Some problems with a behavioristic account of early group pretense

In normal child development, both individual and group pretense first emerges at approximately two years of age. The metarepresentational account of pretense holds that children already have the concept PRETEND when they first engage in early group pretense. A behavioristic account suggests that early group pretense is analogous to early beliefs or desires and thus require no mental state concepts. I argue that a behavioral account does not explain the actual behavior observed in children and it cannot explain how children come to understand that a specific action is one of pretense versus one of belief. I conclude that a mentalistic explanation of pretense best explains the behavior under consideration.

Visceral hedonic rhetoric : exploring the design of interactive products

Blurb: This empirical study analysed consumer emotional responses towards interactive products, specifically looking at properties that persuasively induce the pursuit of pleasure at an instinctual level of cognition, now known as ‘visceral hedonic rhetoric'. By analysing three different types of interactive products results found hierarchical and inter-relatable attributes with the potential to provide a positive consumer-product relationship that is more meaningful, less disposable and more sustainable in the future.

Idealistic quantum psychopathology : a way forward?

Quantum psychopathology holds the so called “quantum mind” hypothesis, which is controversial. In addition, this hypothesis focuses attention onto quantum processes in the brain, and how this may relate to psychopathological issues. This is very “low level”. As a consequence, it is challenging to form bridges to “higher level” problems related to psychopathology. By adopting the stance used in the quantum interaction community or researchers, this reply puts forward the idea that an idealistic approach may circumvent the controversy and opens the way for addressing challenges at higher levels of psychopathology.

Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

The nonconceptual gateway to early word learning

My research investigates why nouns are learned disproportionately more frequently than other kinds of words during early language acquisition (Gentner, 1982; Gleitman, et al., 2004). This question must be considered in the context of cognitive development in general. Infants have two major streams of environmental information to make meaningful: perceptual and linguistic. Perceptual information flows in from the senses and is processed into symbolic representations by the primitive language of thought (Fodor, 1975). These symbolic representations are then linked to linguistic input to enable language comprehension and ultimately production. Yet, how exactly does perceptual information become conceptualized? Although this question is difficult, there has been progress. One way that children might have an easier job is if they have structures that simplify the data. Thus, if particular sorts of perceptual information could be separated from the mass of input, then it would be easier for children to refer to those specific things when learning words (Spelke, 1990; Pylyshyn, 2003). It would be easier still, if linguistic input was segmented in predictable ways (Gentner, 1982; Gleitman, et al., 2004) Unfortunately the frequency of patterns in lexical or grammatical input cannot explain the cross-cultural and cross-linguistic tendency to favor nouns over verbs and predicates. There are three examples of this failure: 1) a wide variety of nouns are uttered less frequently than a smaller number of verbs and yet are learnt far more easily (Gentner, 1982); 2) word order and morphological transparency offer no insight when you contrast the sentence structures and word inflections of different languages (Slobin, 1973) and 3) particular language teaching behaviors (e.g. pointing at objects and repeating names for them) have little impact on children's tendency to prefer concrete nouns in their first fifty words (Newport, et al., 1977). Although the linguistic solution appears problematic, there has been increasing evidence that the early visual system does indeed segment perceptual information in specific ways before the conscious mind begins to intervene (Pylyshyn, 2003). I argue that nouns are easier to learn because their referents directly connect with innate features of the perceptual faculty. This hypothesis stems from work done on visual indexes by Zenon Pylyshyn (2001, 2003). Pylyshyn argues that the early visual system (the architecture of the "vision module") segments perceptual data into pre-conceptual proto-objects called FINSTs. FINSTs typically correspond to physical things such as Spelke objects (Spelke, 1990). Hence, before conceptualization, visual objects are picked out by the perceptual system demonstratively, like a finger pointing indicating ‘this’ or ‘that’. I suggest that this primitive system of demonstration elaborates on Gareth Evan's (1982) theory of nonconceptual content. Nouns are learnt first because their referents attract demonstrative visual indexes. This theory also explains why infants less often name stationary objects such as plate or table, but do name things that attract the focal attention of the early visual system, i.e., small objects that move, such as ‘dog’ or ‘ball’. This view leaves open the question how blind children learn words for visible objects and why children learn category nouns (e.g. 'dog'), rather than proper nouns (e.g. 'Fido') or higher taxonomic distinctions (e.g. 'animal').

Homeostatic epistemology : reliability, coherence and coordination in a Bayesian virtue epistemology

How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of ignorance are managed in an uncertain world. Perhaps decision-making in the shadow of knowledge best explains human wellbeing—a Bayesian approach? In this dissertation I argue that a hybrid of virtue and Bayesian epistemologies explains human flourishing—what I term homeostatic epistemology. Homeostatic epistemology supposes that an agent has a rational credence p when p is the product of reliable processes aligned with the norms of probability theory; whereas an agent knows that p when a rational credence p is the product of reliable processes such that: 1) p meets some relevant threshold for belief (such that the agent acts as though p were true and indeed p is true), 2) p coheres with a satisficing set of relevant beliefs and, 3) the relevant set of beliefs is coordinated appropriately to meet the integrated aims of the agent. Homeostatic epistemology recognizes that justificatory relationships between beliefs are constantly changing to combat uncertainties and to take advantage of predictable circumstances. Contrary to holism, justification is built up and broken down across limited sets like the anabolic and catabolic processes that maintain homeostasis in the cells, organs and systems of the body. It is the coordination of choristic sets of reliably produced beliefs that create the greatest flourishing given the limitations inherent in the situated agent.

The ADHD debate and the philosophy of truth

There is ongoing and wide-ranging dispute over the proliferation of childhood behaviour disorders. In particular, the veracity of the category Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), has been the subject of considerable scepticism. With no end to the debate in sight, it will be argued here that the problem might effectively be approached, not by addressing the specific features of ADHD itself, but rather by a philosophical analysis of one of the terms around which this entire problem revolves: that is, the notion of truth. If we state: “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, what exactly do we mean? Do we mean that it is an objective fact of nature? Do we mean that it fits seamlessly with other sets of ideas and explanations? Or do we simply mean that it works as an idea in a practical sense? This paper will examine the relationship between some of the dominant models of truth, and the assertions made by those in the field of ADHD. Specifically, the paper will contrast the claim that ADHD is a real disorder, with the claim that ADHD is a product of social governance. The intention is, first, to place some significant qualifications upon the validity of the truth-claims made by ADHD advocates, and second, to re-emphasise the potential and promise of philosophical investigation in providing productive new ways of thinking about some obstinate and seemingly intractable educational problems.

Insights from ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory can underpin a philosophy of coaching

The aim of this paper is to show how principles of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory can underpin a philosophy of coaching practice in a nonlinear pedagogy. Nonlinear pedagogy is based on a view of the human movement system as a nonlinear dynamical system. We demonstrate how this perspective of the human movement system can aid understanding of skill acquisition processes and underpin practice for sports coaches. We provide a description of nonlinear pedagogy followed by a consideration of some of the fundamental principles of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory that underpin it as a coaching philosophy. We illustrate how each principle impacts on nonlinear pedagogical coaching practice, demonstrating how each principle can substantiate a framework for the coaching process.

Quantum models of cognition and decision

Much of our understanding of human thinking is based on probabilistic models. This innovative book by Jerome R. Busemeyer and Peter D. Bruza argues that, actually, the underlying mathematical structures from quantum theory provide a much better account of human thinking than traditional models. They introduce the foundations for modelling probabilistic-dynamic systems using two aspects of quantum theory. The first, "contextuality", is a way to understand interference effects found with inferences and decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The second, "entanglement", allows cognitive phenomena to be modelled in non-reductionist ways. Employing these principles drawn from quantum theory allows us to view human cognition and decision in a totally new light...

Trial by jury in civil proceedings : “convenience” and the philosophy of the UCPR

In Syddall v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited [2008] QSC 101 Daubney J ordered the action be tried without a jury. His judgment considered the circumstances in which a trial involves any technical, scientific or other issue that can not be “conveniently” considered and resolved by a jury as provided in r 474 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)

The individual and interactive relationship between long chain omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids and physical activity as predictors of cognition in cognitively impaired and non-impaired older adults

Alterations in cognitive function are characteristic of the aging process in humans and other animals. However, the nature of these age related changes in cognition is complex and is likely to be influenced by interactions between genetic predispositions and environmental factors resulting in dynamic fluctuations within and between individuals. These inter and intra-individual fluctuations are evident in both so-called normal cognitive aging and at the onset of cognitive pathology. Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), thought to be a prodromal phase of dementia, represents perhaps the final opportunity to mitigate cognitive declines that may lead to terminal conditions such as dementia. The prognosis for people with MCI is mixed with the evidence suggesting that many will remain stable within 10-years of diagnosis, many will improve, and many will transition to dementia. If the characteristics of people who do not progress to dementia from MCI can be identified and replicated in others it may be possible to reduce or delay dementia onset, thus reducing a growing personal and public health burden. Furthermore, if MCI onset can be prevented or delayed, the burden of cognitive decline in aging populations worldwide may be reduced. A cognitive domain that is sensitive to the effects of advancing age, and declines in which have been shown to presage the onset of dementia in MCI patients, is executive function. Moreover, environmental factors such as diet and physical activity have been shown to affect performance on tests of executive function. For example, improvements in executive function have been demonstrated as a result of increased aerobic and anaerobic physical activity and, although the evidence is not as strong, findings from dietary interventions suggest certain nutrients may preserve or improve executive functions in old age. These encouraging findings have been demonstrated in older adults with MCI and their non-impaired peers. However, there are some gaps in the literature that need to be addressed. For example, little is known about the effect on cognition of an interaction between diet and physical activity. Both are important contributors to health and wellbeing, and a growing body of evidence attests to their importance in mental and cognitive health in aging individuals. Yet physical activity and diet are rarely considered together in the context of cognitive function. There is also little known about potential underlying biological mechanisms that might explain the physical activity/diet/cognition relationship. The first aim of this program of research was to examine the individual and interactive role of physical activity and diet, specifically long chain polyunsaturated fatty acid consumption(LCn3) as predictors of MCI status. The second aim is to examine executive function in MCI in the context of the individual and interactive effects of physical activity and LCn3.. A third aim was to explore the role of immune and endocrine system biomarkers as possible mediators in the relationship between LCn3, physical activity and cognition. Study 1a was a cross-sectional analysis of MCI status as a function of erythrocyte proportions of an interaction between physical activity and LCn3. The marine based LCn3s eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) have both received support in the literature as having cognitive benefits, although comparisons of the relative benefits of EPA or DHA, particularly in relation to the aetiology of MCI, are rare. Furthermore, a limited amount of research has examined the cognitive benefits of physical activity in terms of MCI onset. No studies have examined the potential interactive benefits of physical activity and either EPA or DHA. Eighty-four male and female adults aged 65 to 87 years, 50 with MCI and 34 without, participated in Study 1a. A logistic binary regression was conducted with MCI status as a dependent variable, and the individual and interactive relationships between physical activity and either EPA or DHA as predictors. Physical activity was measured using a questionnaire and specific physical activity categories were weighted according to the metabolic equivalents (METs) of each activity to create a physical activity intensity index (PAI). A significant relationship was identified between MCI outcome and the interaction between the PAI and EPA; participants with a higher PAI and higher erythrocyte proportions of EPA were more likely to be classified as non-MCI than their less active peers with less EPA. Study 1b was a randomised control trial using the participants from Study 1a who were identified with MCI. Given the importance of executive function as a determinant of progression to more severe forms of cognitive impairment and dementia, Study 1b aimed to examine the individual and interactive effect of physical activity and supplementation with either EPA or DHA on executive function in a sample of older adults with MCI. Fifty male and female participants were randomly allocated to supplementation groups to receive 6-months of supplementation with EPA, or DHA, or linoleic acid (LA), a long chain polyunsaturated omega-6 fatty acid not known for its cognitive enhancing properties. Physical activity was measured using the PAI from Study 1a at baseline and follow-up. Executive function was measured using five tests thought to measure different executive function domains. Erythrocyte proportions of EPA and DHA were higher at follow-up; however, PAI was not significantly different. There was also a significant improvement in three of the five executive function tests at follow-up. However, regression analyses revealed that none of the variance in executive function at follow-up was predicted by EPA, DHA, PAI, the EPA by PAI interaction, or the DHA by PAI interaction. The absence of an effect may be due to a small sample resulting in limited power to find an effect, the lack of change in physical activity over time in terms of volume and/or intensity, or a combination of both reduced power and no change in physical activity. Study 2a was a cross-sectional study using cognitively unimpaired older adults to examine the individual and interactive effects of LCn3 and PAI on executive function. Several possible explanations for the absence of an effect were identified. From this consideration of alternative explanations it was hypothesised that post-onset interventions with LCn3 either alone or in interation with self-reported physical activity may not be beneficial in MCI. Thus executive function responses to the individual and interactive effects of physical activity and LCn3 were examined in a sample of older male and female adults without cognitive impairment (n = 50). A further aim of study 2a was to operationalise executive function using principal components analysis (PCA) of several executive function tests. This approach was used firstly as a data reduction technique to overcome the task impurity problem, and secondly to examine the executive function structure of the sample for evidence of de-differentiation. Two executive function components were identified as a result of the PCA (EF 1 and EF 2). However, EPA, DHA, the PAI, or the EPA by PAI or DHA by PAI interactions did not account for any variance in the executive function components in subsequent hierarchical multiple regressions. Study 2b was an exploratory correlational study designed to explore the possibility that immune and endocrine system biomarkers may act as mediators of the relationship between LCn3, PAI, the interaction between LCn3 and PAI, and executive functions. Insulin-like growth factor-1 (IGF-1), an endocrine system growth hormone, and interleukin-6 (IL-6) an immune system cytokine involved in the acute inflammatory response, have both been shown to affect cognition including executive functions. Moreover, IGF-1 and IL-6 have been shown to be antithetical in so far as chronically increased IL-6 has been associated with reduced IGF-1 levels, a relationship that has been linked to age related morbidity. Further, physical activity and LCn3 have been shown to modulate levels of both IGF-1 and IL-6. Thus, it is possible that the cognitive enhancing effects of LCn3, physical activity or their interaction are mediated by changes in the balance between IL-6 and IGF-1. Partial and non-parametric correlations were conducted in a subsample of participants from Study 2a (n = 13) to explore these relationships. Correlations of interest did not reach significance; however, the coefficients were quite large for several relationships suggesting studies with larger samples may be warranted. In summary, the current program of research found some evidence supporting an interaction between EPA, not DHA, and higher energy expenditure via physical activity in differentiating between older adults with and without MCI. However, a RCT examining executive function in older adults with MCI found no support for increasing EPA or DHA while maintaining current levels of energy expenditure. Furthermore, a cross-sectional study examining executive function in older adults without MCI found no support for better executive function performance as a function of increased EPA or DHA consumption, greater energy expenditure via physical activity or an interaction between physical activity and either EPA or DHA. Finally, an examination of endocrine and immune system biomarkers revealed promising relationships in terms of executive function in non-MCI older adults particularly with respect to LCn3 and physical activity. Taken together, these findings demonstrate a potential benefit of increasing physical activity and LCn3 consumption, particularly EPA, in mitigating the risk of developing MCI. In contrast, no support was found for a benefit to executive function as a result of increased physical activity, LCn3 consumption or an interaction between physical activity and LCn3, in participants with and without MCI. These results are discussed with reference to previous findings in the literature including possible limitations and opportunities for future research.

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.