Auction econometrics by least squares

This paper proposes a method to structurally estimate an auction model using a variation of OLS, under commonly held assumptions in both auction theory and econometrics. In spite of its computational simplicity, the method applies to a wide variety of environments, including interdependent values in general, and certain forms of endogenous participation and bidder asymmetry. Furthermore, it can be used for hypotheses testing about the shape of the valuation distribution, valuation interdependence, or existence of bidder asymmetry.

kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Teoria de Leilões com Aplicação ao Mercado de Petróleo Brasileiro

O processo de reforma que ocorreu na indústria petrolífera a partir da década de 1990, associada à transferência de serviços de utilidade pública para o setor privado, trouxe mudanças importantes para a economia. Neste contexto, a intensificação do uso de leilões, para a privatização das empresas públicas e para a concessão de direitos de exploração de seus serviços assumiu um papel de grande relevância na economia brasileira. A discussão sobre o desenho de leilão adotado para a venda de blocos petrolíferos é fundamental, pois representa o ponto inicial desta nova política. Sendo assim, este trabalho aborda os principais aspectos que fundamentam a escolha de um formato apropriado de leilão, detalhando as peculiaridades da indústria petrolífera e, finalmente, discutindo os resultados obtidos.

Leilões eletrônicos reversos multiatributo : uma abordagem de decisão multicritério como instrumento de agregação de valor aos processos de compras do setor público brasileiro

Leilões são instituições seculares utilizadas nas relações comerciais entre indivíduos e organizações. Provêem maior flexibilidade aos processos de determinação de preços e alocação de bens, aumentando o espaço para negociações entre compradores e vendedores. Na Internet, têm sido empregados, de maneira crescente, em atividades de comércio eletrônico B2B e G2B, em sua maioria, através da modalidade de leilão reverso. No entanto, seu aspecto unidimensional reduz as negociações à variável preço, produzindo, muitas vezes, resultados aquém do desejado. No caso brasileiro, o Governo Federal instituiu o Portal Comprasnet, através do qual, as organizações públicas adquirem bens e serviços de fornecedores cadastrados. Dentre as modalidades de licitação disponíveis, destaca-se o Pregão Eletrônico, um mecanismo de leilão eletrônico reverso baseado no atributo preço, através do qual, fornecedores submetem lances decrescentes, na disputa por contratos do setor público. No presente trabalho, o autor propõe uma abordagem de decisão multicritério, baseada na Teoria da Utilidade Multiatributo, como uma alternativa para a adoção de leilões reversos baseados em múltiplos atributos e, consequentemente, para uma maior agregação de valor pelas organizações compradoras do setor público brasileiro.

Asynchronous Auction for Distributed Nonlinear Resource Allocation Problem

Resource Allocation Problems (RAPs) are concerned with the optimal allocation of resources to tasks. Problems in fields such as search theory, statistics, finance, economics, logistics, sensor & wireless networks fit this formulation. In literature, several centralized/synchronous algorithms have been proposed including recently proposed auction algorithm, RAP Auction. Here we present asynchronous implementation of RAP Auction for distributed RAPs.

Hybrid Auctions I: Theory

In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.

Feminist Disability Theory: Domestic Violence Against Women with a Disability

Women with a disability continue to experience social oppression and domestic violence as a consequence of gender and disability dimensions. Current explanations of domestic violence and disability inadequately explain several features that lead women who have a disability to experience violent situations. This article incorporates both disability and material feminist theory as an alternative explanation to the dominant approaches (psychological and sociological traditions) of conceptualising domestic violence. This paper is informed by a study which was concerned with examining the nature and perceptions of violence against women with a physical impairment. The emerging analytical framework integrating material feminist interpretations and disability theory provided a basis for exploring gender and disability dimensions. Insight was also provided by the women who identified as having a disability in the study and who explained domestic violence in terms of a gendered and disabling experience. The article argues that material feminist interpretations and disability theory, with their emphasis on gender relations, disablism and poverty, should be used as an alternative tool for exploring the nature and consequences of violence against women with a disability.

Batch Verification of Validity of Bids in Homomorphic E-auction

Bid opening in e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic secret sharing function is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic secret reconstruction is employed to open the bids. However, this high efficiency is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g., within a special range). An undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately, validity verification of the bids is ignored in the auction schemes employing homomorphic secret sharing (called homomorphic auction in this paper). In this paper, an attack against the homomorphic auction in the absence of bid validity check is presented and a necessary bid validity check mechanism is proposed. Then a batch cryptographic technique is introduced and applied to improve the efficiency of bid validity check.