953 resultados para Antitrust Laws
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Cover title.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
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"Calendar no. 446."
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No more published.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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At head of title: 88th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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There is growing worldwide concern about bias in the enforcement of competition law in favour of domestic firms. Even seemingly neutral antitrust laws can lead discrimination if they are enforced selectively. - Authors investigate the distortions that national competition authorities generate when they pursue non-competition goals in favour of domestic firms, and discuss ways to address this negative policy development in a globalised world. - The distortions identified in the paper would dissipate if governments agreed that the sole objective of competition law ought to be the protection of consumer welfare that competition-law institutions ought to be protected against capture. - A realistic and effective way to prompt international convergence towards independent enforcement of competition laws is through the inclusion of competition clauses in bilateral trade agreements and the development of dispute-resolution mechanisms.
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„Open source and European antitrust laws: An analysis of copyleft and the prohibition of software license fees on the basis of art. 101 TFEU and the block exemptions“ Open source software and open source licenses (like the GNU GPL) are not only relevant for computer nerds or activists – they are already business. They are for example the fundament of LINUX, the only real rival of MICROSOFT’s WINDOWS-line in the field of operating systems for IBM PC compatibles. Art. 101 TFEU (like the identical predecessor art. 81 TEC) as part of the EU antitrust laws prohibits contract terms like price fixing and some forms of technology control. Are copyleft – the „viral effect“, the „cancer“ – and the interdiction of software license fees in the cross hairs of this legal rule? On the other side the European Union has since 2004 a new Technology Transfer Block Exemption with software license agreements for the first time in its scope: a safe harbour and a dry place under a umbrella for open source software? After the introduction (A) with a description of open source software the following text analyses the system of the European Unions competition law respectivley antitrust law and the requirements of the block exemptions (B). Starting point of antitrust analysis are undertakings – but who are the untertakings (C) in the field of widespread, independent developers as part of the „bazar organization“? To see how much open source has to fear from the law of the European Union, at the end the anti competitive and pro competitive effects of open source are totalized within the legal framework (D). The conclusion (E) shows: not nothing, but not much.
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The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.
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Printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee.
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At head of title: Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law of the Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
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Chaotic dynamical systems with two or more attractors lying on invariant subspaces may, provided certain mathematical conditions are fulfilled, exhibit intermingled basins of attraction: Each basin is riddled with holes belonging to basins of the other attractors. In order to investigate the occurrence of such phenomenon in dynamical systems of ecological interest (two-species competition with extinction) we have characterized quantitatively the intermingled basins using periodic-orbit theory and scaling laws. The latter results agree with a theoretical prediction from a stochastic model, and also with an exact result for the scaling exponent we derived for the specific class of models investigated. We discuss the consequences of the scaling laws in terms of the predictability of a final state (extinction of either species) in an ecological experiment.