O prazo decadencial das contribuições especiais, a edição da Súmula Vinculante n 08/2008 e a polêmica na modulação de seus efeitos

No presente trabalho foram analisadas a natureza jurídica das contribuições especiais, suas hipóteses de validação constitucional como seu critério de distinção perante as demais espécies tributárias, bem como a correta determinação do prazo decadencial a elas estabelecido pelo art 146 do Código Tributário Nacional (CTN), especialmente em face da inconstitucionalidade do art 45 da Lei n 8.212/91 declarada através da Súmula Vinculante n 08/2008. Também foram abordadas as correntes doutrinárias favoráveis e contrárias à possibilidade da restrição dos efeitos das decisões de inconstitucionalidade das normas tributárias, bem como realizada a crítica à modulação dos efeitos da SV n 08/2008, que culminou por limitar a repetição do indébito das contribuições irregularmente constituídas apenas àqueles contribuintes que haviam se insurgido contra seu pagamento, administrativa ou judicialmente, até a data de 11/06/2008.

Una mirada al papel del precedente judicial y su aplicación por parte de los jueces administrativos y de la administración pública. estudio del propósito de las sentencias de unificación jurisprudencial y del mecanismo de extensión de jurisprudencia, consagrados en la ley 1437 de 2011.

El Ordenamiento jurídico colombiano desde sus inicios se ha enmarcado en la familia jurídica Romano Germánica, donde la Jurisprudencia ocupa un papel secundario en el momento de tomar decisiones por parte de los jueces, fungiendo como un instrumento meramente auxiliar, totalmente opacado por la ley. Sin embargo, a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la Constitución de 1991, con la creación de la Corte Constitucional junto al valor vinculante que se ha dado a sus decisiones, el tradicional sistema de fuentes ha presentado una evolución que lo aproxima al uso de instituciones, como el precedente judicial, que parecían exclusivas del Common Law. De esta manera, lo novedoso del problema de investigación es que la discusión sobre la alteración de la jerarquía de las fuentes del derecho, se aborda desde una perspectiva teórica, pero desarrolla puntualmente, mecanismos como las sentencias de unificación y la extensión de jurisprudencia, que posiblemente dan alcance al concepto de precedente judicial en el Contencioso Administrativo en la práctica.

Empirismo e sua relação com o direito: precedente e súmula vinculante

Esse trabalho de conclusão de curso se propõe a relacionar Empirismo e direito. Para isso se faz necessário considerar que a concepção empírica (conhecimento como fruto da experiência) é corrente no sistema jurídico da Common Law, sendo o Empirismo responsável também pela matriz epistemológica que originou o Realismo Jurídico. Considerando que o sistema jurídico pátrio é o da Civil Law, buscou-se realizar uma comparação - através de suas características principais - entre os dois institutos de efeito vinculante de nosso país. Em ambos os sistemas os aludidos institutos são oriundos de decisões dos Tribunais Superiores, por esta razão o trabalho tem como objetivo principal constatar se as Súmulas Vinculantes representam uma versão nacional dos Precedentes norte-americanos. A hipótese criada não foi ratificada dado que verificou-se a impossibilidade de comparação literal entre os institutos. Afinal as distinções superam as semelhanças.

Transformaciones y evolución de las fuentes del derecho administrativo colombiano a partir de los tratados de integración

Esta tesis producto del trabajo de investigación se planteo sobre las bases de un derecho administrativo interno creado para resolver los problemas suscitados al interior del Estado en consonancia con los postulados constitucionales, teniendo en cuenta el artículo 4° en que se establece la supremacía de la Constitución y los artículo 9°, 93, 94 y 224 al 227 que ordenan el desarrollo del derecho de integración en el marco de los países Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, por lo que surge la imperiosa necesidad de armonizar el derecho de la integración con el ordenamiento jurídico nacional y en especial con el derecho administrativo quien deberá recepcionar el mencionado ordenamiento supraestatal, alterando las tradicionales concepciones de las fuentes de este derecho interno. Por lo tanto, desde la perspectiva del derecho administrativo comprendido como un derecho legislado que regula las relaciones entre el Estado y los particulares en el que prevalece el “principio de legalidad” de los actos administrativos, se puede intuir que constituye un problema jurídico los impactos derivados de los tratados de integración, donde nos preguntamos sí las categorías de fuentes actuales del derecho administrativo son las adecuadas para abordar la recepción de estas disposiciones Por lo que al explorara las incidencias en el derecho administrativo con ocasión de la recepción del derecho de integración con particular énfasis en la Comunidad Andina, identificamos que uno de los rasgos más distintivos del ordenamiento jurídico andino, como el de otros esquemas de integración, proviene del discutido concepto de supranacionalidad. Dentro de la teoría jurídica contemporánea la comprensión de este término trae una novísima concepción que al mismo tiempo es respetuosa de la soberanía interna de los Estados miembros, la cual permite el surgimiento del nuevo ente común donde es posible la distribución de competencias en la reglamentación de ciertos ámbitos entre autoridades multilaterales y nacionales, conservando su propia autonomía. Este concepto ha permitido que en el ordenamiento comunitario andino, a semejanza de lo que acontece en el derecho interno de los Estados, exista un sistema de control de las normas jurídicas garantizado por una jurisdicción contenciosa-administrativa ejercida a través del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina. Lo que en definitiva incide en el derecho administrativo interno al encontramos frente a ordenamientos independientes, como lo son los del derecho de integración, en los que se producen, aplican y ejecutan normas según las reglas de juego adoptadas para ese efecto por los Estados miembros, que dependerán del marco del proceso de integración y su armonización con las normas internas. Es por ello, que en el resultado final de esta tesis se constata la aparición de nuevas fuentes de legalidad, donde ya no sólo se contemplará la ley y la jurisprudencia, ésta última posicionada con el devenir del tiempo debido a su pertinencia, como lo podemos contrastar con la expedición del Nuevo Código de Procedimiento Contencioso Administrativo (L. 1437/11) que aún no ha entrado en vigencia, en donde se resalta la importancia del Precedente Judicial a partir de las sentencias de unificación del Consejo de Estado. Pero más allá, de este nuevo reconocimiento legislativo, el sistema de fuentes establecido se verá alterado en su jerarquía con el derecho que nace con ocasión de los tratados de integración, lo que aún no se refleja en este nuevo Código, el cual no prevé la aplicación de las nuevas fuentes de legalidad.

A ascensão de aspectos do common law no sistema processual civil brasileiro: uma crítica à aplicação da jurisprudência e à doutrina dos precedentes judiciais

Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS

Gay Parenthood and the Revolution of the Modern Family: An Examination of the Unique Barriers Confronting Gay Adoptive Parents

Abstract: In recent decades, the structure of the American family has been revolutionized to incorporate families of diverse and unconventional compositions. Gay and lesbian couples have undoubtedly played a crucial role in this revolution by establishing families through the tool of adoption. Eleven adoptive parents from the state of Connecticut were interviewed to better conceptualize the unique barriers gay couples encounter in the process adoption. Both the scholarly research and the interview data illustrate that although gay couples face enormous legal barriers, the majority of their hardship comes through social interactions. As a result, the cultural myths and legal restrictions that create social hardships for gay adoptive parents forge a vicious and discriminatory cycle of marginalization that American legal history illustrates is best remedied through judicial intervention at the Supreme Court level. While judicial intervention, alone, cannot change the reality of gay parenthood, I argue that past judicial precedent illustrates that such change can serve as a tool of individual, political, and legal validation for the gay community for obtaining equal rights.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent

The claim that the common law displays an economic logic is a centerpiece of the positive economic theory of law. A key question in this literature is whether this outcome is due to the conscious efforts of judges, or the result of invisible hand processes. This paper develops a model in which to two effects combine to determine the direction of legal change. The main conclusions are, first, that judicial bias can prevent the law from evolving toward efficiency if the fraction of judges biased against the efficient rule is large enough; and second, that precedent affects the rate of legal change but not its direction.

Judicial and legislative considerations in the taxation of compensation receipts : an international comparison

In 1995, the Federal Commissioner of Taxation released Taxation Ruling TR 95/35 in an attempt to comprehensively address the appropriate capital gains tax treatment of a receipt of compensation, awarded either by the courts or via a settlement. The ruling was in response to the numerous, somewhat contradictory, court decisions of the early 1990s. Despite the release of TR 95/35, there still appears to be a lack of consensus as to the appropriate treatment of such awards. It has been suggested that the only way a taxpayer can, with any certainty, determine their liability is to obtain a private binding ruling, a far from satisfactory situation. In an attempt to clarify what the capital gains tax consequences of a compensation receipt should be, this article examines the Australian position and explores the comparative jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and Canada to ascertain whether the Australian attitude is consistent with these international jurisdictions. This article concludes that while the jurisdictions, through differing approaches, achieve a similar result, there is still a need to address the uncertainties that remain.

Judicial intervention in the affairs of unincorporated religious associations in New South Wales

The leading Australian High Court case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 confirmed that associations which are 'social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in character’, and not formed ‘for private gain or material advantage’, are usually formed on a basis of mutual consent. Unless there is some clear, positive indication that the members wish to relate to each other in a legal fashion, the rules of the association will not be treated as an enforceable contract in contrast to the rules of incorporated bodies. Australian unincorporated associations experiencing internal disputes, like those in most other common law jurisdictions, have found courts reluctant to provide a remedy unless there is a proprietary interest or trust to protect. This is further compounded by the judicial view that an unincorporated association has no legal recognition as a ‘juristic person’. The right to hold property and the ability to sue and be sued are incidences of this recognition. By contrast, the law recognises ‘artificial’ legal persons such as corporations, who are given rights to hold property and to sue and be sued. However, when a number of individuals associate together for a non-commercial, lawful purpose, but not by way of a corporate structure, legal recognition ‘as a group’ is denied. Since 1934, a significant number of cases have distinguished or otherwise declined to follow this precedent of the High Court. A trenchant criticism is found in McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295, 298 where Wootten J said that ‘citizens are entitled to look to the courts for the same assistance in resolving disputes about the conduct of sporting, political and social organisations as they can expect in relation to commercial institutions’. According to Wootten J at 298, if disputes are not settled by the courts, this would create a ‘legal-no-man's land, in which disputes are settled not in accordance with justice and the fulfilment of deliberately undertaken obligations, but by deceit, craftiness, and an arrogant disregard of rights’. Cameron v Hogan was decided in 1934. There is an increasing volume of first instance cases which distinguish or, in the words of Palmer J, ‘just pay lip service’ to this High Court decision. (Coleman v Liberal Party of Australia (2007) 212 FLR 271, 278). The dissenting cases seem to call for a judicial policy initiative. This would require recognition by judges that voluntary associations play a significant role in society and that members have a legitimate, enforceable expectation that the rules of the association will be observed by members and in the last resort, enforced by the courts without the need to prove contractual intention, the existence of a trust or the existence of a right of a proprietary nature. This thesis asks: what legal, as distinct from political, redress does an ordinary member have, when a rule is made or a process followed which is contrary to the underlying doctrines and philosophies embodied in the constitutional documents of an unincorporated religious association? When, if at all, will a court intervene to ensure doctrinal purity or to supervise the daily life of a large unincorporated religious association? My research objective is to examine and analyse leading cases and relevant legislation on the enforceability of the constitutions of large, unincorporated, religious associations with particular reference to the Anglican Church in New South Wales. Given its numerical size, wide geographical spread and presence since the foundation of New South Wales, the Anglican Church in New South Wales, contains a sufficient variety of ‘real life’ situations to be representative of the legal issues posed by Cameron v Hogan which may be faced by other large, unincorporated, religious associations in New South Wales. In contemporary society, large, unincorporated, religious associations play an important community role. The resolution of internal disputes in such associations should not remain captive to legal doctrines of an earlier age.

Email negotiations form a binding land contract without a 'signature'

Email is rapidly replacing other forms of communication as the preferred means of communication between contracting parties. The recent decision of Stellard Pty Ltd v North Queensland Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 119 reinforces the judicial acceptance of email as an effective means of creating a binding agreement and the willingness to adopt a liberal concept of ‘signing’ in an electronic environment.

A objetivação do controle concreto de constitucionalidade nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal

The independence of the United States and the revolutions that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century led to the birth of the written constitution, with a mission to limit the power of the State and to ensure fundamental rights to citizens. Thus, the Constitution has become the norm and ultimate founding of the State. Because of this superiority felt the need to protect her, emerging from that constitutional jurisdiction, taking control of constitutionality of provisions his main instrument. In Brazil, the constitutionality control began with the Constitution of 1891, when "imported" the American model, which is named after incidental diffuse model of judicial review. Indeed, allowed that any judge or court could declare the unconstitutionality of the law or normative act in a concrete case. However, the Brazilian Constituent did not bring the U.S. Institute of stare decisis, by which the precedents of higher courts eventually link the below. Because of this lack, each tribunal Brazilian freely decide about the constitutionality of a rule, so that the decision took effect only between the parties to the dispute. This prompted the emergence of conflicting decisions between judicantes organs, which ultimately undermine legal certainty and the image of the judiciary. As a solution to the problem, was incorporated from the 1934 Constitution to rule that the Senate would suspend the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. With the introduction of abstract control of constitutionality, since 1965, the Supreme Court went on to also have the power to declare the invalidity of the provision unconstitutional, effectively against all without the need for the participation of the Senate. However, it remained the view that in case the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of the fuzzy control law by the Senate would continue with the competence to suspend the law unconstitutional, thus the decision of the Praetorium Exalted restricted parties. The 1988 Constitution strengthened the abstract control expanding legitimized the Declaratory Action of Unconstitutionality and creating new mechanisms of abstract control. Adding to this, the Constitutional Amendment. No. 45/2004 brought the requirement of general repercussion and created the Office of Binding Precedent, both to be applied by the Supreme Court judgments in individual cases, thus causing an approximation between the control abstract and concrete constitutional. Saw themselves so that the Supreme Court, to be the guardian of the Constitution, its action should be directed to the trial of issues of public interest. In this new reality, it becomes more necessary the participation of the Senate to the law declared unconstitutional in fuzzy control by the Supreme Court can reach everyone, because such an interpretation has become obsolete. So, to adapt it to this reality, such a rule must be read in the sense that the Senate give publicity to the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, since mutated constitutional

As súmulas vinculantes no Brasil e a necessidade de limites ao ativismo judicial

O Autor aborda que, a partir do fortalecimento da jurisdição constitucional, Constituição/1988, novas técnicas interpretativas serão permitidas, no intuito de ampliar a atuação jurisdicional em assuntos tradicionalmente de alçada dos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo.

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.