Swiss Banking Secrecy; The Erosion of an Institution. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2008

Switzerland has for a long time been an important centre of banking services in Europe and beyond. Consequently, the banking sector has become important to Switzerland’s prosperity. This paper focuses on a central reason behind the success of the Swiss banking sector: the institution of banking secrecy, deeply enshrined in the Swiss history and tradition. The rapid development of international markets that eventually gave rise to a “group structuration process” has, however, progressively eroded Swiss banking secrecy. It has had to bend before the duty of transparency within the groups in order not to promote financial criminality through accelerated asset inflows. Switzerland has also had to develop a comprehensive legislative frame to tackle financial criminality, and to enter into international agreements providing for mutual assistance. This process has undoubtedly and irremediably weakened the Swiss banking secrecy. Most importantly, nevertheless, the questionable ethical and socio-economic grounds of this controversial institution could and should also start to erode it from within.

O sigilo bancário e a fraude fiscal

Tax evasion and fraud threaten the economic and social objectives of modern tax systems, precluding the state funding for the satisfaction of collective needs and the fair distribution of wealth, being a violation of basic principles and values of our society. In tax law, to give tax administration the necessary powers to supervise and control the information provided by taxpayers and combat tax evasion and fraud, over the last years the grounds for a derogation of bank secrecy without judicial authorization have been extended, which raises some constitutional compatibility issues. Similarly, this tendency of making this legal regime more flexible and increasing automatic exchange of information has been followed by the European Union and the international community. Banking secrecy, as a professional secrecy, is an instrument to protect the right to privacy but also appears as an anti-abuse and repressive mechanism of evasive and fraudulent behaviors. Because of the conflict of interests will always be necessary to make a practical agreement between them, ensuring the legality and the due guarantees of the taxpayers but also an effective way to combat tax evasion and fraud. Bank secrecy cannot be one method to, behind the right to privacy, taxpayers practice illegal activities. But the practice of these irregular conducts also does not justify a total annihilation of the right to banking secrecy, uncovering all documents and bank information’s. Although considering the legislative changes, the administrative derogation of bank secrecy will always be what the tax administration does of it.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens during the decades before World War II is still little known. To date, the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 1930s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of five countries (Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany), this paper offers therefore a new comparative appraisal of international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: What was the specificity of the Swiss case - already considered a quintessential tax haven at the time - in comparison to other banking centres? The findings of this research study are twofold. First, the 1920s and 1930s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. Second, within this general environment, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the banking community, British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury, and the English business circles.

The Rise of The Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period: An International Comparison

The history of tax havens is still little known for the decades before World War II. Up to now the studies that have focused on the 1920s and 30s have presented either a very general perspective on the development of tax havens or a narrow national point of view. Based on unpublished historical archives of four countries, this paper offers therefore a new comparative look on international tax competition during this period in order to answer the following question: was the Swiss case - already considered as a quintessential tax haven at the time - specific in comparison to other banking centres? This research has two results. On the one hand, the 1920s and 30s appear as something of a golden age of opportunity for avoiding taxation through the relocation of assets. Actually, most of the financial centres granted consistent tax benefits for imported capital, while the extremely limited degree of international cooperation and the usual guarantee of banking secrecy in European countries prevented the taxation of exported assets. On the other hand, within this general balance sheet, the fiscal strategies of a tax haven like Switzerland differed from those of a great financial power like Great Britain. Whereas the Swiss administration readily placed itself at the service of the bankers, the British policy was more balanced between the contradictory interests of the Board of Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the English business circles.

Image Resilience after Multiple Crises : The Case of Switzerland in the United States

In der heutigen Welt sind die Reputation und das Image eines Landes als wichtige Faktoren für den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Erfolg angesehen. Jedoch ist die Pflege der Marke eines Landes komplex und führt zu zwei Positionen, die sich potentiell widersprechen: Einerseits kann ein positives Erscheinungsbild eines Landes durch aktive Massnahmen gefördert werden. Andererseits ist es schwierig, das Bild eines Landes abzugrenzen und es ist mit Klischees behaftet. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Auswirkungen von zwei grösseren Krisen auf das Image der Schweiz in den Vereinigten Staaten: die Krise um die nachrichtenlosen Vermögen aus der Zeit des 2. Weltkriegs im Jahr 2000 sowie die Krise um die UBS und das Bankgeheimnis im Jahr 2009. Die Studie zeigt, dass das Erscheinungsbild der Schweiz unberührt blieb, obwohl ein beachtlicher Teil der Bevölkerung und der Meinungsführer von beiden Krisen wusste. Dies stützt die Hypothese, dass das Image eines Landes eine hohe Beständigkeit aufweist. In today's world, country's reputation and image have become key issues, widely believed to be success factors both economically and politically. Nevertheless, managing a country's brand is complex and leads to two positions that are potentially contradictory: On the one hand, a country's image can be influenced either by promotional activities. On the other hand, a country's image is a construct that is very difficult to delimit and is highly stereotyped. This contribution study the impact of two major crises on the image of Switzerland in the United States: the unclaimed wartime deposits crisis in 2000 and the UBS and banking secrecy crisis in 2009. It shows that despite the fact that a substantial proportion of the public and of opinion leaders was aware of both crises, the image of Switzerland was unaffected, which tends to support the hypothesis of strong stability of a country's image.

Le secret bancaire et l'entraide internationale

Parmi les indicateurs de la mondialisation, le secret bancaire est au centre d'un débat animé en ce moment historique, caractérisé par la globalisation de l'économie, les exigences de sécurité croissantes, l'urgence de la lutte contre le blanchiment des capitaux provenant d’activités criminelles et l’internationalisation expansive des réseaux bancaires. La tendance vers le renforcement de la coopération internationale, met en discussion la forte sauvegarde du secret bancaire de plusieurs pays. La question dirimante est plutôt claire. Il s'agit, effectivement, de savoir jusqu'à quel point le secret, dans sa conception la plus inextensible et inflexible, devient par contre un instrument décisif pour contourner les règles communes,faire une concurrence déloyale sur les marchés et assurer des véritables crimes, par exemple de type terroriste. Pour faire évoluer les situations jugées problématiques, la démarche parallèle des trois organismes BÂLE, l’OCDE puis le GAFI est d’autant plus significative, qu’elle a été inspirée par les préoccupations exprimées au sein du G7 sur les dangers que présenteraient pour l’économie internationale certaines activités financières accomplies sur et à partir de ces territoires. L’ordre public justifie aussi la mise en place de mesures particulières en vue d’enrayer le blanchiment des capitaux provenant du trafic des stupéfiants. Selon les pays, des systèmes plus ou moins ingénieux tentent de concilier la nécessaire information des autorités publiques et le droit au secret bancaire, élément avancé de la protection de la vie privée dont le corollaire est, entre autres, l’article 7 et 8 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et l’article 8 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales du citoyen, et donc de l’atteinte à ces libertés. Nous le verrons, les prérogatives exorbitantes dont bénéficient l’État, l’administration ou certains tiers, par l’exercice d’un droit de communication et d’échange d’information, constituent une véritable atteinte au principe sacré de la vie privée et du droit à la confidentialité. Cette pénétration de l’État ou de l’administration au coeur des relations privilégiées entre la banque et son client trouve certainement une justification irréfutable lorsque la protection est celle de l’intérêt public, de la recherche d’une solution juridique et judiciaire. Mais cela crée inévitablement des pressions internes et des polémiques constantes,indépendamment de l’abus de droit que l’on peut malheureusement constater dans l’usage et l’exercice de certaines prérogatives.

Ao Ministério Público da união e à Receita Federal brasileira, tudo? uma análise crítica à lei complementar 105 de 2001 como possível meio de coibir o crime de Sonegação Fiscal

O trabalho de conclusão de curso tem como objetivo central a análise crítica da Lei Complementar nº 105 de 2001- que autoriza a Receita Federal do Brasil a quebrar diretamente o sigilo bancário dos contribuintes, com base em possíveis indícios de omissões, fraudes e simulações- como meio hábil para coibir o crime de sonegação fiscal. A partir dessa análise, vamos testar a hipótese de que nenhum agente público pode determinar a quebra das informações bancárias de um contribuinte, sem a prévia autorização do Poder Judiciário. O artigo tem três partes. Na primeira, os principais conceitos que envolvem o sigilo bancário e as possíveis exceções à quebra do sigilo bancário são descritas e discutidas. A partir do exame conceitual, vamos estudar a correlação desse assunto com o combate à sonegação fiscal e a afirmação do princípio da transparência fiscal na comunidade internacional. Na última parte, somos chamados a estudar a opinião da Suprema Corte quanto ao objeto do presente trabalho. A conclusão a que se chega é a de que os agentes públicos não podem obter as referidas informações sem prévia autorização de um juiz. Contudo, a matéria apesar de muito antiga, ainda é polêmica para a doutrina e a jurisprudência. Além disso, a alteração na composição do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de 2010 para 2015, pode indicar uma mudança também no entendimento dos magistrados quanto ao assunto.

To investigate the enforcement and effectiveness of the Bank Secrecy Act [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, July 13, 1982.

"Serial no. 97-70."

A study of the co-operative banking system in kerala

The co-operative credit structure in a state set up consists of 3 tiers — Primary Societies at the base, District Co-operative Banks at the middle and State Cooperative Bank at the top. But, some societies at the primary level are governed by, in addition to Co-operative Societies Act, the Banking Regulation Act. Thus they are under dual control. In addition, they are working under the direct purview of Reserve Bank of India. The scope of this study is restricted to such Primary Societies, District Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Bank. For the evaluation of the working of Co-operative Banks, the board of directors and staff were interviewed with the help of pre-constructed and pre-tested interview schedules. However, the share holders and customers were not interviewed mainly because almost all respondents were reluctant to provide copies of an exhaustive list of share holders and non-share holder customers, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy. This being an individual work, it was found physically and financially very difficult to extend the study so as to cover the share holders and non-share holder customers. Limitations of time were also responsible for restricting this study. The period of study was restricted to 1980-'81 to 1983-'84 as the data relating to earlier periods were firstly not available from all banks and secondly the prior data was considered out of date for the purpose of the study.

Open-economy central banking: Explaining Australia's recommitment to central bank independence

Why do governments offload major instruments such as monetary policy to an independent central bank? This article answers this question in relation to the Australian case, a case which reflects wider global developments. The article challenges the methodology of quantitative approaches to explaining central bank independence and instead argues that a model of 'embedded statism' is the most fruitful explanatory approach.

The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia

This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.

Factores determinantes do nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados de acordo com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions - evidência empírica no sector bancário português

Este estudo analisa o nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados e seus factores determinantes nas entidades bancárias portuguesas. Para o efeito, foi utilizado um índice de divulgação, baseado nas recomendações emitidas pelo Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e pela Organisation of Securities Commissions, e analisados os Relatórios & Contas anuais, individuais, relativos a 2009. Conclui-se que o número de empresas que apresenta informação sobre a utilização de instrumentos derivados é bastante elevado, mas o valor médio de divulgação apresentado é bastante reduzido. Identificam-se, como factores determinantes do nível de divulgação, o tamanho da empresa, a qualidade do auditor externo e o facto de a empresa ter procedido a um aumento de capital durante o exercício económico em análise.