A költségvetési hiány politikai gazdaságtana (The political economy of budgetary deficit)

A fejlett ipari országokra a hetvenes évektől mind inkább jellemző tartós költségvetési hiányt sem a keynesi, sem pedig a neoklasszikus elmélet nem tudta kielégítően magyarázni. Az új politikai gazdaságtan azonban, úgy tűnik, sikerrel tárta fel nemcsak a tartós hiány és a növekvő eladósodottság okait, hanem a fiskális politikai teljesítményben országok között és időben mutatkozó jelentős eltérések forrásait is. A siker elsősorban annak köszönhető, hogy az új politikai gazdaságtan a költségvetési politika alakításának politikai és intézményi korlátai felé fordult, azzal a nem titkolt szándékkal, hogy kiterjessze a főáramú közgazdaságtan határait, és beépítse modelljeibe a gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal folyamatát. Tanulmányunkban négy átfogó magyarázatot tekintünk át - ezek: 1. az adósságállomány stratégiai használata, 2. a stabilizáció elodázása, 3. a politikai és választási rendszerek különbözősége és 4. a gyenge vagy széttöredezett végrehajtói hatalom -, azzal az egyértelmű igénnyel, hogy a szokásos pozitív elemzést normatív vizsgálódással egészítsük ki. / === / Neither Keynesian nor Neoclassical theory managed to explain adequately the increasingly typical state of chronic budgetary deficit found in developed industrial countries since the 1970s. But the new political economy seems to have revealed the causes of the chronic deficit and mounting indebtedness and of the reasons for the marked differences in fiscal-policy performance between countries and periods. The success can be ascribed primarily to the fact that the new political economy turned to the political and institutional constraints on the formation of budgetary policy, with the unconcealed aim of broadening the bounds of mainstream economics and building the policy-making process into it. The study examines four comprehensive explanations: 1. strategic use of debt stock, 2. postponement of stabilization, 3. differences of political and electoral systems, and 4. weak or fragmented executive power, with the clear intention of complementing the customary positive analysis with a normative examination.

El "presupuesto participativo" y sus potenciales aportes a la construcción de políticas sociales orientadas a las familias

Incluye Bibliografía

Population, ageing and development

Includes bibliography

El gobierno económico de la Unión Europea y los principios de justicia del gasto público en una hacienda plural

A partir de 2011 se ha reforzado el gobierno económico de la UE a través de seis instrumentos legislativos, el llamado Six Pack, que supone fundamentalmente una reforma de la supervisión de la política presupuestaria de los Estados miembros. Más recientemente el Tratado de estabilidad, coordinación y gobernanza de UE de marzo de 2012 (TECGUE) establece un conjunto de normas destinadas a promover la disciplina presupuestaria a través de un pacto presupuestario; a reforzar la coordinación de sus políticas económicas; y a mejorar la gobernanza de la zona del euro. En el presente trabajo se analiza si este modelo basado en una estricta disciplina presupuestaria es compatible con los postulados del Estado social, y más concretamente con los principios de justicia del gasto público. En efecto, a partir de la reforma del art. 135 de la Constitución Española, el principio de estabilidad presupuestaria debe ser interpretado coordinadamente con otros principios constitucionales que en el momento presente están plenamente vigentes y pueden adquirir una nueva función: la de actuar como límite y medida del objetivo de estabilidad presupuestaria. Del mismo modo se analizan los principios de coordinación entre las políticas presupuestarias y de endeudamiento de los Estados miembros en un Estado con una pluralidad de Haciendas, como es el caso español.

The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

PNAES : uma análise da implementação da política de assistência estudantil no Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de Brasília

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade UnB Planaltina, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Gestão Pública, Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Pública, 2016.

Explaining the 'health check' of the Common Agricultural Policy: budgetary politics, globalisation and paradigm change revisited

Three potential explanations of past reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be identified in the literature: a budget constraint, pressure from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) negotiations or commitments and a paradigm shift emphasising agriculture’s provision of public goods. This discussion on the driving forces of CAP reform links to broader theoretical questions on the role of budgetary politics, globalisation of public policy and paradigm shift in explaining policy change. In this article, the Health Check reforms of 2007/2008 are assessed. They were probably more ambitious than first supposed, although it was a watered-down package agreed by ministers in November 2008. We conclude that the Health Check was not primarily driven by budget concerns or by the supposed switch from the state-assisted to the multifunctional policy paradigm. The European Commission’s wish to adopt an offensive negotiating stance in the closing phases of the Doha Round was a more likely explanatory factor. The shape and purpose of the CAP post-2013 is contested with divergent views among the Member States.