Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

Agency theory and the family business

The conceptual domain of agency theory is one of the dominant organisational theory perspectives applied in current family business research (Chrisman et al., 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to individuals’ selfinterest and decision making based on rational thinking and oriented toward own preferences. With more people involved in decision making, such as through the separation of ownership and management, agency costs occur due to different preferences and information asymmetries between the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, agents take decisions based on their individual preferences (for example, short term, financial gains) instead of the owners’ preferences (for example, long term, sustainable development).

Behavioural agency theory and the family business

The behavioural agency theory was developed to provide a more comprehensive explanation and prediction of managerial risk taking, in response to some shortcomings of agency theory. In general, the theory offers explanations of why decision makers prefer some strategic choices to others. The use of behavioural agency theory in family business research has, however, been very limited. Family business scholars recently adapted this theory to construct the family business variant, the ‘socioemotional wealth’ construct, which offers better explanations for the risk taking and decision making behaviours of family firms. This chapter provides an overview of behavioural agency theory and the socioemotional wealth construct, explores how they have been used in family business research, and offers suggestions for how this theory can be used in further research to contribute to both the family business and the general management literature. Keywords: family business, behavioural agency theory, socioemotional wealth, family firm heterogeneity.

Funding social sector activity in Brazil: a case study analysis of agency risk incidence and mitigation

Empresas e organizações sociais têm um papel cada vez mais importante no mercado brasileiro. Essas organizações - sejam elas com ou sem fins lucrativos –têm como objetivocausar um profundo e positivo impacto social.Ambas enfrentamtambém o mesmo desafio: financiar as suas operações. Recentemente, dois modelos inovadores de financiamento, o fundo de venture capitalVox Capital e o fundo de empréstimo social SITAWI, entraram no mercado brasileiro para solucionar esse desafio. Este estudo analisa ambos os fundos,associando o problema do financiamento de empresas e organizações sociais às teorias tradicionais de negócio. Mais especificamente, por meio de um estudo de caso,é avaliado se o risco de agência (agency risk) explica as práticas e o designcontratual utilizados pelos fundos. A pesquisa é baseada num estudo de Alemany e Scarlata (2010) sobre a estruturação dos negócios de fundos filantrópicos de capital empreendedor (PhVC, na sigla em inglês) na América do Norte e na Europa. Uma definição chave desse estudo é que organizações sem fins lucrativos, ao contrário daquelas com fins lucrativos, estão sujeitas a uma restrição de distribuição de lucros. Embora Alemany e Scarlata (2010) tivessem descobertoque parceria (stewardship), mais do que o problema de agência (agency problem), explica a estrutura dos negócios dos fundos PhVC, as implicações do presente estudo de caso para o Brasil são diferentes. Os resultados sugerem que o problema de agência,mais do que a parceria,descreve adequadamente os contratos analisados de financiamento. Detectou-seque cláusulas contratuais não foram apenas usadas para mitigar o risco de agênciaresultanteda ausência de uma restrição de distribuição de lucros, mas também para reger as estruturas cooperativas com organizações sem fins lucrativos. No caso de SITAWI, a restrição dos destinatários de fundos de distribuir lucros provou-se uma ferramenta efetiva para alinhar os interesses entre os financiadores e os destinatários dos fundos. Apesar daimplicação da presença de parceria, os contratos do fundo social contiveram cláusulas geralmente usadas para reduzir o risco de agência. No caso de Vox Capital, os destinatários dos fundos eram empresas com fins lucrativos, portanto não sujeitas à restrição de distribuição de lucros. O modelo de negócio de Vox Capital é organizado para impedir qualquer incidência potencial do problema de agência. Ambos os fundos, independentemente da estrutura jurídica dos beneficiários destes fundos, evidenciaram o intuito de garantir a aplicação de práticas de negócio utilizadas pelas empresas tradicionais do setor corporativo em vez daquelas utilizadas no setor social.

The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating agency and organisational control perspectives

The role of the board of directors in firm strategy has long been the subject of debate. However, research efforts have suffered from several deficiencies: the lack of an overarching theoretical perspective, reliance on proxies for the strategy role rather than a direct measure of it and the lack of quantitative data linking this role to firm financial performance. We propose a new theoretical perspective to explain the board's role in strategy, integrating organisational control and agency theories. We categorise a board's approach to strategy according to two constructs: strategic control and financial control. The extent to which either construct is favoured depends on contextual factors such as board power, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry.

Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

Delegation of pricing authority to the sales force:an agency-theoretic perspective of its determinants and impact on performance

In industrial selling situations, the questions of what factors drive pricing authority delegation to salespeople and under what conditions price delegation is beneficial for the firm are often asked. To advance knowledge in this area, we (1) develop and empirically test a framework of important drivers of price delegation based on agency-theoretic research and (2) investigate the impact of price delegation on firm performance, taking into account agency theory variables as potential moderators. The study is based on data from a sample of 181 companies from the industrial machinery and electrical engineering industry in Germany. The results indicate that the degree of pricing delegation increases as information asymmetry between the salesperson and sales manager increases and as it becomes more difficult to monitor salespeople's efforts. Conversely, risk-aversion of salespeople is negatively related to the degree of price delegation. Furthermore, we find a positive effect of price delegation on firm performance, which is amplified when market-related uncertainty is high and when salespeople possess better customer-related information than their managers. Hence, our results clearly show that rigid, “one price fits all” policies are inappropriate in many B2B market situations. Instead, sales managers should grant their salespeople sufficient leeway to adapt prices to changing customer requirements and market conditions, especially in firms that operate in highly uncertain selling environments.

Determinants of Capital Structure of Swedish limited companies : Testing Trade-off Theory Against Pecking Order Theory

Research question- This thesis investigates the determinants of capital structure of the Swedish companies. In order to do so, the two dominant theories of the corporate structure are studied and their assumptions are tested. Thus, the study researches which one of the two theories is more appealing for the Swedish market. Methodology-The study follows a purely quantitative study, by conducting an econometric analysis. The data are collected from a secondary source and more particularly the "Retriever" database, which contains financial data of the Swedish companies. Findings- The findings indicate that the determinants of the corporate structure for the Swedish market do not differ from other studies which have been conducted in other countries. However, there is a difference when it comes to tax and non-tax shields. The results suggest that in most cases the Pecking Order Theory appears to be more representative for the Swedish market, since most of the coefficient appear to be in favour of it. Moreover, the significance of the effect of the industry for the financial leverage is confirmed.

Transações com partes relacionadas : determinantes e impactos no desempenho das empresas

A literatura internacional que analisa os fatores impactantes das transações com partes relacionadas concentra-se no Reino Unido, nos EUA e no continente asiático, sendo o Brasil um ambiente pouco investigado. Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar tanto os fatores impactantes dos contratos com partes relacionadas, quanto o impacto dessas transações no desempenho das empresas brasileiras. Estudos recentes que investigaram as determinantes das transações com partes relacionadas (TPRs), assim como seus impactos no desempenho das empresas, levaram em consideração as vertentes apresentadas por Gordon, Henry e Palia (2004): (a) de conflitos de interesses, as quais apoiam a visão de que as TPRs são danosas para os acionistas minoritários, implicando expropriação da riqueza deles, por parte dos controladores (acionistas majoritários); e (b) transações eficientes que podem ser benéficas às empresas, atendendo, desse modo, aos objetivos econômicos subjacentes delas. Esta pesquisa apoia-se na vertente de conflito de interesses, com base na teoria da agência e no fato de que o cenário brasileiro apresenta ter como característica uma estrutura de propriedade concentrada e ser um país emergente com ambiente legal caracterizado pela baixa proteção aos acionistas minoritários. Para operacionalizar a pesquisa, utilizou-se uma amostra inicial composta de 70 empresas com ações listadas na BM&FBovespa, observando o período de 2010 a 2012. Os contratos relacionados foram identificados e quantificados de duas formas, de acordo com a metodologia aplicada por Kohlbeck e Mayhew (2004; 2010) e Silveira, Prado e Sasso (2009). Como principais determinantes foram investigadas proxies para captar os efeitos dos mecanismos de governança corporativa e ambiente legal, do desempenho das empresas, dos desvios entre direitos sobre controle e direitos sobre fluxo de caixa e do excesso de remuneração executiva. Também foram adicionadas variáveis de controle para isolar as características intrínsecas das firmas. Nas análises econométricas foram estimados os modelos pelos métodos de Poisson, corte transversal agrupado (Pooled-OLS) e logit. A estimação foi feita pelo método dos mínimos quadrados ordinários (MQO), e para aumentar a robustez das estimativas econométricas, foram utilizadas variáveis instrumentais estimadas pelo método dos momentos generalizados (MMG). As evidências indicam que os fatores investigados impactam diferentemente as diversas medidas de TPRs das empresas analisadas. Verificou-se que os contratos relacionados, em geral, são danosos às empresas, impactando negativamente o desempenho delas, desempenho este que é aumentado pela presença de mecanismos eficazes de governança corporativa. Os resultados do impacto das medidas de governança corporativa e das características intrínsecas das firmas no desempenho das empresas são robustos à presença de endogeneidade com base nas regressões com variáveis instrumentais.

A relevância do relatório de auditoria para os investidores institucionais, analistas financeiros e analistas de crédito

In the 70s, a new line of research focused on the study of the influence of the audit report on the decision process of investors, financial analysts and credit analysts. Notwithstanding the numerous studies that have been carried out, results have not been consistent. Given the above, and considering the lack, in Portugal, of a research of this nature, it seems urgent to carry out a study that allows the analysis of the use of the audit report, as well as its influence on the decision making process of Portuguese stakeholders. For that purpose, in the light of the positivist research paradigm, a questionnaire was designed, which was administered by mail and on the Survey Monkey platform to a sample of institutional investors, financial analysts and credit analysts. The statistical analysis of the data obtained was undertaken with resource to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences and SmartPLS 2.0. Corroborating the literature review and the assumptions of the Agency Theory and the Stakeholder Theory, used in the theoretical framework of analysis, empirical evidence has shown that the audit report influences the decision of institutional investors, financial analysts and credit analysts, and that the opinion expressed in that document is the most determinant factor of this influence. In addition to this factor, it was found that the degree of utilization of the audit report, as well as the value ascribed to this document, determine its influence in the decision process of research groups studied. Only in the case of institutional investors, the results did not reveal a correlation between the utility ascribed to the audit report and the influence of this document in their decision making process. In turn, the statistical inference of the model explaining the degree of use of the audit report revealed that it is conditioned by the perceived quality of the information enclosed in the audit report, the utility assigned to the audit report on the decision process, as well as the relevance of the other sources of information used by stakeholders. Therefore, this study allowed proving the importance of the audit report to its users. As a result, we believe to have filled a gap in national literature and to have contributed to the enhancement of international literature. The importance that this document has for the development of any country is, therefore, shown, and it is urgent to maintain rigor in the selection of its staff, in the development of its standards, and especially in the development of audits. Moreover, we also consider that this research may contribute to the improvement of the audit report, insofar as it will help professional bodies to understand the information needs and perceptions of stakeholders.