interpreted and applied in a fashion which has become remarkably similar to constitutional law, and are therefore having an important affect over other legislation. Quasi-constitutionality has surprisingly received limited scholarly attention, and very few serious attempts at explaining its significance have been made. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive study of quasi-constitutionality which considers its theoretical basis, its interpretation and legal significance, as well as its similarities to comparable forms of law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part I examines the theoretical basis of quasi-constitutionality and its relationship to the Constitution. As a statutory and common law form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutionality is shown to signify an association with the Canadian Constitution and the foundational principles that underpin it. Part II proceeds to consider the special rules of interpretation applied to quasi-constitutional legislation, the basis of this interpretative approach, and the connection between the interpretation of similar provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation and the Constitution. As a statutory form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutional legislation is given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation which significantly expands the rights which they protect. The theoretical basis of this approach is found in both the fundamental nature of the rights upheld by quasi-constitutional legislation as well as legislative intent. Part III explores how quasi-constitutional statutes affect the interpretation of regular legislation and how they are used for the purposes of judicial review. Quasi-constitutional legislation has a significant influence over regular statutes in the interpretative exercise, which in some instances results in conflicting statutes being declared inoperable. The basis of this form of judicial review is demonstrated to be rooted in statutory interpretation, and as such it provides an interesting model of rights protection and judicial review that is not conflated to constitutional and judicial supremacy.

Surveillance électronique et métadonnées : vers une nouvelle conception constitutionnelle du droit à la vie privée au Canada?

Ce mémoire traite de la portée de la protection constitutionnelle du droit à la vie privée informationnelle au Canada, au regard de la surveillance électronique gouvernementale à grande échelle des métadonnées des communications électroniques, à des fins de sécurité nationale. Il est soutenu, après une présentation de l’importance démocratique de la vie privée, de même que de la nature et de la portée de certaines activités gouvernementales de surveillance électronique, que le cadre d’analyse du « Biographical core », qui conditionne l’étendue de la protection de la vie privée informationnelle en droit constitutionnel canadien, est susceptible d’inclure les métadonnées des communications électroniques. Cette position est appuyée par un argumentaire juridique fondé sur les règles d’interprétation et la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pertinente. Cet argumentaire se trouve renforcé par potentiel considérablement révélateur des métadonnées, des particularités propres aux activités de surveillance électronique analysées, ainsi que des implications non-juridiques soulevées par ces dernières.

Análisis constitucional. Una introducción : cómo hacer cosas con la Constitución

La Corte Constitucional colombiana, a través de la interpretación del texto de la carta política, ha hecho invaluables aportes al desarrollo del derecho en nuestro país. Sin embargo, este proceso de definir las palabras de la Constitución requiere la utilización de preferencias valorativas y esto, como es natural, implica un grave riesgo para la seguridad jurídica: ¿hasta dónde puede llegar el intérprete, ¿cuáles son los límites que debe respetar?. Este riesgo incrementa si tenemos en cuenta que buena parte de la doctrina constitucional colombiana contemporánea, llamada por algunos neoconstitucionalismo, ha creado una nueva jerga erudita impenetrable llena de metáforas sofisticadas, razonamientos abstrusos, argumentos con una gran carga emotiva y citas herméticas que, en cierta medida, le han permitido encubrir sus ideas y valoraciones y, de este modo, evitar que sean sensatamente escudriñadas. En un sistema como el colombiano, erigido sobre el principio de frenos y contrapesos entre los distintos poderes del Estado, si el poder político se ejerce a través de la justicia constitucional, en un lenguaje incomprensible y presentado como un argumento de última instancia, todo el equilibrio se viene abajo y, muy pronto, el derecho se convierte en el principal instrumento del despotismo., de Daniel Mendonca, es un libro perfectamente honesto que presenta sus ideas con absoluta claridad y ayuda a trazar los límites entre la discrecionalidad y la arbitrariedad de la interpretación constitucional.

El bloque de constitucionalidad en el Ecuador. Derechos Humanos más allá de la Constitución (Tema Central)

Aunque en el Derecho comparado el bloque de constitucionalidad se ha venido desarrollando desde hace más de tres décadas, en nuestro país su tratamiento es de gran novedad, su importancia teórica y práctica es inmensa, más aún con la expedición de una nueva Constitución, que merece precisamente el adjetivo calificativo de nueva, por consagrar al Ecuador como un Estado constitucional de derechos y justicia. Sobre la base de dicha premisa el presente ensayo realiza un estudio histórico comparado de esta institución del cual se desprende un ejercicio crítico que, conjuntamente con el estudio de las cláusulas de remisión de nuestra actual Constitución y la experiencia jurisprudencial ecuatoriana, permiten construir una definición y establecer un contenido propio para nuestro sistema jurídico, advirtiéndonos sobre sus oportunidades y riesgos.

Criterios de interpretación en la nueva Constitución de Bolivia. Voluntad del constituyente vs. jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Tema Central)

En este artículo se analizará la posibilidad del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional de aplicar, como criterio de interpretación, la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, de forma preferente a la voluntad del constituyente boliviano como otro criterio de interpretación dispuesto expresamente, a ese efecto se tendrá en cuenta el rol de la interpretación constitucional y su relación con las normas internacionales de derechos humanos, el análisis de la posición jurídica de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el sistema jurídico boliviano, el efecto de la jurisprudencia de la Corte en la protección de derechos humanos, y el análisis de esta jurisprudencia en relación con la voluntad del constituyente como criterios de interpretación.

Discursos de desenvolvimento no Supremo Federal : a participação indígena na autorização parlamentar para o aproveitamento hidrelétrico Belo Monte

Nesta pesquisa estudamos o caso Belo Monte – entendido como a disputa judicial sobre o Aproveitamento Hidrelétrico Belo Monte, travada no Supremo Tribunal Federal –, para saber se existe uma relação entre os discursos de desenvolvimento mobilizados pelas partes litigantes e pelo STF e a interpretação dada por esses atores para o parágrafo 3º do artigo 231 da Constituição Federal de 1988. Partimos da seguinte hipótese: interpretações que restringem os direitos de participação política dos povos e comunidades indígenas e que impõem poucas condições para o exercício da discricionariedade dos Poderes da União são acompanhadas por discursos preocupados com o desenvolvimento econômico; interpretações que reconhecem amplo direito de participação política para povos e comunidades indígenas e que impõem maiores condições para o exercício da discricionariedade dos Poderes da União não são acompanhados por discursos de desenvolvimento. Confirmando parcialmente nossa hipótese, chegamos à seguinte conclusão: em primeiro lugar, parece existir uma tendência para que, quando mobilizados discursos de desenvolvimento, a interpretação dada ao parágrafo 3º do artigo 231 da Constituição Federal imponha menos condições para o exercício da discricionariedade dos Poderes da União e reduza, ou desconsidere, os direitos de participação política dos povos e comunidades indígenas; por outro lado, alguns discursos de desenvolvimento foram mobilizados num sentido aposto, e serviram tanto para afirmar os direitos políticos de povos e comunidades indígenas, quanto para impor mais condições para o exercício da discricionariedade dos Poderes da União.

O desenvolvimento sustentável na ordem constitucional e sua promoção através do planejamento urbano

The man, being subject and object of their changes, has passed by many process to find a better life way. Since your existence, he finds to live in groups for make easy your life and make concrete yours desires. All by history, when the individual´s rights was establishment, collectives and lonely way, contribute for evaluate the relationship between individuals and they own, and them and state, which has a duty to those, positive or negative, depending on the case. The circle of fundamentals rights has been sustainable development and the concept of growth economy associated to the environment protection. This association reflect a apparent conflict between values very distinct, but the constitutional interpretation can be reunite both of them and make it live in harmony; values of environmental order and economical order can be exist together, as long as the state contribute to this. On the city, where the most of relationships happening, the urban plan appear how a effective way of sustainable development, finding the harmony between the growth economy and environment protection. To effective the socials functions of the city (inhabit, circulate, work and entertainment) and the citizen´s life quality, the city is the scenery that show how the urban plan, across established previously legal instruments, like the governmental public politics, to effective the right to development, right of third generation. The director plan how effective tool for local needs - obligation defined by Citizen Statute that contribute for the program linked defined by the urban plan. The state´s intervention on the private sector of citizen, and the restriction on their rights are be justified by the collective´s rights and their quality of life. So, in front the urban scenery has been the plan to make social functions of city, the healthy way of life, which is the sustainable development

Direito fundamental ao tempo razoável do processo judicial: limites e possibilidades de concretização no ordenamento jurídico pátrio

This dissertation aims to address the limits and possibilities of realizing the fundamental right to reasonable time of the Brazilian legal system process. From this perspective, we analyze a reasonable time concept for the process, consistent with the civil homeland process; the relationship between efficiency, effectiveness, legal security and reasonable time of adjudication; a formal recognition of the fundamental right to reasonable time of the procedure in the Constitution of 1988; and the immediate applicability of this fundamental right. As indicated, the crisis of the Judiciary and procedural delay are problems directly related to the limits and possibilities of realization of the fundamental right under study. Moreover, we also present some mechanisms that can be used to overcome these problems. The subject was developed based on constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights, an approach that will always have this concern to be based on a methodology which includes the normative and empirical-dogmatic fields, realizing the fundamental right to reasonable time of the process. We adopted as methodological approach the study of this issue in judicial aspect, more specifically in the field of civil procedure. Finally, we weave through a critical and analytical view, our conclusions, which demonstrate the possibilities of overcoming the limits imposed to immediate implementation of the fundamental right to reasonable time of the process in our legal system

Repercussão geral e súmula vinculante: os efeitos no controle difuso

Brazil since its first republican constitution has adopted systems of laws control. The review activity was given to three state powers or functions state, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. However, it appears that in the country along the constitutional history, has stood considerably the jurisdictional control of the most important control. Initially, back in 1891, Brazil adopted the jurisdictional control of diffuse from U.S, whose role in monitoring of standards is delivered to all organs of the judiciary, which may face a case, put on trial, ascertain whether or not the possibility of applying a law, removing its impact in case of unconstitutionality. In 1969, entered in the second legal model of judicial review, the concentrated control of constitutionality, whose inspiration comes from the positivist theory of Hans Kelsen, and was adopted by the Austrian Constitution of 1920. According to the abstract control the supervision of law is given to a Court or Constitutional Court, responsible for the analysis of the legal constitutionality independent of its application to a specific case. In Brazil the role of concentrated control was handed over exclusively to the Supreme Court, which serves as the Constitutional Court, which accumulates that function with other constitutionally provided jurisdiction. Throughout this period, from 1891 until today, Brazil has maintained a dual system of judicial control of legal constitutionality, where they coexist and harmonize the diffuse control exercised by any organ of the Judiciary, and concentrated control of competence the Supreme Court. However, one must recognize that with the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988, the concentrated control has emerged on the national stage due to two important factors: the expansion of the legal capacity to sue and the inclusion of other ways control, besides the already known Direct Claim of Unconstitutionality. This concentrated control and projection of the Supreme Court s attempt to become a true constitutional court, led to a relative weakening of diffuse control even when performed by the Brazilian Constitutional Court. In order to become a true constitutional court, all decisions handed down by the Supreme in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction should have the same weight and the same measure, or at least bring improvement to similar effects, once is the responsible for the final word when it comes to constitutional interpretation. Thus, the writs of certiorari and stare decisis were responsible for profound changes in the diffuse control, allowing the Supreme Court can strengthen its decisions even in the diffuse control. These two institutions have substantially changed the legal status of diffuse control, allowing an extension of the effects of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court, so that you can no longer be said that the effects of this control to restrict the disputing parties in the process

Intervenção judicial nas sociedades limitadas em face da liberdade de iniciativa

The judicial intervention in limited liability company goes through several issues of legislative and hermeneutics origin, based considerably on the small importance given to freedom of economic initiative by the participants in the process of formation and application of the law. In addition, Brazilian law, due to incompleteness, inconsistency or lack of valid grounds, put the judge in a procedural delicate situation. Being forced to judge, the judiciary faces severe uncomfortable interpretive situations, of which derive solutions of dubious constitutionality and affecting, significantly, the dynamics of business activity. In this context, and considering the limited liability company as an expression of free enterprise, corresponding to a lawful association of people in order to undertake economically, in exercise of his freedom of contracting and professional action, intended to be offered safe parameters of constitutionality for judicial intervention in limited liability company in the hypothesis of (i) transfer of corporate shares, (ii) attachment of corporate shares, (iii) dismissal of directors, (iv) appointment of judicial stakeholders, (v) exclusion of shareholders and (vi ) trespass. The hypothetical-deductive approach was adopted, building hypotheses to overcome the gaps and unconstitutionality of the law and subjecting them to tests, reviews, and comparisons with hypothetical facts and case law in order to determine the constitutional validity of the proposed solutions. The procedure aimed to reconcile the historical, comparative, dialectical and scientific methods. The roots of temporal institutes were researched as well as current solutions provided by national and compared law. From problematizations point, addressed by the constitutional interpretation of the law and jurisprudence, responses that bring out the unconstitutionality of certain conceptions were headed