Towards a java bytecodes compiler for nios II soft-core processor

Reconfigurable computing is one of the most recent research topics in computer science. The Altera - Nios II soft-core processor can be included in a large set of reconfigurable architectures, especially because it is designed in software, allowing it to be configured according to the application. The recent growth in applications that demand reconfigurable computing made necessary the building of compilers that translate high level languages source codes into reconfigurable devices instruction sets. In this paper we present a compiler that takes as input the bytecodes generated by a Java front-end compiler and generates a set of instructions that attends to the Nios II processor instruction set rules. Our work shows how we process Java bytecodes to the intermediate code, in the Nios II instructions format, and build the control flow and the control dependence graphs. © 2009 IEEE.

Compilação de bytecodes Java para um ambiente de arquitetura reconfigurável

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Evaluating the Java Virtual Machine as a Target for Languages Other Than Java

The portability and runtime safety of programs which are executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) makes the JVM an attractive target for compilers of languages other than Java. Unfortunately, the JVM was designed with language Java in mind, and lacks many of the primitives required for a straighforward implementation of other languages. Here, we discuss how the JVM may be used to implement other object-oriented languages. As a practical example of the possibilities, we report on a comprehensive case study. The open source Gardens Point Component Pascal compiler compiles the entire Component Pascal language, a dialect of Oberon-2, to JVM bytecodes. This compiler achieves runtime efficiencies which are comparable to native-code implementations of procedural languages.

Implementing languages other than Java on the Java Virtual Machine

The portability and runtime safety of programs which are executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) makes the JVM an attractive target for compilers of languages other than Java. Unfortunately, the JVM was designed with language Java in mind, and lacks many of the primitives required for a straight forward implementation of other languages. Here, we discuss how the JVM may be used to implement other object oriented languages. As a practical example of the possibilities, we report on a comprehensive case study. The open source Gardens Point Component Pascal compiler compiles the entire Component Pascal language, a dialect of Oberon 2, to JVM bytecodes. This compiler achieves runtime efficiencies which are comparable to native code implementations of procedural languages.

Lightweight Modeling of Java Virtual Machine Security Constraints using Alloy

The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the component known as the Bytecode Verifier. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of a real-world malicious applet is given to demonstrate the efficacy of the approach.

Modeling the Java Bytecode Verifier

The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Java, particularly in the Bytecode Verifier, a critical component used to verify class semantics before loading is complete. This paper describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code. Analysis of the approach in the context of known security exploits is provided. This type of analysis represents a significant departure from standard malware analysis methods based on signatures or anomaly detection.