Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.

Inhibiting outrage: tactics and counter-tactics in legal cases of sexual harassment

Sexual harassment can be conceptualised as an interaction between harassers and targets. Utilising 23 detailed legal transcripts, this study explored evidence of a range of perpetrator tactics and target counter-tactics. These tactics can be readily fitted into the backfire framework, which proposes that powerful perpetrators of perceived unjust acts are likely to cover up the actions, devalue the target, reinterpret the events, use official channels to give an appearance of justice, and intimidate or bribe people involved. Targets can respond using counter-tactics of exposure, validation, reframing, mobilisation of support, and resistance. The findings have implications for raising awareness of harassing tactics and recommendations for effective informal responses in organisations.

Social norms and corruption

We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels.

Anti-bribery disclosures: A response to networked governance

This study examined the posited link between networked governance (the activities of NGOs and the media) and the anti-bribery disclosures of two global telecommunication companies. Based on a joint consideration of legitimacy theory, media agenda setting theory and responsive regulation, the findings show that anti-bribery disclosures are positively associated with the activities of the media and NGO initiatives. The findings also show that companies make anti-bribery disclosures to maintain symbolic legitimacy but are less prominent in effecting a substantive change in their accountability practices.

Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft even though individual bribe size might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation if they lower demanded bribe levels and thus encourage small businesses to participate.

Situative Risikofaktoren von Korruption – Gelegenheit allein macht keine Diebe

In diesem Beitrag werden die Ergebnisse von sieben Datenhebungen zur Relevanz situativer Risikofaktoren für Korruption aus den Jahren 2010 bis 2013 vorgestellt. In fünf quantitativen Datenerhebungen wurden folgende sechs Faktoren untersucht: Dauer der Korruptionsbeziehung, Vorteilshöhe, Art der Vorteilsempfänger, Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit, Vorliegen einer persönliche Notlage und situative Unsicherheit. In zwei qualitativen Datenerhebungen wurde mit offenen Fragen nach situativen Einflussfaktoren von Korruption gefragt. Erwartungswidrig erwiesen sich die untersuchten Faktoren als weitgehend irrelevant für die Bewertung von Korruption sowie für das Meldeverhalten bei beobachteter Korruption. Zu vermuteten ist, dass situative Risikofaktoren nicht unmittelbar, sondern indirekt über vom Umfeld geteilte mögliche Rechtfertigungen korrupter Handlungen im Alltag wirken. Die durchgängig nicht signifikanten Ergebnisse lassen daran zweifeln, dass korruptes Handeln maßgeblich durch situative Risikofaktoren beeinflussbar ist.

La pelota no se mancha: Un estudio histórico sobre el desarrollo y la política en FIFA

Esta investigación se centra en la Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) como organización política. Intenta responder dos interrogantes primordiales: 1) ¿cómo la FIFA ha constituido el poder que tiene actualmente y, así, hacerse del monopolio indiscutido del fútbol? Y 2) ¿cómo ha cambiado en el tiempo la política interna de FIFA y su vínculo con la política internacional? Para lograr esto, se realiza un estudio histórico, basado principalmente en documentos, que intenta caracterizar y analizar los cambios de la organización en el tiempo. Se enfatizan las últimas dos presidencias de FIFA, de João Havelange y Joseph Blatter, como casos de estudio.

Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania

Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially towards the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

Bribes vs. gifts

This paper closely examines the concept of bribery in dealings between business managers and public officials, the networks of bribery that operate and the different forms that bribery can take including situations where a bribe can be given under the name and cloak of a gift. However, there is a fine line that divides a gift from a bribe in the context of business interactions and not all gift-giving is bribery. The paper enhances our understanding of the difference between a gift and a bribe in the context of dealings between a business manager and a public official and proposes ‘test of disclosure’ as a means to establish whether a gift is indeed a gift or not, regardless of the cultural situation involved.