The non-binding vote on executive pay : a review of the CLERP 9 reform

Directors’ and executives’ remuneration, including levels of pay, accountability and transparency, is controversial. Section 250R of the CLERP (Audit Reform & Disclosure) Act 2004 that was not greatly anticipated, requires the holding of a non-binding resolution on board remuneration at companies’ annual general meetings. The reform has been criticised on the basis that, inter alia, it blurs the respective roles of shareholders and directors. This article identifies possible motivations for the imposition of the non-binding resolution in Australia. These are evaluated with reference to sources of corporate governance policy and the current state of Australia’s relevant corporate governance structures. We speculate that the non-binding vote will not amount to a substantive addition to the corporate governance regime.

Auditor independence : an analysis of the adequacy of selected provisions in CLERP 9

Worldwide corporate collapses in the past have highlighted various weaknesses in corporate governance, which included auditor independence. This thesis advocates the use of private interest theory as a framework to evaluate proposals for law reform related to the independence of external company auditors. This study argues that the current regulation of auditor independence falls short of the 'ideal independence' required by the general public. This is because the regulation was developed, in some instances, to serve the private interests of powerful lobby groups rather than the public interest. This research concludes that there is a case for reform of the existing requirements in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in respect of auditor independence.

Preliminary review of over-regulation in Australian financial services

This article examines a preliminary review and the limited evidence of over-regulation in Australian financial services. The 1997 Wallis Report and the CLERP 6 paper resulted in the amendments to Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by the Financial Services Reform Act. Nearly a decade later the system based upon 'one-size fits all' dual track regime and a consistent licensing regime has greatly increased the costs of compliance. In the area of enforcement there has not been a dramatic change to the effective techniques applied by ASIC over other agencies such as APRA. In particular there are clear economic arguments, as well as international experiences which state that a single financial services regulator is more effective than the multi-layered approach adopted in Australia. Finally, in the superannuation area of financial services, which is worth A$800 billion there is unnecessary dual licensing and duplicated regulation with little evidence of any consumer-member benefit but at a much greater cost

The impact of regulatory reforms on the earnings forecasting behaviour of IPO firms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to jointly assess the impact of regulatory reform for corporate fundraising in Australia (CLERP Act 1999) and the relaxation of ASX admission rules in 1999, on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts in initial public offer (IPO) prospectuses. The relaxation of ASX listing rules permitted a new category of new economy firms (commitments test entities (CTEs))to list without a prior history of profitability, while the CLERP Act (introduced in 2000) was accompanied by tighter disclosure obligations and stronger enforcement action by the corporate regulator (ASIC). Design/methodology/approach – All IPO earnings forecasts in prospectuses lodged between 1998 and 2003 are examined to assess the pre- and post-CLERP Act impact. Based on active ASIC enforcement action in the post-reform period, IPO firms are hypothesised to provide more accurate forecasts, particularly CTE firms, which are less likely to have a reasonable basis for forecasting. Research models are developed to empirically test the impact of the reforms on CTE and non-CTE IPO firms. Findings – The new regulatory environment has had a positive impact on management forecasting behaviour. In the post-CLERP Act period, the accuracy of prospectus forecasts and their revisions significantly improved and, as expected, the results are primarily driven by CTE firms. However, the majority of prospectus forecasts continue to be materially inaccurate. Originality/value – The results highlight the need to control for both the changing nature of listed firms and the level of enforcement action when examining responses to regulatory changes to corporate fundraising activities.

Impact of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on initial public offering prospectus earnings forecasts

Commencing 13 March 2000, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) introduced changes to the regulation of corporate fundraising in Australia. In particular, it effected a reduction in the litigation risk associated with initial public offering prospectus disclosure.We find that the change is associated with a reduction in forecast frequency and an increase in forecast value relevance, but not with forecast error or bias. These results confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk affect the level but not the quality of disclosure. They also suggest that the reforms’ objectives of reducing fundraising costs while improving investor protection, have been achieved.

Mandatory auditor rotation : Australian evidence

A key part of the auditor independence reforms in Australia, as represented by Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (CLERP 9), mandates audit partner rotation. The change was criticised predominantly due to the costs imposed on both the audit firms and the audit clients. This study examines the Australian experience post-CLERP 9 with mandated auditor rotation. Based on data of audit partner rotation over 2003–2009 (on average 1200 listed Australian companies over the sample period), we show that audit partner tenure sat at a median of 2–3 years, but that the maximum audit partner tenure was as high as 20 years in the pre-CLERP 9 period. For around 85% of the market, audit partner rotation occurred voluntarily at between 1–5 years. The interesting result is that for 15% of the market, the mandated audit partner rotation had a significant impact on corporate governance practice. There is also a greater observed impact of mandatory rotation on audit engagements involving the non-global auditing firms. These findings inform the debate as to the ‘costliness’ of the law reform.

Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who takes the stronger line?

A key part of corporate governance reforms in Australia, as represented by CLERP 9, addresses concerns over the audit function and the role of independent auditors in monitoring managers and providing useful information to stakeholders about the financial position of the company. In comparing the regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas, there have been claims that CLERP 9 is less ‘stringent’ than the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US. This paper looks at three particular situations that have been the subject of recent reform to strengthen independence: the mandatory rotation of auditors, recruitment of former auditors as board members, and provision of non-audit services to clients. In each case, we compare the similarities and differences of the regulatory response between Australia and US, to distil the efficacy of the CLERP 9 approach.

How should regulators deal with entrenched company executives?

The regulatory framework for corporate governance, both in Australia and internationally, shifts between rules based regimes and principles based approach. The rules based regimes are typified by legislation that imposes mandated compliance based rules, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Other regimes, such as Australia’s CLERP 9 and the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s principles, have opted for a disclosure approach. This paper examines these approaches in the context of the non-binding vote rule, which arguably combines aspects of both. The study’s methodology empirically considers evidence relating to actual voting patterns as well as case study examples of the non-binding vote’s effectiveness. Significantly, our analyses show that from its inception, the non-binding vote was effective in motivating management to change the remuneration package to one they perceived as more acceptable to shareholders and that the non-binding vote is an effective regime to manage CEO remuneration (and by extension) executive remuneration.

Impact of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on initial public offering prospectus earnings forecasts

Commencing 13 March 2000, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) introduced changes to the regulation of corporate fundraising in Australia. In particular, it effected a reduction in the litigation risk associated with initial public offering prospectus disclosure. We find that the change is associated with a reduction in forecast frequency and an increase in forecast value relevance, but not with forecast error or bias. These results confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk affect the level but not the quality of disclosure. They also suggest that the reforms' objectives of reducing fundraising costs while improving investor protection, have been achieved.