Les regards traîtres (recueil de nouvelles), suivi de Le motif du mauvais œil dans les nouvelles fantastiques de Bertrand Bergeron (essai)

Ce mémoire est constitué de trois volets. Tout d'abord, on y présente une création littéraire, court recueil de nouvelles intitulé Les regards traîtres. Celui-ci est suivi d'un essai portant sur le sous-genre fantastique, qui dans sa forme canonique offre une place prépondérante aux motifs littéraires. Suit une courte revue du motif du mauvais œil et une analyse détaillée d'un corpus de nouvelles de l'auteur québécois Bertrand Bergeron. Celles-ci ont été sélectionnées parmi les ouvrages de l'auteur afin de mettre en lumière la transformation et la refonte du motif littéraire du mauvais œil dans l'écriture néo-fantastique contemporaine. Enfin, le dernier volet consiste en un retour réflexif ayant pour but de démontrer les mécanismes à l’œuvre dans ma création afin d'illustrer les questions étudiés dans le mémoire. Il s'agit donc ici, tant dans l'étude des théories et dans celle du corpus de Bergeron que dans la création inédite, d'explorer non seulement les constituants du sous-genre fantastique et la présence du motif à l'étude, mais bien de cerner l'actualisation de ce motif dans l’œuvre de Bergeron, d'en démontrer la forme, renouvelée ou pas, et finalement de procéder à la mise en scène dans mes propres nouvelles de cette actualisation. Les résultats obtenus à la suite de ces exercices démontrent que le motif littéraire du mauvais œil, bien qu'utilisé de manière différente, subsiste dans une forme revisitée sous la plume d'un auteur de néo-fantastique tel que Bertrand Bergeron. Les nouvelles du recueil Les regards traîtres concrétisent, quant à elles, la possibilité de faire vivre ce motif, voire d'en faire le moteur de mes intrigues.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Modification of Bertrand's theorem and extended Runge-Lenz vector

It is shown that for a particle with suitable angular moments in the screened Coulomb potential or isotropic harmonic potential, there still exist closed orbits rather than ellipse, characterized by the conserved aphelion and perihelion vectors, i.e. extended Runge-Lenz vector, which implies a higher dynamical symmetry than the geometrical symmetry O-3. The closeness of a planar orbit implies the radial and angular motional frequencies are commensurable.

Representaciones del imaginario medieval en el siglo XIX : la mano de gloria según Nerval, Bertrand, Maupassant y Schwob

Integran este número de la revista ponencias presentadas en Studia Hispanica Medievalia VIII: Actas de las IX Jornadas Internacionales de Literatura Española Medieval, 2008, y de Homenaje al Quinto Centenario de Amadis de Gaula.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.