Developing the eclectic paradigm of internationalization on the issue of multinational contractors bidding for Australian infrastructure

Against a background of already thin markets in some sectors of major public sector infrastructure in Australia and the desire of the Australian federal government to leverage private finance, concerns about ensuring sufficient levels of competition are prompting federal government to seek new sources of in-bound foreign direct income - as part of attracting more foreign contractors and consortia to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure. As a first step towards attracting greater overseas interest in the Australian public sector market infrastructure market, an improved understanding of the determinants of multinational contractors’ willingness to bid in this market is offered by Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and which have has been a dominant approach in international business for over 20 years and yet has been little used in the context of international contracting. This paper aims to develop Dunning’s eclectic framework and also gives a brief outline of a research plan to collect secondary data and primary data from international contractors around the globe in pursuance of testing the eclectic framework.

The theory and practice on pre-qualification in bidding procedure

资格预审是招标程序中重要环节.通过对投标人的资质和业绩等审查既能保证不符合 要求的投标人尽可能早地退出无谓竞争的行列,避免了大量人力"物力的损失和浪费, 又能促进建筑市场优胜劣汰,提高企业竞争力.同时鉴于目前资格预审和建筑市场存在 的问题,笔者以为通过强化资格预审可以有效推进建筑市场信用体系建设,促进行业健康发展,并且深入探讨了资格预审体系建立的具体对策和措施.

A multivariate approach to bidding strategies

A multivariate approach to bidding strategy is presented in comparison with previous standard approaches. An optimal formulation is derived and a method of parameter estimation proposed. A case study illustrates the derivation of optimal and other strategic mark up values against a single bidder. Concluding remarks concern extensions to multiple competitors differing levels of information, and sensitivity analysis.

Generalised gamma bidding model

A generalised gamma bidding model is presented, which incorporates many previous models. The log likelihood equations are provided. Using a new method of testing, variants of the model are fitted to some real data for construction contract auctions to find the best fitting models for groupings of bidders. The results are examined for simplifying assumptions, including all those in the main literature. These indicate no one model to be best for all datasets. However, some models do appear to perform significantly better than others and it is suggested that future research would benefit from a closer examination of these.

Analysis of temporary traffic control cost items in transportation construction bidding process

Temporary Traffic Control Plans (TCP’s), which provide construction phasing to maintain traffic during construction operations, are integral component of highway construction project design. Using the initial design, designers develop estimated quantities for the required TCP devices that become the basis for bids submitted by highway contractors. However, actual as-built quantities are often significantly different from the engineer’s original estimate. The total cost of TCP phasing on highway construction projects amounts to 6–10% of the total construction cost. Variations between engineer estimated quantities and final quantities contribute to reduced cost control, increased chances of cost related litigations, and bid rankings and selection. Statistical analyses of over 2000 highway construction projects were performed to determine the sources of variation, which later were used as the basis of development for an automated-hybrid prediction model that uses multiple regressions and heuristic rules to provide accurate TCP quantities and costs. The predictive accuracy of the model developed was demonstrated through several case studies.

Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web

In this paper, we address a key problem faced by advertisers in sponsored search auctions on the web: how much to bid, given the bids of the other advertisers, so as to maximize individual payoffs? Assuming the generalized second price auction as the auction mechanism, we formulate this problem in the framework of an infinite horizon alternative-move game of advertiser bidding behavior. For a sponsored search auction involving two advertisers, we characterize all the pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We also prove that the bid prices will lead to a Nash equilibrium, if the advertisers follow a myopic best response bidding strategy. Following this, we investigate the bidding behavior of the advertisers if they use Q-learning. We discover empirically an interesting trend that the Q-values converge even if both the advertisers learn simultaneously.

Investigation on the development of bidding strategies for a wind farm owner

In this paper, the development of bidding strategies is investigated for a wind farm owner. The optimization model is characterized by making the analysis of scenarios. The proposed approach allows evaluating alternative production strategies in order to submit bids to the electricity market with the goal of maximizing profits. The problem is formulated as a linear programming problem. An application to a case study is presented

Cost dependent strategy for electricity markets bidding based on adaptive reinforcement learning

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. MASCEM is a multi-agent electricity market simulator to model market players and simulate their operation in the market. Market players are entities with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting with other players. MASCEM provides several dynamic strategies for agents’ behavior. This paper presents a method that aims to provide market players with strategic bidding capabilities, allowing them to obtain the higher possible gains out of the market. This method uses a reinforcement learning algorithm to learn from experience how to choose the best from a set of possible bids. These bids are defined accordingly to the cost function that each producer presents.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Metalearner based on Dynamic Neural Network for Strategic Bidding in electricity Markets

The restructuring of electricity markets, conducted to increase the competition in this sector, and decrease the electricity prices, brought with it an enormous increase in the complexity of the considered mechanisms. The electricity market became a complex and unpredictable environment, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. Software tools became, therefore, essential to provide simulation and decision support capabilities, in order to potentiate the involved players’ actions. This paper presents the development of a metalearner, applied to the decision support of electricity markets’ negotiation entities. The proposed metalearner executes a dynamic artificial neural network to create its own output, taking advantage on several learning algorithms implemented in ALBidS, an adaptive learning system that provides decision support to electricity markets’ players. The proposed metalearner considers different weights for each strategy, depending on its individual quality of performance. The results of the proposed method are studied and analyzed in scenarios based on real electricity markets’ data, using MASCEM - a multi-agent electricity market simulator that simulates market players’ operation in the market.

Espírito Santo Saúde: The bidding war

This case study describes the current situation of Espírito Santo Saúde, which involved an eventful takeover process. The company initially went public on February 2014 and later that year, due to the financial situation of its holdings it had to be sold. The bidding war began in August 2014, after Ángeles announced the first offer. Other participants who also pitched bids include José de Mello Saúde, UnitedHealth and Fosun. Furthermore, the potential projects Espírito Santo Saúde was considering implementing prior to the sale and the current situation of the healthcare industry in Portugal, will also be analysed.