Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Missing the logic of the text: Lord Butler’s report on intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction

This article focuses on the final report of Lord Butler’s review of British intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), specifically on its treatment of the accuracy of the use of intelligence on Iraqi WMD in a government dossier published in September 2002 ahead of the 2003 Iraq war. In the report, the demonstration of the accuracy of the “September Dossier” hinges on the insertion of tables that compare side-by-side quotations from this document and from intelligence assessments. The analysis of the textual and visual methods by which the report is written reveals how the logic of the comparative tables is missed in the Butler report: the logic of these tables requires that the comparison between quotations from the two documents should be performed at the level of their details but the Butler report performs its comparison only at a broad and general level.

Spooked: Britain, empire and intelligence since 1945

A collection of pieces on British intelligence including sources (Christopher R. Moran), methodology (Richard Aldrich), media (Philip H.J. Davies), historiography (Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew), South Africa and the Wilson government (Philip Murphy), Pakistan and ISI (Rob Johnson), and UK security policy in the face of radical Islam (Anthony Glees).

British Double Agents and Operation Fortitude: A New Perspective

On June 6th, 1944, Allied forces stormed the beaches of Normandy as a part of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of France. While they experienced pockets of stiff resistance, Allied troops sustained far fewer casualties than they had expected. The reason for this was due to Operation Fortitude, a deception mission that intended to fool Hitler about the time and location of the Allied invasion mission. The use of double agents by British Intelligence services was essential for the effective execution of Fortitude. The story of the double agents goes beyond their success during Fortitude. Double agents were initially recruited as German agents, but key agents immediately turned themselves in to British authorities upon reaching the nation. These agents decided to become involved with British Intelligence due to broader circumstances that were happening in Europe. The emergence of Fascist regimes disrupted the political landscape of Europe and led to widespread condemnation from political and social spheres. Their development as double agents became crucial to their effectiveness during Operation Fortitude. Their successful infiltration of German Intelligence allowed them to convince Hitler and German High Command that the main Allied invasion force would come at the Pas de Calais instead of Normandy. The result was that the Allies met an unprepared German defense force on D-Day and were able to advance past the beaches. The work of the double agents during Fortitude saved thousands of Allied lives and was vital to the success of Operation Overlord.

Einfallstor in die Sowjetunion: Die Besatzung Deutschlands und die Aussp?hung der UdSSR durch den britischen Nachrichtendienst?

Maddrell, John, 'Einfallstor in die Sowjetunion: Die Besatzung Deutschlands und die Aussp?hung der UdSSR durch den britischen Nachrichtendienst', Vierteljahrshefte f?r Zeitgeschichte (2003) 51(2) pp.183-227 RAE2008

Alienated Selfhood and Heroism: A Poststructuralist Reading of John le Carré’s Spy Fiction Novels

John le Carré’s novels “The Spy Who Came in From the Cold” (1963), “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy” (1974), and “The Tailor of Panama” (1997), focus on how the main characters reflect the somber reality of working in the British intelligence service. Through a broad post-structuralist analysis, I will identify the dichotomies - good/evil in “The Spy Who Came in From the Cold,” past/future in “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy,” and institution/individual in “The Tailor of Panama” - that frame the role of the protagonists. Each character is defined by his ambiguity and swinging moral compass, transforming him into a hybrid creation of morality and adaptability during transitional time periods in history, mainly during the Cold War. Le Carré’s novels reject the notion of spies standing above a group being celebrated. Instead, he portrays spies as characters who trade off individualism and social belonging for a false sense of heroism, loneliness, and even death.

Cross-Cultural Intelligence (CQ): its impact on British Expatriates Adjustment in International Construction Projects

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the facets of cultural intelligence (CQ) (cognitive, meta-cognitive, motivational and behavioural) and the dimensions of cross-cultural adjustment (interaction, general and work adjustment).

Design/methodology/approach: Interviews and questionnaire survey were carried out with British expatriates from the architectural, engineering and construction sector. A total of 191 respondents, with experience from 29 different countries, actively participated in this research. Structural equation model was subsequently developed to investigate the relationship between elements of CQ and cross-cultural adjustment.

Findings: Results of structural equation modelling revealed that collectively all the four aspects of CQ have significant influence on general, interaction and work adjustment, particularly motivational and cognitive CQ. Cognitive CQ which empowers the expatriates with in-depth knowledge about different cultures was a significant predictor of interaction and work adjustment, whereas, motivational CQ is a significant predictor for general and work adjustment. However, no support was gathered for meta-cognitive and behavioural aspects of CQ.

Practical implications: Globally, construction companies and projects are entering an era of increased internationalisation which has prompted the migration/promotion of British construction professionals to different parts of the world for their specialised capabilities and skills. Thus, it is of utmost importance that these professionals adjust to their new world of varied culture and still be productive in their work.

Originality/value: An understanding of these essential factors can actually help British construction organisations to select and mentor individuals and to provide necessary training for successful international assignments.

The British state and the Irish rebellion of 1916: an intelligence failure or an failure of response

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

Strategic intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War

Jackson, Peter, and Joe Maiolo, 'Strategic intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War', Military History (2006) 65(2) pp.417-461 RAE2008