Generalizations and Models in Ecology : Lawlikeness, Invariance, Stability, and Robustness

The question at issue in this dissertation is the epistemic role played by ecological generalizations and models. I investigate and analyze such properties of generalizations as lawlikeness, invariance, and stability, and I ask which of these properties are relevant in the context of scientific explanations. I will claim that there are generalizable and reliable causal explanations in ecology by generalizations, which are invariant and stable. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change called an intervention that changes the value of its variables. Whether a generalization remains invariant during its interventions is the criterion that determines whether it is explanatory. A generalization can be invariant and explanatory regardless of its lawlike status. Stability deals with a generality that has to do with holding of a generalization in possible background conditions. The more stable a generalization, the less dependent it is on background conditions to remain true. Although it is invariance rather than stability of generalizations that furnishes us with explanatory generalizations, there is an important function that stability has in this context of explanations, namely, stability furnishes us with extrapolability and reliability of scientific explanations. I also discuss non-empirical investigations of models that I call robustness and sensitivity analyses. I call sensitivity analyses investigations in which one model is studied with regard to its stability conditions by making changes and variations to the values of the model s parameters. As a general definition of robustness analyses I propose investigations of variations in modeling assumptions of different models of the same phenomenon in which the focus is on whether they produce similar or convergent results or not. Robustness and sensitivity analyses are powerful tools for studying the conditions and assumptions where models break down and they are especially powerful in pointing out reasons as to why they do this. They show which conditions or assumptions the results of models depend on. Key words: ecology, generalizations, invariance, lawlikeness, philosophy of science, robustness, explanation, models, stability

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Questions to Artificial Nature: A Philosophical Study of Interdisciplinary Models and their Functions in Scientific Practice

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.

Herakleitos, filosofia ja metafysiikka : Collin ja Heideggerin tulkintojen valossa

Tutkielmani aiheena on noin 2500 vuotta sitten Efesoksen kaupungissa eläneen Herakleitoksen ajattelu. Selvitän, mikä suhde Herakleitoksen ajattelulla on filosofiaan ja metafysiikkaan. Lähestyn tätä kysymystä pääasiassa kahden uuden ajan filosofin italialaisen Giorgio Collin (1917-1979) ja saksalaisen Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) esittämien tulkintojen pohjalta. Osoitan, että Herakleitoksen ajattelu eroaa olennaisesti Platonin ja Aristoteleen jälkeisestä filosofisesta ja metafyysisestä ajattelusta. Perusteluna tarkastelen Herakleitoksen ajattelua neljästä näkökulmasta: 1) historiallisesti filosofian syntyä edeltäneen viisauden ja uskonnollisen ajattelun edustajana, 2) loogisesti olevan käsitteeseen keskittyvästä metafysiikasta poikkeavana ajatteluna, 3) välittömän kokemuksen ajatteluna ja 4) fenomenologisena ilmiön ja kätkeytymättömyyden ajatteluna. Ensimmäinen ja kolmas näkökulma edustavat Collin tulkintaa, toinen ja neljäs näkökulma puolestaan Heideggerin tulkintaa. Tärkeimpinä lähteinäni ovat Collin teokset Filosofian synty (1975), Filosofia dell'espressione (1969) ja La sapienza greca (1977-80) sekä Heideggerin teokset Oleminen ja aika (1927), Einführung in die Metaphysik (1935/53), Aletheia (1951), Logos (1951) ja Heraklit Seminar (1966-67).

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Tuomas Akvinolaisen käsitys logiikasta : Logiikka taitona ja tieteenä, logiikan subjekti ja suhde tieteelliseen argumentaatioon

Tämän pro gradu -tutkielman tehtävänä on eksplikoida systemaattisen analyysin avulla se, mitä Tuomas Akvinolainen tarkoittaa ilmaisulla ”logiikka”. Tähän tehtävään liittyy kaksi osatehtävää: sen selvittäminen, millaisissa käsitteellisissä yhteyksissä Tuomas käyttää ilmaisua ”logiikka”, ja sen selvittäminen, miten ”logiikan” merkitys rakentuu näissä käsitteellisissä yhteyksissä. Tutkielman lähdeaineisto on laaja, koska Tuomas ei kirjoittanut yhtä teosta, jossa hän olisi esittänyt kattavasti huomautuksia siitä, mitä logiikka on. Ensimmäisessä luvussa kysyn, mitä Tuomas tarkoittaa logiikalla taitona ja tieteenä. Taidolla Tuomas tarkoittaa praktisen sielunosan intellektuaalista hyvettä, joka koskee kontingenttia tuotettavissa olevaa. Tuottaminen merkitsee operaatiota tai toimintaa, joka siirtää muodon toimijasta ulkoiseen materiaan, ja siten syntyy tuotos. Logiikka on taitona mahdollinen, koska järki voi järkeillä omasta aktistaan ja ohjata itseään. Järjen aktista syntyy tuotos, kuten laji tai syllogismi, joita käytetään tieteellisen tiedon saamiseen. Siten logiikka on vapaa taito, jonka kautta opitaan tapa, jolla tieteellistä tietoa voidaan saada. Tieteenä logiikka tarkastelee edellä mainittuja järjen aikaansaamia tuotoksia. Koska se tieteenä tarkastelee sitä, minkä ihminen voi saada aikaan, voidaan tällainen tieteellinen tieto suunnata kohti operaatiota tai tuotosta. Siksi logiikka on praktinen tiede, joka palvelee sellaisia spekulatiivisia tieteitä, jotka eivät tarkastele sitä, minkä ihminen voi saada aikaan. Toisessa ja kolmannessa luvussa kysyn, mitä Tuomas tarkoittaa tieteenä olevan logiikan subjektilla? Tieteen subjekti on se, mitä tieteessä tarkastellaan. Koska Tuomas mainitsee logiikan subjektiksi järjen olevan, tarkastelen toisessa luvussa olevan käsitettä. Olevan käsite perustuu olemassaolon käsitteelle, joka voidaan sanoa analogisesti muun muassa luonnosta, tiedosta ja Jumalasta. Oleva merkitsee sitä, mikä on. Se on analoginen sana, joka perustuu eri olemassaolon tapoihin. Koska olemassaolo voi olla esimerkiksi luonnossa ja tiedossa, on oltava mielen ulkopuolinen oleva ja mielessä oleva. Kolmannessa luvussa käsittelen järjen olevan käsitettä. Järjen oleva on yhdenlainen mielessä oleva. Mielessä olevan olemassaolon tapa on olla tosi. Jotkin mielessä olevat voivat olla olevia myös mielen ulkopuolella. Sen sijaan järjen oleva voi olla olemassa vain mielessä, minkä vuoksi se on olemassa oleva vain totena. Logiikan subjektina on järjen oleva. Logiikan tarkastelema järjen oleva on intellektuaalinen tai toinen intentio, joka perustuu ymmärrettyyn tai ensimmäiseen intentioon. Ymmärretty intentio syntyy kognitiivisen prosessin päätepisteenä intellektissä. Se on sisäinen sana, jota ulkoinen sana merkitsee. Kun intellekti refleksiivisesti tarkastelee ymmärrettyä intentiota, syntyy intellektuaalinen intentio kuten esimerkiksi suku. Logiikan tarkastelema intellektuaalinen intentio on vain järjessä oleva relaatio, joka on relaation relaatio, jonka termejä ovat käsitteet. Esimerkiksi looginen relaatio suku merkitsee intellektuaalista intentiota, joka on relaatio esimerkiksi eläimen käsitteestä ihmisen käsitteeseen. Tällaisella intellektuaalisella intentiolla on välitön suhde ymmärrettyyn intentioon, mutta välillinen suhde mielen ulkopuoliseen olevaan. Siten logiikka ei tarkastele välittömästi todellisuutta. Neljännessä luvussa kysyn, miten logiikkaan liittyvät huomautukset välittyvät tieteelliseen argumentaatioon todistavan syllogismin käsitteen kautta. Todistava syllogismi on tieteellistä tietoa aikaansaava syllogismi, jonka päämääräsyy on tieteellinen tieto, mistä seuraa, että sen premissien eli materiaalisten syiden on oltava tietynlaiset. Tieteellinen tieto koskee todistuksen johtopäätöstä, josta tiedetään sen totuuden syy, ja tämä totuuden syy on johtopäätöksen tietämisen syy. Johtopäätöksessä subjektisuvusta on predikoitu sille ominainen aksidenssi tai attribuutti. Analysoimalla suvun, erilaisuuden ja lajin käsitteitä esitän, että suvun sopiva aksidenssi on muun muassa ominaisuus tai suvun jakava erilaisuus. Siten erityisesti todistuksen johtopäätös, joka on tiedetty tieteellisesti, perustuu Porfyrioksen puun mukaisille loogisille relaatioille, ja muun muassa tässä mielessä loogiset relaatiot määrittävät tieteellistä tietoa todistavan syllogismin käsitteen kautta.

Clemens Aleksandrialaisen kristillinen filosofia Paedagogus-teoksessa

Clemens Aleksandrialainen oli sivistynyt varhaiskristillinen kirjoittaja. Tämän tutkielman päälähteenä on hänen Paedagogus-teoksensa, jota analysoimalla vastataan kysymykseen,millainen kristillisen elämän opas se on, ja mitä kirjoittaja opettaa siinä kristillisestä elämästä. Metodina on systemaattinen analyysi. Koska Clemens-tutkimuksessa on usein keskitytty hänen oletettuun pääteokseensa Stromateis, avaa Paedagogus-teoksen opetukseen tutustuminen sekä Clemensin ajattelusta että varhaiskristillisestä elämästä uusia puolia. Kirjoittajan opetusta kristillisestä käytännön elämästä (kr. praksis) on tutkittu hyvin vähän. Clemens on tärkeä varhaisen kirkon opettaja, joka kehitti ratkaisevalla tavalla ihmisen jumalallistumiseen (kr. theosis) liittyvää terminologiaa. Tutkielmassa keskitytään näiden kahden osa-alueen suhteeseen, jossa Clemensin tunneteorialla on keskeinen merkitys.

Recreações do homem sensivel, ou, collecção de exemplos verdadeiros, e patheticos, nos quaes se dá hum curso de moral pratica conforme ás maximas da sãa filosofia, e da religião, para as pessoas de todos os estados... : dedicada á serenissima Senhora Infanta D. Carlota Joaquina, com permissão de S. Alteza / traduzida do original francez de Monsieur Arnaud por Antonio de Moraes Silva

A indicação de responsabilidade aparece abreviada no v.1, mas por extenso nos demais vs.

Spinoza e a comunicação da filosofia: a natureza da linguagem na ethica

Em sua teoria do conhecimento, cuja formulação definitiva se encontra na segunda parte da Ethica, Spinoza afirma que o conhecimento que se dá por meio de signos pertence à Imaginação, isto é, ao primeiro gênero de conhecimento, o qual é essencialmente inadequado uma vez que não consegue compreender a natureza das coisas, mas simplesmente as conhece de forma mutilada e confusa. Contudo, atribuir o conhecimento ex signis ao âmbito imaginativo não pode implicar a recusa, por parte de Spinoza, de toda e qualquer utilização de signos a fim de comunicar o conhecimento verdadeiro, sob pena de o próprio texto da Ethica deslegitimar suas pretensões de verdade já no momento mesmo em que se anuncia. Partindo do princípio de que deve haver certo modo de utilização de signos que consiga contornar, em alguma medida, sua constituição essencialmente inadequada a fim de comunicar idéias adequadas, a presente investigação reconstrói uma teoria da linguagem subjacente à doutrina da Ethica na tentativa de estabelecer por que meios se pode efetuar uma utilização filosófica dos signos.

Senso comum e filosofia

Verifica-se, no correr da história da filosofia, dois sentidos próximos, mas divergentes, no emprego da expressão senso comum. Propõe-se a designação de senso comum natural para um e a de senso comum cultural para o outro, designações estas que unificam razoavelmente, dentro de suas próprias vertentes, os conceitos de senso comum e às quais corresponde algo de concreto, segundo definições estritas. A partir dessas definições, estuda-se o relacionamento entre a filosofia e o senso comum, procurando estabelecer até que ponto se trata de uma relação de antagonismo ou de dependência, na busca de um conhecimento que possa ser tido por verdadeiro.

Nietzsche, ensaio de uma pedagogia messiânica: sobre as origens e o desenvolvimento do conceito de bildung em sua primeira filosofia da cultura

Esse estudo procura investigar as origens do conceito de Bildung tal como ele é formulado no domínio dos textos que Nietzsche escreve entre 1858, época de sua formação secundária no Gymnasium, instituição de ensino neo-humanista da Alemanha do século XIX, e 1876, ano em que rompe definitivamente com Wagner, e quando parece abandonar certas expectativas a respeito de sua atividade como professor na Universidade de Basiléia, onde lecionava desde 1869. Entre esses dois limites cronológicos, é possível observar uma formulação desse conceito que sustenta o que poderíamos chamar de sua primeira filosofia da cultura, que atualiza e redimensiona uma série de tradições filosóficas, institucionais, sociais e estéticas, buscando uma unidade justamente no confronto com elas. A pesquisa que procuro empreender aqui pretende identificar os processos que derivaram nesse confronto e o tipo de tratamento sintético que Nietzsche deu aos problemas que lhe eram contemporâneos As conferências Sobre o futuro de nossos estabelecimentos de ensino, pronunciadas em Basiléia no inverno de 1872, funcionam como lugar privilegiado desse tratamento, enquanto criticam duramente a cultura e suas instituições na Alemanha da época e tentam definir as bases para o que seria o resgate da verdadeira cultura.

Ensaísmo e filosofia em Theodor W. Adorno

O estudo aborda o problema da forma de exposição do pensamento filosófico a partir da defesa da forma do ensaio na obra de Theodor W. Adorno. O que se põe em questão é o quanto a forma ensaística, em seu esforço de elaborar conceitualmente os dados da experiência particular, é capaz de dar conta da atividade filosófica - uma atividade universalista e interessada na determinação dos fundamentos últimos do real - em um momento histórico no qual não parece ser mais possível a ela erguer pretensões de sistema. Em seu desenvolvimento este trabalho se volta para a própria ensaística adorniana e procura mostrar se e em que medida ela escapa do espírito próprio dos sistemas fechados.