Lo siniestro, femenino, identidad, imagen, inconsciente, alter ego

873 p.

‘From the ‘roads to freedom’ to the ‘roads of humanism’? Sartre and his literary alter ego Mathieu in Les Chemins de la liberté (1938-1949)’

War and Memory international conference- Poetics after ’45,
QUB, Belfast, June 2008

Interactivity and identification: alter ego and conversation piece

In this presentation I discuss two recent works that use new technologies to explore the expression or communication of individual human identity.

Johnny be gonzo

The legend of Hunter S. Thompson*the great gonzo*has grown deeper and more layered since his death in February 2005 than it was even in his exotic and controversyfilled life. The most recent addition to the mythology*The Rum Diary(Bruce Robinson, 2011)*stars Johnny Depp, possibly Thompson’s greatest fan, and certainly a man dedicated to keeping the man’s memory alive. Not for the first time, Depp brings his A-list status and good looks to playing the Thompson character on the big screen. In Terry Gilliam’s adaptation of Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (1998) he played the writer’s alter ego, Raoul Duke. Duke was Thompson, and Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas a fictionalized account of what is generally accepted to have been a real-life episode. In The Rum Diary he plays Paul Kemp, the young journalist who lands a job as a crime reporter on a struggling Puerto Rican newspaper. Again, the protagonist is a version of Thompson himself, who did indeed spend time in 1960 working for the Puerto Rican press. Both films join Gonzo (Alex Gibney, 2008) to form a trilogy of Depp-infused movies about a journalist some regard as one of the greatest of the twentieth century, and others view as an overrated charlatan who leveraged his one big idea into a four decades-long career brought low by drugs, booze, dysfunctional sex and, finally, Hemingwayesque despair...

Notas sobre o Rupestre Contemporâneo, Nadam Guerra e 10 anos do Grupo UM

Esta dissertação foi elaborada a partir do livro Rupestre Contemporâneo, Nadam Guerra e 10 anos do Grupo UM, que integrou a exposição de mesmo nome realizada em outubro e novembro de 2013 na Galeria de Arte do IBEU com Curadoria de Bernardo Mosqueira. Nesta exposição individual de Nadam Guerra foram apresentadas obras em parceria de Nadam Guerra com Leo Liz, Aline Elias, Euclides Terra, Domingos Guimaraens e Juca Amélio. O texto é construído na forma de diálogo entre os artistas do Grupo UM e convidados pensando a produção e o histórico do grupo além de temas das práticas artísticas atuais como criação coletiva, diluição da identidade, alterego, escritas de si, convergência de linguagem artísticas, arte, vida, ficção, os modos de produção e circulação da arte no mundo. Ao que se acrescenta mais duas camadas de discurso nas notas de pé de página e em comentários laterais criando um texto polifônico de teoria de artista.

Wergiliusz jako twórca labiryntu

Romani antiqui putabant litteras aedificiis similes esse. Nonnulli scriptores Latini tali modo metaphoras suas composuerunt, ut descriptio aedificii una cum descriptione operis poetici esset. Aeneis etiam effigiem suam continet, quae est ecphrasis portae templi Apollinis. In fabulam Aeneae Vergilius fabulam Daedali introduxit, quae diu doctis ad nihil pertinere videbatur. Falsissime quidem, quia non solum coniunctio fabularum exsistit, sed etiam multae sunt causae fabulae Daedali hoc loco imponendae. Imprimis caelamen monstrat multos casus ex vita Daedali et Aeneae similes fuisse, deinde ostendere Daedalum creatorem hibridarum esse videtur. Aeneis etiam hibrida est, quia constat ex duabus partibus, quae sunt, ut ita dicam, „pars Odysseica” et „pars Iliadica”. Utri (Daedalus Vergiliusque scilicet) sunt ergo creatores hibridarum. Maximi momenti est quaestio: quis dicit “miserum!” in hac parte poematis? Auctrix commentationis censet illum clamantem Vergilium esse, quia poeta constructorem „alter ego” suum esse credebat. Auctrix scripsit etiam imaginem illam, in qua caelata est fabula de Minotauro sine Theseo, viam esse pietatis Aeneae minuendae. Scripsit verba illa quoque opinionem Vergilii de natura poesis et vocem Augusti absconditam esse.

Discussions sur les genres des québécoises de la génération X parlent d'autofiction au féminin

Ce mémoire porte sur la réception, par des lectrices de la génération X, de cinq oeuvres autofictionnelles écrites par les auteures québécoises Marie-Sissi Labrèche ( Borderline 2000 et La brèche 2003), Nelly Arcan (Putain 2001 et Folle 2004) et Mélikah Abdelmoumen (Le dégoût du bonheur 2001), lesquelles appartiennent à cette même génération. Leurs récits ont suscité un certain engouement public et obtenu un écho considérable dans la sphère médiatique et dans le milieu de la recherche universitaire. Les observateurs notent, de façon générale, que les narratrices autodiégétiques, alter ego des auteures, sont brutalement imparfaites, névrosées, mal dans leur peau, sexuellement soumises, assujetties aux désirs des hommes, et qu'elles ne parviennent pas à s'épanouir comme êtres humains, mais surtout, comme femmes. D'une part, les héroïnes rompent avec les représentations largement véhiculées dans les médias et dans la littérature québécoise contemporaine. D'autre part, leur profil correspond aux discours populaires sur la génération X, fréquemment qualifiée de génération sacrifiée, désabusée. Ma recherche, exploratoire, se fonde sur quatre approches théoriques : théorie des genres littéraires, théories de la réception, études féministes et gender studies, sociologie des générations. J'ai tenu cinq entretiens collectifs auprès de seize Québécoises de la génération X. J'ai réuni ces lectrices, qui s'étaient d'elles-mêmes intéressées aux récits, en petits groupe [i.e. groupes] de trois ou quatre participantes. Le compte-rendu et l'analyse de leurs discussions m'ont permis d'observer la portée sociale des récits éminemment personnels de Labrèche, d'Arcan et d'Abdelmoumen. Une interrogation m'a habitée du début à la fin de ma démarche : pourquoi et comment ces récits"parlent-ils", intellectuellement et émotionnellement, aux lectrices de la génération X? Je dégage de mon analyse quelques hypothèses interprétatives. D'abord, les lectrices ont du mal à distinguer les auteures et les narratrices. Elles tendent à appréhender les récits autofictionnels comme des autobiographies et elles procèdent à une lecture littérale des oeuvres. Ensuite, plus de la moitié des lectrices s'identifient, à différents degrés, aux narratrices. Comme ces dernières, les participantes à ma recherche affirment qu'elles ressentent une certaine pression sociale liée aux normes de beauté et de féminité et à l'hypersexualisation de l'espace public. En cela, leurs positions se rapprochent de celles du courant féministe radical. Cependant, les lectrices refusent d'être cantonnées dans un rôle de victime. Elles reprochent aux narratrices de s'autodétruire. Les femmes doivent, selon les participantes, se responsabiliser et se montrer critiques envers les modèles qui leur sont offerts. Enfin, les lectrices reconnaissent dans les héroïnes certains traits associés à la génération X. Elles attribuent en partie la souffrance des narratrices au contexte social dans lequel ces dernières évoluent. Mais elles estiment que cette souffrance est surtout tributaire de carences familiales. Les discussions des lectrices reflètent en quelque sorte leur propre appartenance à la génération X. Ainsi, l'importance qu'elles accordent à la sphère privée, par rapport à la sphère publique, constitue une des particularités des X qui ressort clairement des entretiens. Par ailleurs, leurs observations sont teintées d'un certain individualisme. Bref, à la lumière de mes résultats, je conclus que les récits autofictionnels de Marie-Sissi Labrèche, de Nelly Arcan et de Mélikah Abdelmoumen ont une certaine portée sociale, mais que leur écho résonne davantage sur le plan individuel, chez les lectrices qui s'identifient personnellement aux narratrices. Cela dit, les participantes semblent toutes avoir été portées à se questionner et à réfléchir, pendant et après leur lecture, sur l'identité féminine dans la société actuelle.

The artist biopic: a historical analysis of narrative cinema, 1934-2010

The thesis provides an historical overview of the artist biopic that has emerged as a distinct sub-genre of the biopic as a whole, totalling some ninety films from Europe and America alone since the first talking artist biopic in 1934. Their making usually reflects a determination on the part of the director or star to see the artist as an alter-ego. Many of them were adaptations of successful literary works, which tempted financial backers by having a ready-made audience based on a pre-established reputation. The sub-genre’s development is explored via the grouping of films with associated themes and the use of case studies. These examples can then be used as models for exploring similar sets of data from other countries and time periods. The specific topics chosen for discussion include the representation of a single painter, for example, Vincent Van Gogh, to see how the treatment of an artist varies across several countries and over seventy years. British artist biopics are analysed as a case study in relation to the idea of them posing as a national stereotype. Topics within sex and gender studies are highlighted in analysis of the representation of the female artist and the queer artist as well as artists who have lived together as couples. A number of well-known gallery artists have become directors of artist biopics and their films are considered to see what particular insights a professional working artist can bring to the portrayal of artistic genius and creation. In the concluding part of the thesis it is argued that the artist biopic overall has survived the bad press which some individual productions have received and can even be said to have matured under the influence of directors producing a quality product for the art house, festival and avant-garde distribution circuits. As a genre it has proved extremely adaptable and has reflected the changing attitudes towards art and artists within the wider community. It has both encouraged renewed interest in the work of established national artists and also raised the profile of those relatively obscure such as Séraphine de Senlis and Pirosmani.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

L’autoréflexion de l’énonciation filmique du film Punch-Drunk Love

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La Parenthèse ; suivi de Tensions et enfermement dans les Cent Vingt Journées de Sodome du marquis de Sade

Ce mémoire en recherche-création explore l’enfermement volontaire et les différents types de tensions qu’il provoque. Court roman prenant la forme du journal intime, La Parenthèse met en scène un jeune homme qui décide de s’enfermer chez lui une semaine durant et s’interdit tout contact avec l’extérieur – autant pour prendre un congé temporaire de la vie qu’il mène que pour examiner les raisons de sa détresse quotidienne. Le monologue intérieur se transforme rapidement en dialogue, dès lors qu’un double vindicatif, interrompant la voix principale par des « répliques » entre parenthèses, fait son apparition. Une relation houleuse – sous tension – se tisse entre ces deux facettes du personnage tout au long des sept jours de la réclusion, les passages de dispute alternant avec des récits de souvenirs. En somme, le roman tente de dramatiser la question de l’emprisonnement de soi-même et de la limitation de l’écriture, cette limitation pouvant être à la fois malsaine et libératrice. Quant à l’essai, Tensions et enfermement dans les Cent Vingt Journées de Sodome du marquis de Sade, il part du thème de l’enfermement (en l’occurrence, celui des quatre amis qui exécutent le projet de passer quatre mois dans un château isolé) pour postuler une « architecture du désir » dans Les Cent Vingt Journées de Sodome. L’essai mobilise les ressources de la narratologie en prenant en compte les effets du texte sur le lecteur ; sont ainsi mises en évidence les tensions – sexuelle pour les protagonistes, narrative pour le lecteur – élaborées par cette écriture de l’enfermement et de la contrainte, dans laquelle le désir est toujours maintenu mais rarement satisfait.

Aimer, s’aimer à s’y perdre ? Les jeux spéculaires de Cahun-Moore

Que penser d’une jeune artiste qui se présente tantôt en Méduse ou en beauté orientale, tantôt en bouddha, en haltérophile ou en Gretchen? Que penser de cet autoportrait dédoublé « en damier » qui fait écho au portrait d’une femme « en rayures », celui-ci également dédoublé? Comment décoder des photomontages — tous plus énigmatiques les uns que les autres — conçus en collaboration avec cette même femme « en rayures », et qui se retrouvent intercalés dans un texte intitulé « Aveux non avenus »? Que signifie « aimer », lorsque l’être aimé est notre alter ego? Cette histoire d’amour entre soi et la projection de soi peut-elle éviter l’abîme? Cet article propose de réfléchir sur la notion d’« aimer » chez Claude Cahun et Suzanne Malherbe alias Marcel Moore, en interrogeant le côté « narcissique » et autoréflexif que révèlent la plupart des autoportraits, l’autobiographie et les photomontages, d’une part, et le désir lesbien stigmatisé à l’époque comme un « faux masque », d’autre part. Dans un deuxième temps, il s’intéressera à ce couple symbiotique que forment l’auteure-photographe Cahun et la graphiste-peintre Moore, symbiose artistique qui leur permet de créer des oeuvres à leur image.

Comunidades virtuales de videojugadores : comportamiento emocional y social en Poupée Girl.

Monográfico con el título: 'Sobre vídeojuegos y aprendizaje'. Resumen basado en el de la publicación