899 resultados para Aristotelian self-knowledge


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This paper discusses the capital role that friendship plays in moral self-knowledge within Aristotelian Ethics. It focuses on the different ways in which a friend may shed light on the understanding of our behavior. Great attention is paid to the accounts of certain commentators (especially, of Richard Kraut and Anthony Kenny) on this subject. The paper tries to provide a conciliatory interpretation between views on self-knowledge that are, only in appearance, irreconcilable.

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Mood state facilitates recall of affectively congruent memories (i.e., mood-congruent recall). Mood state may also promote motivation to alleviate a negative affective state, leading to retrieval of affectively incongruent memories (i.e., mood incongruent recall). The present study demonstrates that the focus of self-knowledge influences the occurrence of both mood-congruent recall and mood-incongruent recall. Three experiments found that mood-congruent recall occurred when participants recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was related to the elicitor of moods, whereas mood-incongruent recall occurred when they recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was unrelated to the elicitor of moods. These results suggest that the nature of the self-aspect from which persons recall their experiences determines whether mood-congruent or mood-incongruent recall occurs.

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In this study of the structure of self-knowledge, we examined priming effects for the recall of personal episodes in order to investigate whether abstract trait knowledge and personal episodes are independent mental representations. We found that accessing similar abstract representations of traits facilitated a faster recall of related personal episodes than did accessing irrelevant abstract representations of traits (Experiments 1 and 2), reading a nonword prime (Experiments 2 and 3), accessing knowledge of one's mother (Experiment 3), or accessing semantic knowledge (Experiment 3). Contrary to previous findings, which indicated that abstract trait knowledge is represented independently of related personal episodes (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993, our results suggest that abstract trait knowledge is associated with personal episodes, and therefore that semantic self-knowledge is associated with episodic self-knowledge in long-term self-knowledge.

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Some people recall more positive memories in negative moods than in neutral moods, which is called mood-incongruent effect. Although previous research suggested that structure of self-knowledge influences mood-incongruent effect (Sakaki, 2004), it is possible that motivation for mood-regulation mediates relation between structure of self-knowledge and mood-incongruent effect. The present study aimed at exploring this possibility by using self-complexity. In Study 1, participants with higher self-complexity, whose self-knowledge has more self-aspects with a higher level of differentiation, recalled more positive memories in negative moods (compared to neutral moods) than participants with lower self-complexity, whose self-knowledge has a fewer self-aspects with larger overlap. Study 1 also revealed that these effects hold even when the motivation for mood-regulation was partialed out. Study 2 examined mood-incongruent effect under positive moods, in which participants are unlikely motivated to alter their moods, and it was found that participants with higher self-complexity recalled more negative memories in positive moods (compared to neutral moods) than participants with lower self-complexity.

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Added t.p., engraved, has imprint: London, Printed for T. Tegg and J. Mozley, 1813.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is,
broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.