El absentismo escolar en el municipio de Oviedo : un estudio desde la perspectiva de los Servicios Sociales

Conocer la realidad del absentismo escolar en la poblaci??n de EGB del municipio de Oviedo. 22630 alumnos de EGB de 41 centros del municipio de Oviedo. Se estudia a todo menor con 10 faltas de asistencia entre principio de curso y el 31 de enero. Se analiza: tipolog??a, zonificaci??n, n??mero de alumnos y tasa de absentismo de cada dentro; n??mero y motivo de las faltas; edad, sexo, curso, n??mero de cursos repetidos y cambios de centro de cada alumno; perfil socio-familiar; percepci??n del profesorado en cuanto a aspecto del alumno, indicadores de descuido o maltrato, desarrollo del lenguaje, puntualidad y comportamiento; percepci??n del alumno en cuanto a adaptaci??n al centro; percepci??n de la familia en cuanto al centro escolar y al comportamiento del ni??o. Hoja de recogida de datos en el centro escolar. Cuestionario para el maestro y para el menor. Hoja de recogida de datos en visita al domicilio. Escala de apreciaci??n del hogar. Se establecen dos grupos: de control -menores con ausencias justificadas-, y de riesgo -menores con ausencias no suficientemente justificadas-. Se analizan las diferencias significativas entre ambos grupos para cada una de la variables. Se presentaron 413 casos de alumnos con 10 o m??s faltas, de los cuales 215 pertenecen al grupo de control y 190 al de riesgo. En el grupo de control las faltas se deben frecuentemente a problemas de salud y en el de riesgo en muchas ocasiones se deben a motivos socio-familiares. El perfil del alumno absentista del grupo de riesgo con respecto al de control presenta las siguientes caracter??sticas: menor rendimiento, m??s cambios de centro, menor aprecio positivo del contexto del centro y menor autoestima; el profesor observa en ??l un peor aspecto en higiene, aseo y vestimenta, resulta m??s distra??do, ap??tico, desordenado, con un aprendizaje m??s lento y un desarrollo del lenguaje m??s deficiente, menos adaptado, menos pac??fico y de un humor m??s inestable, menos alegre y comunicativo, menos puntual y hay mucho menor contacto entre su familia y el centro; sus familias suelen ser numerosas, con situaci??n de empleo altamente inestable e ingresos escasos. Los resultados de este estudio indican claramente la necesidad de una intervenci??n coordinada de los sistemas educativos y servicios sociales. Desde estos ??ltimos se hace necesario el desarrollo de un plan concreto de actuaci??n ante este problema, al que es necesario dotar de importantes recursos.

Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Organizational Capability of Local Societies in Rural Development: A Comparative Study of Microfinance Organizations in Thailand and the Philippines

The importance of organizing local people for development work is widely recognized. Both governmental and non-governmental agencies have implemented various projects that have needed and encouraged collective action by people. Often, however, such projects malfunction after the outside agencies retreat from the project site, suggesting that making organizations is not the same as making a system of making organizations. The latter is essential to make rural organizations self-reliant and sustainable. This paper assumes that such a system exists in local societies and focuses on the capacity of local societies for creating and managing organizations for development. It reveals that (1) such capability differs according to the locality, (2) the difference depends on the structure of the organizations that coordinate people's social relations, and (3) the local administrative bodies define, at least partly, the organizational capability of local societies. We compare two rural societies, one in Thailand and the other in the Philippines, which show clear contrasts in both the form of microfinance organizations and the way of making these organizations.

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Pits and quarries.

Includes index.