What is a good project manager? Reconceptualizing the “do” : an Aristotelian perspective

In Social Science (Organization Studies, Economics, Management Science, Strategy, International Relations, Political Science…) the quest for addressing the question “what is a good practitioner?” has been around for centuries, with the underlying assumptions that good practitioners should lead organizations to higher levels of performance. Hence to ask “what is a good “captain”?” is not a new question, we should add! (e.g. Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; Söderlund, 2004, p. 190). This interrogation leads to consider problems such as the relations between dichotomies Theory and Practice, rigor and relevance of research, ways of knowing and knowledge forms. On the one hand we face the “Enlightenment” assumptions underlying modern positivist Social science, grounded in “unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20). In the project management space, this aims at addressing one of the fundamental problems in the field: projects still do not deliver their expected benefits and promises and therefore the socio-economical good (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Bredillet, 2010, Lalonde et al., 2012). The Cartesian tradition supporting projects research and practice for the last 60 years (Bredillet, 2010, p. 4) has led to the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management, despite the sum of research, development of standards, best & good practices and the related development of project management bodies of knowledge (Packendorff, 1995, p. 319-323; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 2–6, Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 436–7; Winter et al., 2006, p. 638). Referring to both Hodgson (2002) and Giddens (1993), we could say that “those who expect a “social-scientific Newton” to revolutionize this young field “are not only waiting for a train that will not arrive, but are in the wrong station altogether” (Hodgson, 2002, p. 809; Giddens, 1993, p. 18). While, in the postmodern stream mainly rooted in the “practice turn” (e.g. Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012), the shift from methodological individualism to social viscosity and the advocated pluralism lead to reinforce the “functional stupidity” (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1194) this postmodern stream aims at overcoming. We suggest here that addressing the question “what is a good PM?” requires a philosophy of practice perspective to complement the “usual” philosophy of science perspective. The questioning of the modern Cartesian tradition mirrors a similar one made within Social science (Say, 1964; Koontz, 1961, 1980; Menger, 1985; Warry, 1992; Rothbard, 1997a; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Boisot & McKelvey, 2010), calling for new thinking. In order to get outside the rationalist ‘box’, Toulmin (1990, p. 11), along with Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 655), suggests a possible path, summarizing the thoughts of many authors: “It can cling to the discredited research program of the purely theoretical (i.e. “modern”) philosophy, which will end up by driving it out of business: it can look for new and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and develop the methods needed for a more practical (“post-modern”) agenda; or it can return to its pre-17th century traditions, and try to recover the lost (“pre-modern”) topics that were side-tracked by Descartes, but can be usefully taken up for the future” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11). Thus, paradoxically and interestingly, in their quest for the so-called post-modernism, many authors build on “pre-modern” philosophies such as the Aristotelian one (e.g. MacIntyre, 1985, 2007; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012). It is perhaps because the post-modern stream emphasizes a dialogic process restricted to reliance on voice and textual representation, it limits the meaning of communicative praxis, and weaking the practice because it turns away attention from more fundamental issues associated with problem-definition and knowledge-for-use in action (Tedlock, 1983, p. 332–4; Schrag, 1986, p. 30, 46–7; Warry, 1992, p. 157). Eikeland suggests that the Aristotelian “gnoseology allows for reconsidering and reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-modernist] thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20—21). By contrast with the modernist one-dimensional thinking and relativist and pluralistic post-modernism, we suggest, in a turn to an Aristotelian pre-modern lens, to re-conceptualise (“re” involving here a “re”-turn to pre-modern thinking) the “do” and to shift the perspective from what a good PM is (philosophy of science lens) to what a good PM does (philosophy of practice lens) (Aristotle, 1926a). As Tsoukas & Cummings put it: “In the Aristotelian tradition to call something good is to make a factual statement. To ask, for example, ’what is a good captain’?’ is not to come up with a list of attributes that good captains share (as modem contingency theorists would have it), but to point out the things that those who are recognized as good captains do.” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) Thus, this conversation offers a dialogue and deliberation about a central question: What does a good project manager do? The conversation is organized around a critic of the underlying assumptions supporting the modern, post-modern and pre-modern relations to ways of knowing, forms of knowledge and “practice”.

What is a good project manager? An Aristotelian perspective

The purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at the question “what is a competent project manager?” and bring some fresh added-value insights. This leads us to analyze the definitions, and assessment approaches of project manager competence. Three major standards as prescribed by PMI, IPMA, and GAPPS are considered for review from an attribute-based and performance-based approach and from a deontological and consequentialist ethics perspectives. Two fundamental tensions are identified: an ethical tension between the standards and the related competence assessment frameworks and a tension between attribute and performance-based approaches. Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy is brought in to reconcile these differences. Considering ethics of character that rises beyond the normative deontological and consequentialist perspectives is suggested. Taking the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis between theory and practice into consideration is advocated to resolve the tension between performance and attribute-based approaches to competence assessment.

Reconnecting theory and practice in a pluralistic organizing context : issues and Aristotelian considerations

The overall purpose of this paper is to contribute to the theory - practice gap debate in organization studies, especially in pluralistic contexts such as project organizing. We briefly outline some of the current debates, i.e. modernist and postmodernist proposals, and the prevalent dichotomous thinking stance assumptions to better move beyond it, anchoring our contribution in the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy. We introduce the current state of the debate, part of the broad question of “science that matters”, and the various discourses between practice and academia within social sciences and more specifically organizational studies. We briefly critically summarize some main features of the two main philosophical stances (modernism, postmodernism), before presenting some key aspects, for the purpose of this paper, of the Aristotelian pre-modern practical and ethical philosophy. Then, we build on the foundations above established, discussing propositions to reconnect theory and practice according the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy, and some key implications for research notably in the following areas: roles played by practitioners and scholars, emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, for closing the “phronetic gap” and reconnecting means and ends, facts and values, relation between collective praxis, development of “good practice” (standards), ethics and politics. We conclude highlighting the role of the suggested shift to an Aristotelian emancipatory style of reasoning for reconciling theory and practice.

Ethics in project management : some Aristotelian insights

Purpose My aim is to introduce, in the project management field, an Aristotelian ethics lens moving beyond the classical deontological and consequentialism approaches underlying the current ethical practices and codes of ethics and professional conducts. In doing so, I wish to pose the premises of a debate on the implications of a conscious ethical perspective for the structure and agency relationship within the project management field Design/methodology/approach Project management is a knowledge field on its own right. However the current perspectives applied to make sense and develop the field (modernism vs. postmodernism) leads to dichotomous thinking rather than recognizing the merits and contextual validity of both sides. I call for Aristotelian Ethics as a way of moving beyond this dichotomous thinking. I introduce briefly Aristotelian Ethics and its consequences in term of relation theory – practice, means and ends, facts and values, and finally politics (i.e. being part of a community of practitioners). Then I illustrate some consequences for the field taking PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct and APM Code of Professional Conduct as supports for discussion Findings I suggest a need for revisiting and/or redesigning the codes of ethics and professional conducts for project management according to an Aristotelian perspective, in order to move beyond the normative limitations of classical deontological (conflict between competing duties, exemplified by PMI Code) or consequentialism (focusing on the "right" outcome to the detriment of duties, exemplified by APM Code) approaches (both, in fact, leading to a disconnection means and ends, and facts and values). This implicates shifting our view from the question "what is my duty?" to the questions "why should I undertake my duty?" and "how ought I act in this situation?" Practical implications Raising Professional Bodies, Industry and Education institutions awareness and consciousness and leading them to rethink about codes of ethics and the implications for the way they conceive practice and research, bodies of knowledge, credentialing, education... Originality/value To the best of my knowledge, this kind of discussion has not yet been conducted within the project management field, and considering the implication of project management in our life and for the well being of the society, an ethical debate may present some value(s)

Reconnecting theory and practice in pluralistic contexts: Issues and Aristotelian considerations

The purpose of this article is to contribute, from a research practitioner perspective, to the theory–practice gap debate in organization studies, focusing on pluralistic contexts such as project organizing. The current debate is introduced; then the features of the two main philosophical traditions (i.e., modernism and postmodernism) are critically summarized. Then, propositions to reconnect theory and practice according to the Aristotelian premodern ethical and practical philosophy are discussed. Some key implications in the following areas are outlined: roles played by practitioners and scholars; emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning; closing the “phronetic gap”; and the development of “good practice,” ethics, and politics.

The ethics of professional accountants: An Aristotelian perspective

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how Aristotle’s ethics can be applied to the ethics of professional accountants, in relation to the approach adopted by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and to consider the reasons that justify the Aristotelian approach. Design/methodology/approach The paper outlines IFAC’s approach and identifies several weaknesses. Three themes of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are applied to the work of professional accountants. Reasons why this perspective is more suitable for professional accountants are then articulated. Findings Several aspects of Aristotle’s ethics can be fruitfully applied to the ethics of professional accountants. These include the relationship between function, goals and the good, an awareness of the human goal to achieve eudaimonia, the development of both excellences of character and of intelligence, and the significance of non-rational aspects of morality, including emotions, will, responsibility and choice. Research limitations/implications This perspective provides an alternative conceptualisation of the ethics of professional accountants. Although it does not provide concrete guidance regarding what the ethical approach to specific situations may be, it presents a useful counterpoint to existing approaches that are largely deontological and utilitarian. Practical implications This paper provides accountants in practice with a more comprehensive and adequate perspective on what it means for a professional accountant to be ethical, and raises several issues related to how ethics is included in the education and training of accountants. Originality/value Investigating the philosophical basis for professional ethics approaches professional codes of ethics in a way that it is not typically considered. The paper also provides a more comprehensive application of Aristotelian ethics than previous work.

Reconciling Opposites in Organisation Studies: An Aristotelian Approach to Modernism and Post-modernism

In view of the current fragmentation in management and organisation studies, we argue that there is a need to elaborate techniques that help reconcile contradictory and superficially incommensurable standpoints. For this purpose, we draw on ‘pre-modern’ Aristotelian epistemological and methodological sources, particularly the idea of ‘saving the appearances’ (SA), not previously introduced into organisation studies. Using SA as our starting point, we outline a methodology that helps to develop reasonable and acceptable intermediary positions in contemporary debates between ‘modernism’ and ‘post-modernism’. We illustrate the functioning of SA in the case of three issues in the philosophy of science where ‘modernist’ and ‘post-modernist’ scholars seem to have incommensurable standpoints: the nature of scientific knowledge; the conception of causality; and the epistemology of practice. We show in particular how to use the logics of ‘qualification’, ‘new conception’, and ‘complementary combination’ to form the basis for mediating positions which could then be accepted by less extreme proponents of both ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’.

Recovering Nussbaum's aristotelian roots

Abstract: The paper examines the relationship between Creating Capabilities and political liberalism. Originally founded on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy, the theory of ‘capabilities’ developed by Nussbaum turns to political liberalism in the mid 90’s. Throughout the article, the principles of both perspectives are depicted and contrasted, focusing on the capacity of affiliation, the concept of common good and the idea of freedom. Severine Deneulin argues that the current reality calls for the capabilities approach to be more rooted in a relational anthropology which the Aristotelian ethical tradition is more akin to. This line can be found in Nussbaum’s first approach to the theory of capabilities, where affiliation as an architectonic capability leads to the common good being the end of political action, and practical reason as an architectonic capability leads to reasoning ordered towards the achievement of the common good, to the detriment of individualism.

Nancy Cartwright, millian and/or aristotelian

Abstract: Nancy Cartwright understands scientific explanation in terms of stable causes which she calls “capacities” or “natures”. She has been criticized for her interpretation of Mill’s tendencies, for her stress on individual causes, for the contrast between her empiricism and her metaphysical approach, and for her “local realism”. This paper will analyze those criticisms and will argue that a greater reliance on Aristotle might help to answer them and consolidate her proposals. Note that Cartwright is more skeptical about the possibilities of causal explanation in the social realm than about its possibilities in natural science. The paper thus also examines Aristotelian social capacities and provides some Aristotelian arguments for Cartwright’s skepticism about our knowledge of them and our using them to arrive at social scientific explanations.

Medical education as moral formation: an Aristotelian account of medical professionalsim.

The medical professionalism movement, bolstered by many influential medical organizations and institutions, has in the last decade produced a number of conceptual definitions of professionalism and a number of concrete proposals for its measurement and teaching. These projects, however laudable, are misguided when they treat professionalism as a unitary descriptive concept rather than as a contested and therefore primarily evaluative one; when they conceive professionalism as a domain of medical practice separable in principle from other domains; and when they treat professionalism as, in principle, a specifiable goal or product of sufficiently well designed educational curricula. The logic of professionalism-as-product corresponds to the logic of techne (art or practical skill) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle provides a cogent argument, however, that the moral excellences denoted by "professionalism" cannot be "produced" or even prespecified in the concrete; rather, they must be acquired through long practice under the careful concrete guidance of teachers who themselves embody these moral excellences. Phronesis (practical wisdom) rather than techne must therefore be the guiding logic of educational initiatives in medical professional formation, with particular emphasis on close mentorship and on the moral character both of students and of those who teach them.

Phronesis and Energeia : a reading of Heidegger's early appropriation of Aristotelian Phronesis (1922-24) in the light of Energeia

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien.

Complexity, pedagogy and aristotelian metaphysics. 'Complejidad, pedagogía y metafísica aristotélica'.

Resumen tomado del autor

The Aristotelian spoudaios as ethical exemplar in Finnis’s natural law theory

One provocative but frequently overlooked feature of John Finnis’s natural law theory is its appeal to the normative role of the Aristotelian spoudaios (the mature person of practical reasonableness). Finnis’s account of the basic requirements of practical reasonableness and defense of the methodological device of “focal meaning” both have recourse to Aristotle’s claim that, in ethics and politics, things should be judged in terms of how they appear to the mature practically reasonable person. The current paper examines the normative role played by the spoudaios within Finnis’s natural law theory and provides a defense of that role against the objection that it lacks justificatory force because it is dependent upon circular reasoning. Section one contextualizes Finnis’s use of the spoudaios by considering its Aristotelian origins and also sketches some reasons for its demise in subsequent moral theory. This serves as the basis for an assessment in section two of whether Finnis’s employment of the spoudaios as an ethical exemplar conflates explanation and justification, and therefore culminates in decisionism. The conclusion of the paper is that Finnis’s recourse to the spoudaios is not viciously circular, because it is grounded in the reflexive and dialogical mode of justification proper to ethical enquiry.

The complexity of motion in the Aristotelian Physics

The intention of this paper is to present some Aristotelian arguments regarding the motion on local terrestrial region. Because it is a highly sophisticated and complex explanation dealt with, briefly, the principles and causes that based theoretic sciences in general and in particular physics. Subdivided into eight topics this article in order to facilitate the understanding of these concepts for the reader not familiar with the Aristotelian texts. With intent to avoid an innocent view, anachronistic and linear the citations are of primary sources or commentators of Aristotle's works.