Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.

To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of suffcient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.

Abstimmen oder Schwimmen? Plebiszitarer Sport und synchronisierte Wahlen. [Sink or swim: Plebiscitary sport and synchronised voting.][In German]

This chapter starts from the observation that new sporting attributes are growing up unnoticed in popular entertainment and ‘reality’ TV. They celebrate not individual heroics but spectator-oriented teamwork which must look effortless and stylish. Instead of objective measurements – ‘faster, higher, stronger’ – winners are picked by voting and consumer choice. Sport and media are converging and integrating. As they do so, what counts as sport, why it is valued, and what it symbolises for contemporary culture, are all changing. I take these changes to be emblematic of something emergent in the culture at large as the modernist paradigm shifts towards a new consumerist paradigm. This is symbolised in new sports, of which the paradigm example is synchronised swimming. The chapter traces these changes via the career and legacy of the Australian swimming and fashion pioneer Annette Kellerman.

The Australian election survey: the tale of the rabbit-less hat. Voting behaviour in 2007

This paper examines voter attitudes and behaviour at the 2007 Australian federal election., using data from the Australian Election Study. It considers socio-demographic factors as well as the role of policy issues and voter evaluations of the party leaders. The paper concludes that issues, such as the government's WorkChoices policy, as well as health and leadership contributed to Labor's victory.

A matter of approval

A contract for the sale of a mixed farming property fronting the Murrumbidgee River provided the basis for a dispute that recently found its way to the High Court. The decision is Park v Brothers [2005] HCA 73. Although largely concerned with appellate court practice and procedure, the decision will also be of interest to those practising in property law and general contract law.

Boosting the margin: A new explanation for the effectiveness of voting methods

One of the surprising recurring phenomena observed in experiments with boosting is that the test error of the generated classifier usually does not increase as its size becomes very large, and often is observed to decrease even after the training error reaches zero. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is related to the distribution of margins of the training examples with respect to the generated voting classification rule, where the margin of an example is simply the difference between the number of correct votes and the maximum number of votes received by any incorrect label. We show that techniques used in the analysis of Vapnik's support vector classifiers and of neural networks with small weights can be applied to voting methods to relate the margin distribution to the test error. We also show theoretically and experimentally that boosting is especially effective at increasing the margins of the training examples. Finally, we compare our explanation to those based on the bias-variance decomposition.

A voting mechanism for named entity translation in English-Chinese question answering

In this paper, we describe a voting mechanism for accurate named entity (NE) translation in English–Chinese question answering (QA). This mechanism involves translations from three different sources: machine translation,online encyclopaedia, and web documents. The translation with the highest number of votes is selected. We evaluated this approach using test collection, topics and assessment results from the NTCIR-8 evaluation forum. This mechanism achieved 95% accuracy in NEs translation and 0.3756 MAP in English–Chinese cross-lingual information retrieval of QA.

Disclosure of proxy voting information by Australian managed investment schemes

The US Securities and Exchange Comission requires registered management investment companies to disclose how they vote proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold. The primary purpose of this rule is to enable fund investors to monitor the role of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance practices of public companies. In Australia, despite reform proposals, there are no regulations requiring institutional investors to report proxy voting procedures and practises. There is little evidence of voluntary disclosure of proxy voting by Australian managed investment schemes in equities, indicating that there are costs involved in such disclosure.