A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer.

A model of seller holdout

We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize higher value. Sellers are able to avoid entering into negotiations with the buyer, so that the order in which they negotiate is endogenous. Holdout occurs if at least one of the sellers is not present in the first round of negotiations. We demonstrate that complementarity of the buyer's technology is a necessary condition for equilibrium holdout. Moreover, a rise in complementarity leads to an increased likelihood of holdout, and an increased efficiency loss. Applications include patents, the land assembly problem, and mergers.

Bargaining failures and merger policy

In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.

The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools.

This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment determination for the public sector. the solution to the model generates structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements.

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

The New Institutions of Transatlantic Aviation

This article focuses on the institutions of transatlantic aviation since 1945, and aims at extracting from this historical process topical policy implications. Using the methodology of an analytic narrative, we describe and explain the creation of the international cartel institutions in the 1940s, their operation throughout the 1950s and 60s, their increasing vulnerability in the 1970s, and then the progressive liberalization of the whole system. Our analytic narrative has a natural end, marked by the signing of an Open Skies Agreement between the US and the EU in 2007. We place particular explanatory power on (a) the progressive liberalization of the US domestic market, and (b) the active role of the European Commission in Europe. More specifically, we explain these developments using two frameworks. First, a “political limit pricing” model, which seemed promising, then failed, and then seemed promising again because it failed. Second, a strategic bargaining model inspired by Susanne Schmidt’s analysis of how the European Commission uses the threat of infringement proceedings to force member governments into line and obtain the sole negotiating power in transatlantic aviation.

TASKGURU

La revolución del internet ha llevado a muchos cambios. Con el paso del tiempo, dependemos menos de los papeles y más de los archivos digitales. Los niveles de información han incrementado exponencialmente y la interconectividad que han brindado servicios como redes sociales se encuentra en niveles jamás pensados hace media década. Sin embargo, el mercado laboral tradicional ha visto pocos cambios; a pesar de que han surgido numerosas ocupaciones y desaparecido puestos del mismo modo, la gran mayoría de personas se ven obligadas a buscar el sustento propio y de sus familias dedicándole una cantidad considerable de tiempo a su trabajo y dejando de lado muchos otros asuntos pertinentes al hogar, a los negocios e incluso asuntos personales. El sistema de adquisición de servicios se encuentra completamente estancado. En Colombia, según cifras de 2011 del Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), existen más de 10 millones de viviendas y más de 500.000 establecimientos de comercio, que por lo menos una vez por año tienen un reparo para hacer, por esta razón, se genera una amplia demanda en la prestación de este tipo de servicios. Miles de personas continúan sin encontrar servicios específicos a sus necesidades en el momento adecuado, incluso cuando existe dinero destinado hacia los mismos, en gran parte debido a los esquemas tradicionales y la inhabilidad de conectar necesidades con servicios. Este emprendimiento busca cambiar ese esquema tradicional de las páginas amarillas, los clasificados y otras fuentes que se han quedado en el siglo XX como medio publicitario de trabajos realizados por independientes en temas relacionados con el hogar u oficina y abrir camino hacia una nueva forma de encontrar un apareamiento en tiempo real y enfocado en los consumidores, creando una sitio web y posteriormente aplicaciones móviles, en la que cada cliente puede comparar los precios estandarizados de cada servicio del hogar, pagar electrónicamente lo pactado y dejar calificaciones del servicio posteriormente; cambiando el estilo de negociación de modo más formal y bajo un esquema que logre acuerdos mutuamente beneficiales. En el corto plazo, se busca que las personas puedan considerar alternativas a los esquemas existentes para dar a satisfacer sus necesidades. En el mediano y largo plazo el objetivo del 4 proyecto es romper los paradigmas en los mismos que se han mantenido desde tanto tiempo y revolucionar su funcionamiento conforme a las herramientas existentes en la actualidad. El siguiente proyecto tiene como propuesta proveer una solución completa para los hogares y establecimientos comerciales en términos de adquisición de servicios prestados por personas independientes y con poca o nula regulación en el mercado actual. Es una propuesta que permite cambiar la logística y el modelo de negociación de mediante una herramienta virtual que adicionalmente brinde una respuesta más rápida y facilidad de uso.

Trajetória dos assentamentos rurais financiados pelo crédito fundiário no estado do Rio Grande do Norte: uma análise da experiência do assentamento da fazenda Paz no município de Maxaranguape/RN

The market-assisted land reform (RAAM) has been constituted as an alternative of agrarian reform funded by the Programa Nacional do Crédito Fundiário (PNCF). It is a policy of acquisition, distribution and use of Earth ideologically disseminated and funded by the World Bank in the context of productive insertion of landless workers. Accordingly, this study seeks to analyze the trajectory of rural settlements financed by this policy, seeking to understand what factors promote or limit the process of rural development of those settlements. To do so, take as a reference case study of the Assentamento da Fazenda Paz, in the municipality of Maxaranguape in the State of Rio Grande do Norte. From the methodological point of view, bibliographical and documentary research were used, in addition to visits to the settlement and semi-structured interviews with the settlers, trade union leaders, consultants and technicians linked to the project. Assuming the reports of respondents, initially constructs the hypothesis that informal and formal institutions present in the Assentamento da Fazenda Paz were unable to effectively coordinate the actions of the agents. The results obtained showed the existence of a very complex undertaking, with a total area of 607 hectares and 80 families settled, endowed with good quality water and irrigation infrastructure, with assets of approximately R$ 5 million reais. Experience experienced by the settlers understood the development of complex systems of production and marketing of fruits and vegetables, with an emphasis on the cultivation of papaya in an area of 45 hectares based on modern irrigation system and extensive use of technology. Collective management of production, marketing, revenue and costs stood out as a major challenge for the settlers and their representative organisations, i.e. the Community Association and the cooperative. From this observation it was possible to identify two moments on the trajectory of the project: the first, between 2007-2011, considered by respondents as successful, in which the integration of public policies and abundant input of revenue from the commercialization of the fruits da Paz, mainly through the sale of papaya and pineapple in national and international markets, allowed an average remuneration of R$ 800.00 reais to R$ 1,000 reais seated/monthIn addition to the production of vegetables and other types of products for sale and consumption; the second, from 2012, characterized as a failure, due to the discontinuity of the cultivation, production and marketing of fruits based on the collective bargaining model deployed. Important factors explain the discontinuity of the project, including the model of agriculture implemented, difficulties related to the management of production, marketing and finance the venture, in addition to the breach of trust between the Board of the cooperative and the associates and the distancing of the governmental organizations more directly responsible for the project. It is therefore concluded that we must to rethink rural development as a multidimensional phenomenon, requiring a broad engagement between State and society under the foundations of a territorial development contract

Estimação de metas estratégicas por meio de análise por envoltória de dados e modelo da Barganha de Nash: aplicação na área de saúde publica

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Mecânica - FEG

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).