773 resultados para liberal ideology


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and the Australian Country Party since 1918. 2. The thesis examines the proposition that the role of a minor party is determined, not by its total strength expressed as a percentage of the national vote, but by how its strength is concentrated. Australia and Britain were chosen for the comparison because of the many similarities in political culture and in the extent of class voting. Each country has a party - the Country Party in Australia and the Liberal Party in Britain - which has had a distinct impact on the political scene in their respective countries. In the period from 1918 to the present day neither party, at the national level, has ever held the largest number of seats in parliament let alone a majority of seats, and it is in this sense that they are herein defined as minor parties. In the thesis the constitutional background of and differences between Australia and Britain are reviewed, followed by a brief historical picture of each of the two parties being studied. The sources of supporc of the two parties are analysed and it is here that real differences emerge. The Country Party in Australia is a deliberately sectional party with a narrow rural base, whereas the British Liberal Party is more broadly based than either the Labour or Conservative Parties in Britain. 3. Party leadership and organisation are then discussed. Both parties have had outstanding leaders, Earle Page and McEwen for the Country Party; Asquith, Lloyd George and Grimond for the Liberal Party. Both parties have had relatively fewer leaders than their major party opponents. However, whereas the Country Party has been free of serious splits the Liberal Party was shattered on the leadership struggles of Asquith and Lloyd George. Both parties have been identified with decentralisation of state power, the Country Party through its support, albeit sometimes lukewarm of the New States Movement; the Liberal Party through its espousal of a federal system for Britain with separate Welsh, Scottish and regional assemblies. Unfortunately for the British Liberal Party the beneficiaries of their policies in this area have been relatively new nationalist parties in both Wales arid Scotland. The major part of the thesis is devoted to a study of how the electoral systems in the two countries have, in practice, worked to the advantage or disadvantage of the Country Party and the British Liberal Party. The Country Party has been as consistently over-represented in the House of Representatives as the Liberal Party has been under-represented in the British House of Commons. With the even distribution of its support the introduction of the single transferable vote, in itself, would bring little benefit to the British Liberal Party in terms of seats. Multimember urban constituencies combined with some type of list system are the only way the Liberals are likely to obtain House of Commons seats in proportion to their votes. 4. Finally, the relations of the two minor parties with their respective major parties are considered. In the conclusion the future of the two parties is reviewed. In general terms it appears that the Country Party is faced with a slow decline. Although the British Liberal Party made a major breakthrough, in terms of votes, in the February 1974 election, they were unable to maintain this momentum in the October election, even though they lost very little ground. In the long term they must make an inroad into Labour held seats if they are to progress further.

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UANL

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UANL

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UANL

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UANL

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This is the audio recording of all discussion sessions of the International Conference on the Re-evaluation of Liberal Neutrality organized by CRÉUM, Montreal May 1-3 2008. (The conference announcement is at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765) // Ceci est l'enregistrement audio des périodes de discussion du colloque organisé par le CRÉUM (Montréal, 1-3 mai 2008) et portant sur une ré-évaluation de la neutralité libérale. (L'annonce du colloque est à l'adresse http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765)

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"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. Droit Dans le cadre du programme de Maîtrise en droit(LL.M.) 2-325-1-0 en option recherche et droit des affaires"

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Dossier : Should Polygamy be Recognized in Canada ? Ethical and Legal Considerations

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In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non-dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper I articulate two different conceptions of what it is to share a reason; I call these conceptions “foundationalist” and “constructivist.” On the foundationalist view, two people “share” a reason just in the sense that the same reason applies to each of them independently. On this view, I argue, debates about the reasons we share collapse into debates about the reasons we have, moving us no closer to an adequate defense of neutrality. On the constructivist view, by contrast, “sharing reasons” is understood as a kind of activity, and the reasons we must share are just those reasons that make this activity possible. I argue that the constructivist conception of sharing reasons yields a better defense of the principle of neutrality.

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My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

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One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionistlaws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are publicinstitutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies.