Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

The impact of SFAS 123R on CEO equity compensation

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Toimitusjohtajien palkitsemisjärjestelmät metsäteollisuusyhtiöissä - empiirinen tutkimus

Tutkielman ensisijaisena tavoitteena oli selvittää miten pörssinoteerattujen metsäteollisuuden alan yhtiöiden toimitusjohtajien palkitsemisjärjestelmät eroavat toisistaan. Tutkimuksessa keskityttiin erityisesti siihen, miten corporate governancen mukainen johtamisen valvonta vaikuttaa toimitusjohtajien palkitsemismenetelmiin. Tutkimuksen aineisto kerättiin internetistä. Corporate governancen näkökulmasta riittävän informaation ja läpinäkyvyyden suositukset nousivat keskeiselle sijalle aineistoa hankittaessa. Tutkimusmenetelminä oli vertaileva ja selittävä tutkimus. Tutkimustulosten mukaan toimitusjohtajien palkitsemisjärjestelmät voidaan jakaa karkeasti kahteen luokkaan: yhdysvaltalaisiin toimitusjohtajiin ja muiden maiden toimitusjohtajiin. Yhdysvalloissa osakkeiden, osakeoptioiden, eläkejärjestelyiden ja muiden pitkän tähtäimen kannustinten osuus on huomattavasti merkittävämpi kuin muissa maissa ja toimitusjohtajien palkan määrä huomattavasti korkeampi kuin muissa maissa. Tutkimustulosten mukaan eri maiden erilaiset corporate governance – järjestelmät synnyttävät näitä eroja, sillä erilaisissa valvontamalleissa

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Firms Performance and CEO Compensation in Canada.

Rapport de recherche

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors

Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem, because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover, I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.

Co-Movement, Spillovers and Excess Returns in Global Bond Markets

This paper investigates global term structure dynamics using a Bayesian hierarchical factor model augmented with macroeconomic fundamentals. More than half of the variation in bond yields of seven advanced economies is due to global co-movement, which is mainly attributed to shocks to non-fundamentals. Global fundamentals, especially global inflation, affect yields through a ‘policy channel’ and a ‘risk compensation channel’, but the effects through two channels are offset. This evidence explains the unsatisfactory performance of fundamentals-driven term structure models. Our approach delineates asymmetric spillovers in global bond markets connected to diverging monetary policies. The proposed model is robust as identified factors has significant explanatory power of excess returns. The finding that global inflation uncertainty is useful in explaining realized excess returns does not rule out regime changing as a source of non-fundamental fluctuations.

Role of MicroRNAs in Islet Beta-Cell Compensation and Failure during Diabetes.

Pancreatic beta-cell function and mass are markedly adaptive to compensate for the changes in insulin requirement observed during several situations such as pregnancy, obesity, glucocorticoids excess, or administration. This requires a beta-cell compensation which is achieved through a gain of beta-cell mass and function. Elucidating the physiological mechanisms that promote functional beta-cell mass expansion and that protect cells against death, is a key therapeutic target for diabetes. In this respect, several recent studies have emphasized the instrumental role of microRNAs in the control of beta-cell function. MicroRNAs are negative regulators of gene expression, and are pivotal for the control of beta-cell proliferation, function, and survival. On the one hand, changes in specific microRNA levels have been associated with beta-cell compensation and are triggered by hormones or bioactive peptides that promote beta-cell survival and function. Conversely, modifications in the expression of other specific microRNAs contribute to beta-cell dysfunction and death elicited by diabetogenic factors including, cytokines, chronic hyperlipidemia, hyperglycemia, and oxidized LDL. This review underlines the importance of targeting the microRNA network for future innovative therapies aiming at preventing the beta-cell decline in diabetes.

Hydrogen purification for fuel cell using CuO/CeO(2)-Al(2)O(3) catalyst

CuO/CeO(2), CuO/Al(2)O(3) and CuO/CeO(2)-Al(2)O(3) catalysts, with CuO loading varying from 1 to 5 wt.%, were prepared by the citrate method and applied to the preferential oxidation of carbon monoxide in a reaction medium containing large amounts of hydrogen (PROX-CO). The compounds were characterized ex situ by X-ray diffraction, specific surface area measurements, temperature-programmed reduction and temperature-programmed reduction of oxidized surfaces; XANES-PROX in situ experiments were also carried out to study the copper oxidation state under PROX-CO conditions. These analyses showed that in the reaction medium the Cu(0) is present as dispersed particles. On the ceria, these metallic particles are smaller and more finely dispersed, resulting in a stronger metal-support interaction than in CuO/Al(2)O(3) or CuO/CeO(2)-Al(2)O(3) catalysts, providing higher PROX-CO activity and better selectivity in the conversion of CO to CO(2) despite the greater BET area presented by samples supported on alumina. It is also shown that the lower CuO content, the higher metal dispersion and consequently the catalytic activity. The redox properties of the ceria support also contributed to catalytic performance. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Empresas com CEO/Chairman fundador apresentam retorno superior ao mercado?

Esse trabalho mostra que o retorno das ações de empresas que possuem como CEO ou Chairman o próprio fundador da empresa supera o retorno do S&P 500 no período de 1995 a 2011. É realizada também uma análise utilizando-se o Modelo de 4 Fatores de Fama-French e o resultado obtido indica que a carteira possui um retorno anualizado em excesso ajustado pelo risco de 5,79% com alta significância estatística e econômica. O trabalho também propõe mais duas análises: uma decomposição setorial da carteira, onde se verifica que o setor de tecnologia é o que mais contribui com o resultado acumulado da carteira; e um estudo sobre o múltiplo P/E (preço sobre lucro) da carteira, que surpreende ao mostrar que o P/E da carteira é sistematicamente superior ao P/E do S&P 500 no período analisado.